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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effectiveness of Central Bank Interventions in the Foreign Exchange 
Market 
By 
Dave Seerattan 
 
The global foreign exchange market is the largest financial market with turnover in this 
market often outstripping the GDP of countries in which they are located. The dynamics 
in the foreign exchange market, especially price dynamics, have huge implications for 
financial asset values, financial returns and volatility in the international financial 
system. It is therefore an important area of study.  Exchange rates have often departed 
significantly from the level implied by fundamentals and exhibit excessive volatility. 
This reality creates a role for central bank intervention in this market to keep the rate in 
line with economic fundamentals and the overall policy mix, to stabilize market 
expectations and to calm disorderly markets.  
 
Studies that attempt to measure the effectiveness of intervention in the foreign exchange 
market in terms of exchange rate trends and volatility have had mixed results.  This, in 
many cases, reflects the unavailability of data and the weaknesses in the empirical 
frameworks used to measure effectiveness. This thesis utilises the most recent data 
available and some of the latest methodological advances to measure the effectiveness 
of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange markets of a variety of countries.  It 
therefore makes a contribution in the area of applied empirical methodologies for the 
measurement of the dynamics of intervention in the foreign exchange market.  It 
demonstrates that by using high frequency data and more robust and appropriate 
empirical methodologies central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market can 
be effective.  Moreover, a framework that takes account of the interactions between 
different central bank policy instruments and price dynamics, the reaction function of 
the central bank, different states of the market, liquidity in the market and the 
profitability of the central bank can improve the effectiveness of measuring the impact 
of central bank policy in the foreign exchange market and provide useful information to 
policy makers.     
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CHAPTER 1 
 THE THEORY AND RATIONALE FOR CENTRAL 
BANK INTERVENTION IN THE FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE MARKET 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
 The global foreign exchange market is the largest financial market with turnover 
in these markets outstripping the GDP of countries in which they are located. The 
dynamics in foreign exchange markets, especially price dynamics, have huge 
implications for financial asset values, financial returns and volatility in the 
international financial system. It is therefore an important area of study.  Exchange rates 
have often departed significantly from the level implied by fundamentals and exhibit 
excessive volatility. This reality creates a role for central bank intervention in this 
market to keep the rate in line with economic fundamentals and the overall policy mix, 
to stabilize market expectations and to calm disorderly markets. 
 
 Studies that attempt to measure the effectiveness of intervention in the foreign 
exchange market in terms of exchange rate trends and volatility have had mixed results.  
This in many cases reflect the unavailability of data and the weaknesses in the empirical 
frameworks used to measure effectiveness. This thesis utilises the most recent data 
available and some of the latest methodological advances to measure the effectiveness 
of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange markets of a variety of countries.  It 
therefore makes a contribution in the area of applied empirical methodologies for the 
measurement of the dynamics of intervention in the foreign exchange market.  It 
demonstrates that central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market can be 
effective when high frequency data and more robust and appropriate empirical 
methodologies are used.  Moreover, a framework that takes account of the interactions 
between different central bank policy instruments and price dynamics, the reaction 
function of the central bank, different states of the market, liquidity in the market and 
the profitability of the central bank can improve the effectiveness of measuring the 
impact of central bank policy in the foreign exchange market and provide useful 
information to policy makers. 
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1.1 The Global Foreign Exchange Market 
 
 The most recent Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and 
Derivative Market Activity published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
estimates that the daily global foreign exchange market turnover had grown to USD 4.0 
trillion by April 2010.  This represents a 20% increase over the global turnover 
estimated in 2007 but much smaller than the 72% increase registered between 2004 and 
2007.  The most recent growth performance it must be noted took place during the 
period of the international financial crisis and the continuing turmoil in European 
sovereign bond markets.  This continuing growth is therefore testament to the 
importance and resilience of this market. 
 
 The growth in foreign exchange turnover has been driven by the fact that it 
presents attractive returns relative to bonds and equities to leveraged short-term 
investors such as investors in the carry trade who exploits interest rate differentials 
across currencies, as well as to longer-term investors such as pension funds looking to 
diversify their portfolios. The growth of online trading platforms has also opened 
foreign exchange trading to retail investors by lowering transactions costs.  The 
increasing international diversification of investors' portfolios combined with the 
availability of instruments to hedge foreign exchange risks meant that currency 
exposure had to be managed more actively which resulted in increased trading by more 
counterparties and therefore greater turnover in the market.  The increasing importance 
of algorithmic trading driven by developments in electronic trading platforms which 
tried to exploit high frequency movements in exchange rates also led to increased 
turnover relative to the size of investors' positions.     
 
 Important trends in these markets which impact on price and liquidity dynamics 
include the increasing importance of the derivatives market, particularly foreign 
exchange swaps, increased trading between dealers and other financial institutions and 
the corresponding decline in inter-dealer trading, the increasing presence of emerging 
market currencies in global foreign exchange trading and the growth and subsequent 
reversal of the carry trade (Galati and Heath, 2007).  The net effect of these changes is 
the growing heterogeneity of agents in foreign exchange markets in developed and 
emerging economies, the increasing need of central banks to take account of foreign 
interest rate when setting domestic rates and increasing volatility in foreign exchange 
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markets driven by international shocks.  All these trends have implications for the way 
in which central banks implement policy in the foreign exchange market generally 
making central banks' remit to promote financial stability more difficult. 
 
 The growth between 2007 and 2010 was driven by other financial institutions 
such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds and central 
banks as these institutions accounted for 85% of the growth in the global foreign 
exchange market.  This category of agents for the first time surpassed dealers and inter-
dealers.  This development reflects greater activity by high frequency traders, more 
trading by smaller banks and the increasing significance of retail investors to global 
turnover (King and Rime, 2010).  There is therefore a growing heterogeniety of agents 
in the market but trading is still concentrated in the large dealers because they invest 
heavily in their trading systems which allow them to guarantee liquidity and smaller 
bid-ask spreads.  In this context, smaller banks are becoming clients for these larger 
dealers in major currencies but contributing to the trade in domestic currencies by being 
the market maker.  This strategy allows smaller banks to profit from their local expertise 
without having to compete in spot markets for major currencies, a role which they are 
not well resourced to perform.   
 
 Additionally, although global turnover in the foreign exchange market increased 
by 20% overall between 2007 and 2010, there is evidence
1
 that liquidity in the market 
dropped sharply and hit a low point close to the end of the second quarter of 2009, only 
recovering to the 2008 levels in 2010.  Daily average global turnover in the foreign 
exchange market may therefore have reached its peak in 2008 following the failure of 
Lehman Brothers.  During the period of the crisis, many investors turned to the spot 
foreign exchange market to hedge risks which would have generated greater volatility in 
foreign exchange market turnover and increased the challenges central bank faced to 
promote stability in these markets.  The increased volatility and risk aversion in foreign 
exchange markets led to a rapid reversal of carry trade positions and the accumulation 
of large losses by investors.  These developments underlined the fact that volumes and 
price dynamics in foreign exchange markets are strongly correlated.   
 
 The financial crisis demonstrated once again that this market was an important 
channel through which financial crises can be propagated. These developments attracted 
                                                 
1
  From the Barclay Foreign Exchange Liquidity Index. 
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the increased attention of central banks which resulted in a tighter regulatory framework 
and increasing activism by central banks in this market through the provision of 
liquidity and more frequent policy interventions.  At the same time, market makers in 
the foreign exchange market are now relying increasingly on central bank windows 
instead of swaps, seemingly accepting this greater role for central banks in the market.  
The study of the effectiveness of central bank policy initiatives in this market is 
therefore worthy of increased attention and study.      
 
1.2 The Literature on Central Bank Interventions in the  
Foreign Exchange Market 
 
 Most central bank operating flexible exchange rate regimes have intervened in 
the markets but over time there has been a growing pessimism about the effectiveness of 
intervention, especially in developed market economies (Schwartz, 2000).  The results 
of empirical studies on the effectiveness of intervention in the 1980s and 1990s, done 
almost exclusively on developed markets, indicated that there was mixed evidence that 
intervention can affect the level and variance of exchange rate returns (Edison, 1993; 
Sarno and Taylor, 2001). In the case of developing countries, there is less pessimism 
since in these markets the intervention volumes are larger relative to total turnover in 
the market.  Additionally, a variety of regulations restricts the size of the market and 
helps to give the central bank leverage.  The central bank also has an information 
advantage in the market due to reporting requirements.  In spite of this, based on a 
review by Disyatat and Galati (2007), it is still unclear whether intervention in emerging 
and transition countries is more effective than in developed countries.  
 
1.2.1 Intervention Channels 
 
 The literature on the effectiveness of central bank intervention in the foreign 
exchange market
2
 generally focuses on the channels through which intervention impact 
on exchange rate dynamics and on the empirical methodologies used to measure the 
impact of intervention.  Theoretically, interventions in the foreign exchange market 
(usually sterilized)
3
 can affect the exchange rate through a variety of channels that are 
                                                 
2
  See Edison (1993), Sarno and Taylor (2001), Neely (2005) and Vitale (2007) for useful reviews of the 
Literature focusing on intervention channels and estimation techniques. 
3
  There is consensus that unsterilized intervention can affect exchange rate dynamics because it changes 
the money base and interest rates which reinforce the impact of the original intervention on exchange 
rates.  
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not mutually exclusive. These include the signaling, portfolio balance channel and 
market microstructure channels, all of which are based on their respective models of 
exchange rate determination
4
.   
 
The Signaling Channel 
 
 In terms of the literature on intervention channels, the signaling channel works 
by signaling to market participants the future stance of monetary policy, shifting their 
expectations about future monetary policy leading to a change in present exchange rate 
dynamics.  This holds even if interventions are sterilized (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993 
a and b; Kaminsky and Lewis, 1995).  In this framework the exchange rate is treated as 
an asset price which is determined by the money supply.  The intervention of the central 
bank works by moving market participants’ expectations of what future monetary 
conditions are likely to be closer to the central banks expectations, even if the 
intervention is sterilized.  This channel can only work effectively if the central bank has 
policy credibility since the lack of credibility may increase the likelihood of speculative 
attacks against the currency where market participants speculate against the defensive 
(usually) interventions of the central bank  (Sarno and Taylor, 2001).  The fact that this 
channel works by changing perceptions means that it can only be effective if it is well 
publicized to strengthen the central bank’s policy signal.   
 
 In developing countries where central banks’ credibility may be weak, this 
channel may not be as effective as in developed market economies where the central 
bank has a long history of prudent macroeconomic management.  As such, the 
magnitude of the interventions by central banks in these jurisdictions may have to be 
larger to have an impact.  In other words, they would have to “buy credibility” for their 
signal of future monetary policy stance to be as effective as in a developed market 
context (Mussa 1981).   
 
 On the other hand, central banks in developing countries enjoy certain benefits 
relative to their developed market counterparts such as information advantages over the 
market and the ability to intervene with larger amounts relative to the market given the 
size of turnover in these markets (Canales-Kriljenko, Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2003).  
                                                 
4
  See Mussa (1981), Taylor (1995) and Lyons (2001) for outlines of the signaling, portfolio balance and 
microstructure approaches to exchange rates respectively.  
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These factors may therefore give central banks in some developing countries an 
advantage over even some of their developed market counterparts in the use of the 
signaling channel, particularly where the size of the intervention amount is relative to 
the overall market is large given the small size of the market. The net effect of these 
structural factors on the effectiveness of the signaling channel can only be resolved by 
empirical measurement.  
 
The Portfolio Balance Channel 
 
 Under the portfolio balance channel, intervention work by generating 
rebalancing in terms of the currency composition of market participants’ portfolios 
which generates changes in the exchange rate. This is based on the portfolio balance 
model of exchange rate determination (Sarno and Taylor, 2001).  The key assumptions 
of this framework are that domestic and foreign-currency denominated financial assets 
are imperfect substitutes and that investors are risk-averse (Edison, 1993; Dominquez 
and Frankel, 1993b).  Agents therefore demand a higher return on the asset whose 
outstanding stocks has increased to equalize risk-adjusted returns.  Foreign exchange 
market interventions alter agents’ relative supply of foreign and local securities and 
force rebalancing which generates changes in the exchange rate.  In the case of un-
sterilized interventions, the corresponding contraction in the monetary base reinforces 
the impact of the intervention.  The portfolio balance channel is thought to be more 
effective in developing countries where central bank credibility may be weak, where 
domestic and foreign currency debt are imperfect substitutes and where the central bank 
interventions are large relative to market turnover
5
 (Canales-Kriljenko, Guimaraes and 
Karacadag, 2003; Galati and Melick, 2002).     
 
The Microstructure Channel 
 
 The microstructure approach to foreign exchange markets focus on order flow
6
, 
information asymmetries, trading mechanisms, liquidity and the price discovery 
process.  Central bank intervention works in this framework by emitting information to 
                                                 
5
  The converse is of course true in developed market economies where the volume of market turnover 
has been growing rapidly restricting the scope for intervention on the scale that would have an impact on 
the rate. 
6
  Order flow is transaction volumes that are signed.  That is if you are the active initiator of a sell order 
this takes on a negative sign while the active initiator of a buy order takes on a positive sign.  Markets 
with a negative sign and a positive sign indicate net selling and buying pressure respectively.     
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the market which modifies expectations and generates huge order flows which change 
exchange rate dynamics (Evens and Lyons, 2002).  Intervention induced order flows 
may also increase volatility but this is dependent on whether the market is tranquil or 
volatile, which in turn depends on the amount of liquidity traders relative to informed 
traders in the market. Central bank intervention is a special form of order flow that 
causes agents to change their expectations on the future part of the exchange rate and 
net open positions which generates a cascade of order flows.  
 
 The relationship between volume and volatility in the microstructure setting is 
driven by agent heterogeneity and asymmetric information where informed traders gain 
at the expense of uninformed traders or customers who trade to eliminate exposure, 
especially when new information flows into the market.  This is related to the mixture of 
distributions hypothesis (MDH) outlined by Easley and O’Hara (1992).  In this 
framework, volume and volatility in prices are related because both aggregates are 
driven by common dynamics as new information comes into the market during normal 
(liquidity trading) periods (Frankel and Froot, 1990; Tauchen and Pitts, 1983), however, 
during periods of market turmoil liquidity traders withdraw from the market and there is 
a negative relationship (Galati, 2000).   
 
 This implies that there are two types of regimes or market conditions in which 
central bank can intervene, a liquidity trading regime where most liquidity traders are 
involved and where the mean and variance of the exchange rate returns are relatively 
small and, an informed trading regime where many liquidity traders leave the market 
and where the mean and variance of exchange rate returns are relatively large.  If the 
market is in the former regime, central bank interventions would tend to increase 
volatility, as there is a positive relationship between volume and volatility in this 
regime.  If the market is in the informed trading state, central bank interventions will 
tend to reduce volatility, since there is a negative relationship between volume and 
volatility in this regime.  
 
Evidence on Intervention Channels 
 
 In terms of the actual evidence on the various channels through which 
intervention affects the exchange rate, empirical studies have found mixed evidence for 
the portfolio balance and signaling channels.  Under the signaling channel, Dominguez 
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and Frankel (1993a) estimated the impact of intervention on current and future 
exchange rate (using survey data) and found that intervention had a significant impact 
on expectations, especially if interventions were publicized.  In terms of the portfolio 
balance effect, Obstfeld (1990) finds that the portfolio balance effects are significant but 
small.  As a matter of fact, the evidence on the portfolio balance effect was until 
recently that this channel was of limited use in intervention (Edison, 1993).  The 
exception to this was Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) who found a significant and large 
portfolio effect using survey data to measure exchange rate expectations and risk 
premiums.  
 
 Recent research that uses the framework of market microstructure and order 
flow (Evens and Lyons, 2002) found that intervention had a significant impact on 
exchange rates (US$/DM and US$/yen) through the portfolio balance channel, with a 
one billion US$ intervention having an immediate 0.44 percent impact on the exchange 
rate with a permanent impact at 0.35 percent.  Dominguez (1999) utilizes an event study 
approach with intra-daily data to capture microstructure elements in a model of central 
bank intervention in the foreign exchange market.  The results indicate that intervention 
has a significant impact on both the US$/DM and US$/yen rates.  The results of this 
study also indicated that the effectiveness of central bank interventions depends on the 
state of the market at the time the central bank intervention becomes known in the 
market. The microstructure of the foreign exchange market could therefore play a 
significant role in determining the effectiveness of the central bank’s intervention in this 
market. 
 
1.2.2 The Empirical Methodology for Measuring of the Effectiveness of Central 
Bank  Intervention 
 
 In terms of the literature on empirical approaches to measuring the impact of 
intervention, a range of methodological approaches has been used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of intervention in the foreign exchange market over the years.  Excellent 
reviews are available in Edison (1993) for studies done in the 1980s, Sarno and Taylor 
(2001) for studies done in the 1990s and Cavusoglu (2010) for studies done in the 
2000s.   
 
 The main methodological approaches include OLS regression of mean, risk 
premium and order flow equations (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993 a and b; Evans and 
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Lyons, 2002), event studies of intervention episodes (Fatum, 2000; Fatum and 
Hutchison, 2003; Hutchison, 2003), unified approaches to monetary policy and foreign 
exchange market intervention using structural vector autoregression (VAR) 
methodology (kim, 2003), a simulated general method of moments (GMM) approach 
using an exogenous shift in intervention policy as an identifying assumption (Kearns 
and Rigobon, 2005), the GARCH framework (Dominguez, 1998; Murray et al., 1997; 
Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2004) and multivariate GARCH approach (Kim and Sheen, 
2006) for evaluating the impact of intervention on the level, as well as the volatility of 
the exchange rate.  Most of these models implicitly assume a linear relationship between 
intervention and the mean and variance of exchange rate returns, which may not be 
relevant or appropriate in many cases. Indeed, many studies have argued that exchange 
rate behaviour generally evolve in a non-linear way (Sarno and Taylor, 2001).   
 
 Many non-linear exchange rate models have emerged geared to better capture 
the data generating process in exchange rates.  These include smooth transition 
autoregressive models (Sarantis, 1999), non-parametric procedures (Diebold and Nason, 
1990; Meese and Rose, 1990), chaos models (Hsieh, 1991) and Markov switching 
models (Engle and Hamilton, 1990; Filardo, 1994; Diebold et. al., 1994).  These non-
linear approaches generally fit the data well within the sample but do not always 
produce better out-of-sample forecasts relative to linear models. In particular, Diebold 
and Nason (1990) and Hsieh (1991) have used non-parametric models to estimate 
exchange rate returns and found that their out-of-sample forecasts were worst than the 
linear random walk model.   
 
 These studies with the exception of the VAR and the simulated GMM 
approaches all suffer from simultaneity problems, that is, the regression of exchange 
rate over intervention fails to separate the degree to which intervention responds to 
exchange rates rather than exchange rates responding to intervention.  Attempts to 
overcome the simultaneity problem have included using lagged values of intervention, 
using the VAR framework (Neely, 2005; Kim, 2003) and simulated GMM (Kearns and 
Rigobon, 2005).   
 
 All approaches to dealing with this problem have their weaknesses.  The 
problem with the VAR approach is the validity of the identifying restrictions used to 
identify structural shocks.  In the case of the instrumental variables approach, finding 
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appropriate instruments, that is, those that are correlated with intervention but 
uncorrelated with exchange rate returns, is very difficult.  The use of lagged values of 
intervention is also problematic since one cannot estimate the impact of 
contemporaneous intervention (Neely, 2005). Finally, the simulated GMM approach is 
very promising but the validity of the assumption that the policy shift is exogenous and 
therefore a valid identifying assumption is also questionable and also very specific to 
particular markets where such policy shifts occurred.  
 
 In spite of potential simultaneity problems regime switching models such as, the 
Markov switching (MS) and smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) models have 
become very popular in studying exchange rate dynamics.  In STAR models the 
transition between regimes is assumed to be smooth while MS models allow for the 
transition to be sharp. MS models are therefore better able to capture sharp and discrete 
changes in the data generating process, with the change in regime a random variable 
which has to be derived from the data.  Countries that experience crises or abrupt 
changes in government policy can expect the speed of transition to be faster than that 
implied by the STAR model.  In this sort of scenario the MS model would be better able 
to capture the dynamics of the data and produce more accurate forecasts (Caporale and 
Spagnolo, 2004).         
 
 In this regard, recent studies have adopted time varying Markov switching 
models to assess the impact of intervention on exchange rate dynamics.  This model 
allows the probability of switching from one regime to the next to be dependent on an 
exogenous variable, with actual intervention or some proxy as the exogenous variable 
determining switches between regimes (Beine et al. 2003; Taylor 2004).  These studies 
have been able to explain the general finding of most studies using the GARCH 
framework that volatility tended to increase after intervention.  They did this by 
showing that intervention could increase volatility if it was done in a low volatility 
regime. However, intervention was also found to decrease volatility if the market was in 
a high volatility state
7
. The fact that single regime models found increased volatility was 
attributed to the fact that low volatility conditions (tranquil regime) usually 
predominates in markets and as such single regime estimates (which are really an 
                                                 
7
  Increased volatility in this case is defined a high probability of moving from the tranquil to the volatile 
regime, with decreased volatility defined as a high probability of moving from the volatile to the tranquil 
regime. 
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average of the low and high volatility regimes) would be biased in favour of the low 
regime outcome (increased volatility). 
 
1.3 Summary 
 
 Developments in foreign exchange markets indicate that turnover in these 
markets is likely to continue growing not only in developed markets but also in 
emerging markets.  These markets are also becoming more complicated with increasing 
heterogeneity among agents in these markets and with the greater integration of national 
and regional markets into the international economic and financial system.  These 
developments have invariably increased the volatility of prices and volumes in foreign 
exchange markets and created greater challenges for central bank to maintain the 
stability of these markets.  The recent 2008-2009 international financial crisis also 
highlighted that these markets are often the primary channels for financial contagion 
which motivated closer oversight of these markets by central banks in terms of tighter 
regulations to limit overly risky behaviour.  The recent crisis has also shown that direct 
intervention in the foreign exchange market can limit the negative impact of shocks on 
exchange rate and liquidity dynamics and could therefore be a vital tool in the arsenal of 
the central bank when confronted with unstable market conditions and extreme risk 
aversion.     
 
 The review of the literature has also shown that there is room for improvement 
in terms of the empirical methodologies for measuring the effectiveness of central bank 
policy initiatives in the foreign exchange market. In many cases, the results of empirical 
studies on the effectiveness of central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market 
were either ambiguous or perverse because of the use of inappropriate or deficient 
empirical methodologies.  Indeed, many recent studies (Kim and Sheen, 2006; Kearns 
and Rigobon, 2005) have shown that central bank interventions in the foreign exchange 
market were effective once an appropriate methodology was used.  There is much scope 
therefore to improve our understanding of the impact of central bank policies in foreign 
exchange markets by using more appropriate and comprehensive empirical frameworks 
for studies in this area.   
 
 This is particularly relevant in the context of the recent crisis since improved 
knowledge in this area is critical to attempts by policy makers, who in all likelihood, 
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will have to intervene more frequently both in developed and emerging market 
economies, to promote more stable dynamics in this very important market.  The 
increasing availability of high frequency data on central bank interventions especially in 
emerging markets where central banks may have more leverage because of their size 
relative to the market also facilitates the use of these more appropriate empirical 
methodologies.  The importance of accounting for different policy and market regimes, 
as well as the inherent inter-connectedness and endogeneity of policy instruments and 
market conditions to the effectiveness of central bank policy was also highlighted. The 
review of the literature also captured the need to use methodologies that accommodated 
the non-linear nature of exchange rates and volume in foreign exchange markets and to 
capture the impact of policies not only on levels but also at the levels of variances.  
 
 In this context, this thesis utilises the most recent data available and some of the 
latest empirical methodological advances such as fixed transition and time varying 
Markov switching models, as well as multivariate GARCH models to measure the 
effectiveness of central bank policy intervention in the foreign exchange markets of a 
variety of developed and emerging economies. It therefore makes a contribution in the 
area of applied empirical methodologies for the measurement of the dynamics of 
intervention in the foreign exchange market.  It demonstrates that central bank policy 
interventions in the foreign exchange market can be effective if high frequency data 
broken down into different policy and market condition regimes are used together with 
more robust and appropriate empirical methodologies to better capture the complex 
dynamics in foreign exchange markets. 
 
In particular, Chapter 2 investigated the impact of direct central bank 
intervention on the mean and variance of exchange rate returns in the foreign exchange 
markets for three developing markets, namely Croatia, Iceland and Jamaica and one 
developed market, Australia, for comparative purposes. Following Hamilton (1994) we 
assume exchange rate dynamics are captured by a first-order Markov switching fixed 
transition probability (FTP) model where there are two regimes, one in which the 
market is characterized by stable conditions (liquidity trading state) with a relatively 
small mean and variance and another characterized by volatility (informed trading state) 
with relatively higher mean and variance.  We then extend this fixed transition model to 
a time varying transition (TVTP) model by making the probability of switching from 
one regime to the next depend on exogenous variables, in this case central bank 
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interventions (Filardo, 1994; Diebold et al., 1994). We also innovate on previous studies 
using the Markov switching framework by including a policy interest rate as a control in 
the TVTP specification for monetary policy measures implemented around the same 
time as direct interventions and which can affect exchange rate dynamics. Additionally, 
we look at the impact of intervention sales and purchases separately in our analysis, 
since in many regards they are different policy instruments.  We also compare the 
intervention dynamics in developing countries with that of a developed market.   
 
The results show that there are two market conditions regimes, each 
characterized mainly by their variances. We find that direct intervention does have an 
impact on the probability of switching between regimes in the developed market but 
having little or no effect in the developing markets reviewed. Direct intervention in the 
developed market is generally found to be stabilizing when implemented in the volatile 
regime but de-stabilizing when implemented in the tranquil regime.  We also find that 
intervention purchases and sales tend to have differential impacts since they are 
generally used to achieve different objectives. Monetary policy is also found to impact 
on the transition probabilities and this instrument tends to overshadow direct 
intervention in the developing countries under review.  Contrary to the predominant 
view therefore, Australia, a developed market, had more success using direct 
intervention relative to the developing countries surveyed.  The reason for this apparent 
anomaly seems to be that actual intervention practices such as having more frequent 
interventions and full and immediate sterilization of direct interventions to preserve its 
status as an independent policy instrument ensured its continued effectiveness in the 
foreign exchange market.   
 
In Chapter 3 we examined the links between direct intervention, interest rate 
policy and exchange rate dynamics in Australia and Japan in a joint trivariate VAR-
GARCH (1,1) framework using the BEKK parameterization. We study the Australian 
and Japanese foreign exchange markets to evaluate these issues since they are the 
largest developed markets in which central banks have intervened directly in the last 
decade.  Their experiences with direct intervention and interest rate policy initiatives in 
the foreign exchange market are therefore among the few on which we can gauge how 
effective these policy instruments are likely to be in other developed markets.   
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The study confirmed that the relationship of intervention to policy interest rates 
could generally be characterized by the “signaling” framework, in that direct 
interventions and interest rate policy were coordinated and consistent so that 
intervention sales of foreign exchange were usually backed up by subsequent increases 
in interest rates to reinforce the impact of the initial direct intervention.  The results also 
confirmed the results of many past studies that intervention is effective in Australia and 
Japan in the sense that it tends to move the level of exchange rate changes in the desired 
direction.  The study also confirmed that central banks generally intervened to “lean 
against the wind”.  
 
The results from the variance equations also showed that shocks to these policy 
instruments were not associated with increased exchange rate volatility in the short 
term.  Indeed, quite to the contrary it showed that these policy instruments were 
generally successful in reducing exchange rate volatility in both countries, although 
Australia appeared to have greater success with direct intervention while Japan had 
more success with interest rate policy changes.  Another noteworthy new insight from 
the results is that the lack of significant spillovers from exchange rate volatility to the 
volatility of direct intervention and interest rate changes also suggest that in both 
Australia and Japan the authorities was more concerned with countering undesirable 
trends in the exchange rate rather that dealing with excessive volatility. Finally, the 
evidence from the conditional correlations suggests that the links between the policy 
instruments were in large part due to the fact that both were driven by common factors.  
In particular, both generally responded to exchange rate changes in the context of 
leaning against undesirable exchange rate trends. Additionally, this relationship was 
most clearly defined when the market was highly unstable and therefore the objective of 
policy interventions was very clear to agents in the market. 
 
Chapter 4 examined whether volume dynamics have a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of central bank policy instruments in the Icelandic foreign exchange 
market in a four variable (exchange rate returns, foreign exchange volume, direct 
intervention and policy interest rates) VAR GARCH framework.  Moreover, given that 
there appears to be distinct policy and market conditions regimes over the full period of 
the study, the VAR-GARCH model is estimated for periods covered by a first period 
characterised by a crawling peg type exchange rate regime, an inflation targeting regime 
which was further divided into two sub-samples one characterised by exchange rate 
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appreciation and the other in which exchange rate depreciation predominated and a last 
period characterised by capital controls and the dominance of the central bank as market 
maker and the primary provider of liquidity to the foreign exchange market.   
 
The results validate the importance of trading volume, especially unexpected 
volumes, in both triggering policy responses and in terms of its role in the transmission 
of policy response to the market. The separating out of the full period into sub-samples 
characterised by distinct policy and market conditions regimes was also validated as the 
effectiveness of policy instruments, the relationship between important market 
parameters and the transmission of volatility were in many cases different in the various 
sub-samples, validating the regime dependent approach taken in chapter 2.  The results 
indicate that unexpected volumes have a significant impact on the exchange rate, both at 
levels and variance.  Furthermore, the central bank takes unexpected volumes into 
account in its decisions not only to intervene but in crafting the nature of the 
intervention as well.  The central bank was also able to control the dynamics of 
unexpected volumes with its direct intervention activities, as well as with policy interest 
rate changes.  
 
These results demonstrate that the volume dynamics was important in Iceland 
over the period being studied particularly in the lead up to the crisis in 2008 and in its 
aftermath.  This adds to the evidence provided by Kim and Sheen (2006) of the 
importance of volume to the effectiveness of policy instruments in and the functioning 
of the foreign exchange market.  This suggests that volume dynamics are important 
irrespective of the size and sophistication of the market and that studies that attempt to 
measure the impact of central bank policy interventions in the foreign exchange market 
without incorporating volume dynamics are fundamentally flawed. 
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CHAPTER 2  
CENTRAL BANK INTERVENTION AND  
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS8 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Foreign exchange market dynamics, especially pricing, are supposed to reflect 
underlying supply and demand conditions in flexible regimes with capital mobility or, 
put another way, they should reflect macroeconomic fundamentals in the long term 
(Rogoff, 1996).  The evidence has been, however, that exchange rates, in developing 
countries and markets
9
 in particular, can depart significantly from the level implied by 
fundamentals and exhibit excessive volatility in the short term (Sarno and Taylor, 
2001). This reality creates a role for central bank intervention in foreign exchange 
markets to keep the rate in line with the economic environment and to stabilize market 
expectations.  Exchange rate stability is still a major policy objective especially in 
developing markets given that the pass-through from exchange rate movements to 
inflation is higher in these markets compared to developed economies (Calvo and 
Reinhart 2002).     
 
In spite of this, relatively few studies focused on developing markets.  Disyatat 
and Galati (2007) provide a comprehensive review of studies on the effectiveness of 
intervention in developing and transition economies and find mixed evidence. Reviews 
of empirical studies, done almost exclusively on developed markets in the 1980s and 
1990s, also produce mixed evidence that intervention affects exchange rate in mean and 
variance (Edison, 1993; Sarno and Taylor, 2001). To our knowledge no study has 
compared the intervention dynamics in developing and developed markets in an attempt 
to determine the factors that may affect the relative effectiveness of intervention in these 
two types of markets. Previous studies all suffer from a variety of methodological and 
                                                 
8
    A condensed version of this chapter has been published in Applied Financial Economics (See 
Seerattan and Spagnolo, 2009). 
9
  Developing countries and developing markets may be used interchangeably in the paper in reference to 
foreign exchange markets.  This is so even though some countries referred to as developing markets may 
actually be classified as developed countries but the fundamental characteristic in relation to this study is 
the level of development of their foreign exchange market.  For instance, two countries considered in this 
study, namely Croatia and Iceland, are classified as upper middle income (or transition) and high income 
respectively by the World Bank. However, their foreign exchange markets are developing considering the 
small turnover in the market and the relatively low level of integration in the international currency 
markets. 
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data shortcomings which include insufficient high frequencies data, simultaneity bias 
and the dependence on linear empirical frameworks that were unsuited to capture the 
complexities of the causality dynamics. The use of linear frameworks, in particular, 
could not adequately measure the impact of intervention in different market 
conditions
10
.   
 
This chapter, using a Markov switching framework, proposes an alternative way 
of measuring the impact of direct central bank intervention on exchange rate dynamics.  
The exchange rate process is allowed to switch between two distributions, one 
corresponding to a relatively stable period and the other to a more volatile period.  The 
advantage of such an approach is that it separates periods of low from periods of high 
volatility allowing the probabilistic structure of the transition from one regime to the 
next to be function of interventions.  The causality effect we are interested in is not 
constrained to be symmetric in the parameterization (intervention affects the exchange 
rate differently in periods of low and high volatility) and in the temporal causality 
(intervention has a different impact on the exchange rate’s future volatility in periods of 
low and high volatility).   
 
The model therefore measures the impact of intervention for different states of 
the market. We extend on two recent studies (Beine et al., 2003; Sager and Taylor, 
2004) that have also adopted time varying transition probability Markov switching 
models. These studies showed that intervention could increase volatility if it was done 
in a low volatility state. Furthermore, intervention was also found to decrease volatility 
if the market was in a high volatility state
11
. The fact that single regime models found 
increased volatility was attributed to the fact that low volatility conditions (tranquil 
regime) usually predominates in markets and as such single regime estimates (which are 
an average of the low and high volatility regimes) would be biased in favour of the low 
regime outcome (low volatility). Similarly, Taylor (2004) and Reitz and Taylor (2008) 
using the Markov switching and Smooth Transition Regression-GARCH approach 
respectively, also find that intervention is effective in the sense that intervention is 
stabilizing when the exchange rate is heavily misaligned but less effective when the 
exchange rate is closer to its fundamental value (purchasing power parity value).    
                                                 
10
  Intervention in this study refers to sales and purchases of foreign currency by the central bank designed 
to change the liquidity and pricing dynamics of the foreign exchange market. 
11
  The market is classified as being in a high volatility state when prices are unstable, bid-ask prices are 
high and liquidity is tight as more risk adverse agents (as opposed to speculator) have withdrawn from the 
market while the opposite is true in the low volatile state . 
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The contribution of this study to the empirical literature is to have a better 
understanding of the intervention dynamics improving earlier contributions by: (i) 
considering and comparing countries with different intervention practices; (ii) including 
a policy interest rate to control for monetary policy measures which can affect exchange 
rate dynamics; (iii) looking at the impact of intervention sales and purchases separately, 
since in many regards they are different policy instruments. The analysis is conducted 
for three developing markets, namely Croatia, Iceland and Jamaica because although 
they are similar in the sense that most interventions are conducted in the spot market 
which is based on an interbank system but different in terms of intervention practices.  
They can therefore serve to highlight how intervention outcomes could differ for a 
group of relatively similar developing markets based on specific intervention practices.   
 
We also include one developed market, Australia, for comparative 
purposes
12
because it is not a dominant international centre for foreign exchange trading 
and intervention in this market is relatively frequent as is the case in most developing 
markets where intervention is practiced. Also, as with developing markets, it is 
dominated by the spot transactions. The chapter is structured as follows; Section 2 
briefly reviews the literature on intervention in the foreign exchange market. Section 3 
describes the model specifications used. Section 4 introduces the data and the dynamics 
of intervention in the markets under review. Section 5 presents the empirical results and 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
The relevant literature on the impact of intervention on exchange rate dynamics 
is reviewed only briefly as excellent reviews are provided by Edison (1993), Sarno and 
Taylor (2001), Akinci et al (2006) and Vitale (2007).  The literature generally focuses 
on the channels through which intervention impacts on the exchange rate.  
Theoretically, interventions can affect the exchange rate through a variety of channels 
                                                 
12
  We are grateful to an anonymous referee who pointed out that the de facto exchange rate regime could 
be a significant determinant of the differential impact of intervention on the exchange rate across the 
group of countries reviewed in this paper.  However, since all countries have de jure floating exchange 
rate regimes with varying degrees of management of the float (Iceland floated fully in March 2001 after 
operating a system where the exchange rate was managed within a 9% band), which includes the scale 
and frequency of intervention in the foreign exchange market, the exchange rate regime and intervention 
practice is not mutually exclusive and therefore we argue that intervention practice is still ultimately a 
valid factor in the differential intervention outcomes across markets observed in this study.  See Gersl and 
Holub (2008) and Akinci et al (2006) for reviews of this issue. 
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that are not mutually exclusive.  These include the signaling (Dominguez and Frankel, 
1993a; Kaminsky and Lewis, 1995), portfolio balance (Edison, 1993; Dominquez and 
Frankel, 1993), and market microstructure channels (Evens and Lyons, 2002), all of 
which are based on their respective models of exchange rate determination.  The 
portfolio balance channel is thought to be more effective in developing countries where 
central bank credibility may be weak, where domestic and foreign currency debts are 
imperfect substitutes and interventions are large relative to market turnover
13
 (Canales-
Kriljenko et al., 2003).  The signaling channel is thought to work more effectively in 
developed markets where central banks have greater credibility (Sarno and Taylor, 
2001).   
 
The most popular model specifications used to measure the effectiveness of 
intervention included OLS regression of risk premium and order flow on exchange rate 
(Dominguez and Frankel, 1993b; Evans and Lyons, 2002), event studies of intervention 
episodes (Fatum, 2000; Hutchison, 2003), unified approaches to monetary policy and 
foreign exchange market intervention using vector autoregression (VAR) methodology 
(Kim, 2003), simulated GMM (Kearns and Rigobon, 2005) and GARCH models 
(Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2004). These models implicitly assume a linear relationship 
between intervention and the mean and variance of exchange rate returns.  
 
Many studies have argued, however, that exchange rate behaviour generally 
evolves in a non-linear way (Sarno and Taylor, 2001).  A number of non-linear 
exchange rate models have emerged geared to better capture the exchange rates data 
generating process.  These include, non-parametric procedures (Diebold and Nason, 
1990), chaos models (Hsieh, 1991) and regime switching models such as smooth 
transition autoregressive (STAR) models (Sarantis, 1999) and Markov switching (MS) 
models (Engle and Hamilton, 1990; Hamilton, 1989).   
 
These non-linear models tend to be superior to single regime type approaches in 
the sense that they can accommodate different outcomes to policy interventions 
depending on whether the market is in a volatile or tranquil initial state
14
. For example, 
intervention in a highly volatility market condition may lower volatility because most 
                                                 
13
  The converse is of course true in developed market economies where the volume of market turnover 
has been growing rapidly restricting the scope for intervention on the scale that would have an impact on 
the rate. 
14
  Initial state of the market refers to market conditions immediately preceding intervention activities. 
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agents in the market understand the rationale for intervention and are likely to act in 
concert with the central bank moving the market in the desired direction.  If, on the 
other hand, the central bank intervenes when the market is relatively calm agents may 
be uncertain about the motives of the central bank and may act counter to central bank 
initiatives making them ineffective. In some respect, the argument is similar to one 
given in the target zone literature (Krugman, 1991) in which central banks normally 
intervenes only when the rates moves out of some predetermined band or zone.  The 
movement of the exchange rate outside the target zone normally coincides with a period 
of increased volatility as agents in the market react to new developments.  Agents in the 
market tend to understand and act in concert with the central bank if it intervenes when 
the rate moves outside the band (increased volatility) but not if the central bank 
intervenes when the exchange rate is inside the band (low volatility).  
 
The notion of two regimes also fits well with the market microstructure 
approach to exchange rates.  The market microstructure channel has also been 
increasingly seen as important in explaining the intervention dynamics in foreign 
exchange markets (Evens and Lyons, 2002). In particular, the Markov switching 
framework by allowing for two or more regimes can more adequately capture the 
micro-structural dynamics. That is, a liquidity trading regime where uninformed or 
liquidity traders dominate trading and the market is characterized by exchange rate 
returns with relatively low mean and variance.  The more volatile informed trading 
state, where informed traders such as market makers or central banks are active in the 
market, is characterized by exchange rate returns that have relatively higher mean and 
variance.  In this framework central bank intervention works by emitting information to 
the market which modifies expectations and generates large order flows.  These orders 
may move the market trend in the desired direction if the central bank intervenes when 
the market conditions are volatile but may also increase short-term volatility if the 
central bank intervenes when the market is relatively calm (Guimaraes and Karacadag, 
2004). 
 
2.2 The Models 
 
This section describes the models used.  The exchange rate returns are defined as 
)/log(*100 1 ttt erery  where ter denotes the number of units of the local currency per 
unit of foreign currency. We first consider the standard random walk (RW) model 
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which normally provides the benchmark for empirical exchange rate models (Meese and 
Rogoff, 1983). The fixed transition Markov switching (FTP) model is then introduced 
and finally the extension to the time varying Markov switching (TVTP) model is 
presented.  
 
2.2.1 The Linear Benchmark Models 
 
Ever since the seminal paper by Meese and Rogoff (1983), it has become 
customary to compare exchange rate models to that of a random walk specification.  In 
this spirit a simple linear stochastic model of the following form is used for comparative 
purposes: 
 
 
   where  2,0~  Nt        (1) 
 
 
with Tt .  For the purpose of this study we extend (1) including lagged intervention. 
This model is of the following form: 
 
 
,      2,0~  Nt ,     Tt      (2) 
 
 
2.2.2 Fixed Transition Markov Switching Model  
 
The regime switching model considered in this section allows for shifts in mean 
and variance separating tranquil from volatile periods.
 t
y  is modeled as being 
conditionally normal, where the mean and variance both depend on the operative 
regime, and is given by
15
: 
 
 
tttt ssy  )()(  ,     )1,0(...~ Ndiit ,  Tt .     (3) 
                                                 
15
 Although autoregressive dynamics are not accounted for explicitly in these analytical models we did 
experiment with different autoregressive structures in the empirical work but these proved not to be 
feasible specifications. 
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where 
)(i
 and 
)(i  (i = 1, 2) are real constants and ts  are random variables in S 
= {1, 2} that indicates the state that the system is in at date t. A stable “liquidity trading” 
regime where 1  and 
2
1  are relatively low (regime 1) and a volatile “informed 
trading” regime where 2  and 
2
2  are relatively high (regime 2).  Throughout, the 
regime indicator }{ ts is assumed to form a homogeneous Markov chain on S with the 
fixed transition probabilities matrix defined as: 
 
 
)/Pr( 1 jsisp tt
ij   , Sji ,       (5) 
 
 
where each column sums to unity and all elements are non-negative. 11p  and 
22p  represent the probability of remaining in regime 1 and 2 respectively. It is also 
assumed that }{ t  and }{ ts  are independent. We shall refer to the two state order Markov 
switching model with fixed transition probabilities defined by (3)-(5) as FTP.  The FTP 
generalizes the standard random walk (RW) model (1) by allowing the mean and 
variance of innovation }{ t  to vary between two states according to a hidden Markov 
chain }{ ts . The probability law that governs these regime changes is flexible enough to 
allow for a wide variety of different shifts, depending on the values of the transition 
probabilities.  For instance, values of ),( Sip ij   not close to unity, imply that structural 
parameters are subject to frequent changes, whereas values near unity suggest that 
regime transitions are not likely to occur.  The density function has two components, 
one for each regime, and the log-likelihood function is constructed as a probability 
weighted sum of these two components.  The parameter vector 
),,,,,( 221122
2
121 ppv    is estimated by maximum likelihood (Hamilton, 1989).  
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2.2.3 Time Varying Markov Switching Model 
 
Finally, to study the intervention dynamics we relax the assumption of fixed 
transition probabilities by allowing the transition probabilities to depend on lagged 
values (Filardo, 1994; Diebold et al., 1994) of intervention ( 1tI ). Lagged values of 
intervention are used instead of contemporaneous intervention to deal with the 
simultaneity bias involved (Beine et al., 2003).  We also include lagged policy interest 
rates )( 1tR  as a control for monetary policy measures which may be implemented 
around the same time as direct intervention.  As with direct interventions, we use lagged 
policy interest rates rather than contemporaneous policy interest rates to deal with 
potential simultaneity bias
16
.  The inclusion of lagged policy interest rates ensures we do 
not overstate the impact of the direct intervention by accounting explicitly for any 
additional base money/interest rate effect on the exchange rate.  Therefore, the transition 
probabilities are defined as:  
 
 
),,1/1(Pr 111
11
  ttttt RIssobp ,       (6) 
 
 
),,2/2(Pr 111
22
  ttttt RIssobp .       (7) 
 
 
The probability to switch from the tranquil to the volatile regime is given by 
)),(1( 11
1112
 tttt RIpp whereas the probability to switch from the volatile to the 
tranquil regime is measured by )),(1( 11
2221
 tttt RIpp .  The functions of the 
transition probabilities are as follows: 
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16
  We experimented with different lag structures but the results were broadly similar in models with two 
lags while models with longer lags often failed to converge. 
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The time varying specification of course collapses to the fixed transition 
probability (FTP) model if 02121   .  If intervention is stabilizing it will 
decrease the probability of remaining in the volatile regime )( 22tp and/or increase the 
probability of remaining in the stable regime )( 11tp , that is, 02   and/or 01   
respectively. If it is de-stabilizing then 02   and/or 01  . Under the market 
microstructure framework, intervention is expected to be stabilizing if implemented in 
the volatile state and de-stabilizing if implemented in the tranquil state.  This implies 
that 1  0 and 2  0.  If intervention increases the probability of remaining in the 
volatile regime ( 02  ), as well as the tranquil regime ( 01  ), then intervention is 
only effective in the tranquil regime, paradoxically when it is generally not needed.  In 
this case, it would have limited effectiveness as a policy instrument in the foreign 
exchange market.   The two-state Markov switching framework is therefore open-ended 
and compatible with any view of the impact of intervention.  In fact it is also compatible 
with the view that intervention has no impact in either regime )0( 21   .   
 
2.3 Data and Intervention Dynamics 
 
We use daily data on exchange rates for Croatia, Iceland, Jamaica and Australia.  
The data set on Croatia includes 1636 observations covering the period January 3, 2000 
to April 10, 2006.  Iceland’s data set includes 1573 observations covering the period 
January 4, 2000 to April 28, 2006.  Jamaica’s data set includes 1161 observations 
covering the period February 7, 2002 to September 28, 2006. Finally, the data set on 
Australia covers 1434 observations over the period January 3, 2000 to June 30, 2005.   
 
The exchange rate for Croatia, Iceland and Jamaica is defined as the midpoint 
between the weighted average bid and ask prices of the domestic currency per unit of 
the intervention currency.  The exchange rate for Australia is defined as the midpoint 
between the weighted average bid and asks prices of the intervention currency per unit 
of the Australian dollar.  The intervention currency for Iceland, Jamaica and Australia is 
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the United Sates dollar while Croatia’s intervention currency is the Euro. We use the 
actual daily sales and purchases of the intervention currency by the central bank against 
the domestic currency as our intervention variable.  The policy interest rates utilized in 
this study are annualized rates and include the inter-bank rate for Croatia, the 3-month 
repurchase rate for Iceland, the 3-month reverse repurchase rate for Jamaica and the 3-
month treasury bill rate for Australia.   
 
All of the exchange rate and interest rate data for Croatia, Iceland and Australia 
were sourced from Datastream.  Intervention data were sourced from the respective 
central banks.  Interest rate and exchange rate data for Jamaica were sourced from the 
Bank of Jamaica.  A briefly description of the intervention dynamics for the countries 
reviewed are outlined below.   
 
The Croatian foreign exchange market is relatively small and under-developed. 
It is driven by links to the Euro rather than the US dollar, with approximately 67% of 
Croatian reserves denominated in Euros. The only market makers in the Croatian 
market are commercial banks. The Croatian central bank (Croatian National Bank, 
CNB) intervenes relatively infrequently (5%) in the spot market using partially 
sterilized interventions.   
 
Table 2.1: The Dynamics of Intervention 
Variable Australia Croatia Iceland Jamaica 
Sales Days 
Purchases Days 
Total Interventions Days 
Total Sample Days 
371 23 29 222 
535 52 511 n/a 
906 75 540 222 
1434 1636 1573 1161 
%  Intervention Days 
% Intervention Sale Days  
% Intervention Purchase Days 
0.63 0.05 0.34 0.19 
0.25 0.01 0.02 0.19 
0.37 0.04 0.32 n/a 
Average Inter. (US$M) 
Average Inter. Sales 
Average Inter. purchases 
Max. Inter. Sales 
Max. Inter. Purchases 
19.5 2.4 1.2 2.3 
7.2 0.7 0.3 2.3 
12.3 1.7 0.9 n/a 
176 148 42.2 26.1 
458 179 82.5 n/a 
Note: % intervention days are calculated as intervention days divided by total sample days. 
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The CNB used mostly buying interventions in this period because buying 
foreign exchange in the first years of Croatian independence was necessary to build up 
the stock of international reserves.  The only year in the reviewed period where the 
CNB used selling operations to support the Kuna was 2003 when a banking crisis 
caused instability and capital outflows (see Table 2.1).  Croatia has a managed floating 
exchange rate regime but the exchange rate exhibits relatively low flexibility.  This is 
most likely due to the CNB’s objective of managing the Kuna within a tight band 
against the Euro
17
. 
 
The Icelandic foreign exchange market is also a small, relatively 
underdeveloped market.  The majority of trades are conducted in US dollars on the spot 
market.  The Icelandic foreign exchange is built on an inter-bank market with the major 
commercial banks as market makers.  In the period reviewed, the Icelandic Central 
Bank (ICB) interventions were relatively infrequent, occurring only on 34% of the days 
in the sample, with 32% of interventions being intervention purchases. The ICB 
intervened with predominantly selling operations in the 2000 and 2001, reflecting the 
fact that it was “leaning against the wind” in a period characterized by outflows of 
foreign currency and uncertainty leading to a weakening of the Krona.  In the period 
2002 to 2006 the ICB intervened mostly with frequent and relatively small buying 
operations, with the aim to build up foreign exchange reserves. The ICB does not fully 
and immediately sterilize its foreign exchange interventions as do central banks in some 
developed markets
18
.   
  
The Jamaican foreign exchange market is based on an inter-bank system, where 
commercial banks are the major market makers.  Traders can directly observe trade 
volumes and prices on a real time basis through the electronic gateway for auctions 
trade and foreign exchange management (E-GATE).  In the period under review the 
Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) intervened relatively infrequently on 19% of the sample days.  
They intervened selling only in the period under review, indicating that the BOJ was 
generally “leaning again the wind” in a period characterized by episodic instability in 
the market.  The average intervention was relatively small. The BOJ sterilizes most of 
its foreign exchange interventions. There are instances, however, where full sterilization 
                                                 
17
  See Egert (2007) and Chmelarove and Schnabl (2006) for more analytical reviews of intervention in 
the Croatian foreign exchange market. 
18
  See Isberg and Petursson (2003) for a more comprehensive description of the intervention process in 
Iceland. 
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would move the money base away from the target set by the BOJ and in these cases the 
intervention would not be fully sterilized, leading to intervention reinforcing monetary 
policy measures (Robinson and Robinson, 1997).  
 
The Australian foreign exchange market in April 2004 accounted for 
approximately 3.4% of average daily global foreign exchange turnover in traditional 
instruments.  In terms of actual practice, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) conducts 
all its interventions in the spot Australian dollar/US dollar market and immediately 
sterilizes these operations. A broad overview of the actual intervention operations of the 
RBA is outlined in Table 2.1.  This shows that the RBA intervened on 906 days out of 
the 1434 sample days, with intervention purchases (535 days) being more frequent than 
intervention sales (371 days).  This suggest that the RBA was “leaning against the 
wind” in this period in which the Australian dollar was appreciating19. 
 
The dynamics of intervention in these markets clearly reflect different 
intervention objectives and differences in the size and sophistication of the markets.  
There are some similarities across jurisdictions, such as, interventions were executed 
predominantly in the spot market and most central banks attempted to sterilize their 
interventions.  There are important differences though which reflect the differences in 
the degree of development of the market and the intervention objectives, as well as 
differences in intervention frequency, surprisingly with Australia, the developed market, 
recording the highest intervention frequency (64%) relative to Iceland (34%), Jamaica 
(19%) and Croatia (5%). The fact that in some developing markets interventions are not 
immediately and/or fully sterilized might lead to monetary/interest rate policy 
dominating direct interventions.  
 
2.4 Empirical Results  
 
 The parameter estimates with t-statistics and values of the likelihood function 
for each model considered for Croatia, Iceland, Jamaica and Australia are presented in 
Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. The null hypothesis of linearity against the 
alternative of Markov regime switching cannot be tested directly using a standard 
likelihood ratio (LR) test
20
. The value of the standardized likelihood ratio statistics 
                                                 
19
  See Edison et al (2006) for a more recent review of the intervention activities of the RBA. 
20
Standard regularity conditions for likelihood-based inferences are violated under the null hypothesis of 
linearity, as the parameters of the transition probabilities are unidentified and scores with respect to 
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along with the associated p-values under the null hypothesis are reported in Table 2.2. 
We also test for the presence of a third state. The results provide strong evidence in 
favor of a two-state regime-switching specification for the four countries reviewed
21
.  In 
order to test the adequacy of the models, Ljung–Box portmanteau tests were performed 
on standardized residuals and squared residuals. Overall the results indicate that the 
Markov regime switching specification captures satisfactorily the heteroskedasticity in 
the data. 
 
The estimated results confirm that the regime switching models capture the 
exchange rate dynamics better than the linear random walk (RW) model and the simple 
linear model with lagged intervention (LWI).  Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 show that the 
filter probabilities for Australia, Croatia, Iceland and Jamaica successfully separate the 
tranquil from the volatile regime (where a volatile regime has been labeled as regime 2). 
The variances in the volatile regime are significantly higher than the variance in the 
tranquil regime in all countries.  The volatile regime variance is as much as 3 times the 
size of the variance in the tranquil period in Croatia and Iceland and as much as 13 
times the size of the variance of the tranquil regime in the case of Jamaica.  It is also 
clear that for Croatia, Iceland and Jamaica the two-state process is driven by the 
variance.  This is a fairly common finding in studies modeling exchange rate dynamics 
using regime switching models (Caporale and Spagnolo, 2004).  Australia is the 
exception in this regard with the tranquil regime being characterized by significant 
positive exchange rate returns (appreciation) and lower variance and the volatile regime 
characterized by significant negative exchange rate returns (depreciation) and larger 
variance. 
 
 The probabilities for the FTP models indicate that generally the low volatility 
regime is more persistent, with the exception of Australia, where the probability of 
staying in the volatile regime is slightly higher.  Nevertheless, both regimes show high 
persistency. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
parameters of interest are identically zero.  Under such circumstances the information matrix is singular.  
An appropriate test procedure has been proposed by Hansen (1992). This procedure requires an 
evaluation of the likelihood function across a grid of different values for the transition probabilities and 
for each state-dependant parameter.   
21
 Selection procedures based on the ARMA representation as well as procedures based on complexity-
penalized likelihood criteria have also been considered. Psaradakis and Spagnolo (2003) show that model 
selection procedures based on the so-called three-pattern method (TPM) and the Akaike (AIC) are 
successful in choosing the correct state dimension.    
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Figure 2.1: Exchange Rate Changes and Filter Probabilities for Australia  
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Figure 2.2: Exchange Rate Changes and Filter Probabilities for Croatia  
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Figure 2.3: Exchange Rate Changes and Filter Probabilities for Iceland  
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Figure 2.4: Exchange Rate Changes and Filter Probabilities for Jamaica  
-8
-4
0
4
8
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Exchange Rate Changes Prob(Regime 2)
Jamaica
%
 C
h
a
n
g
e
P
ro
b
a
b
ility
 
 
 
 
 38 
Table 2.2: States Dimension Test Results 
 Australia Croatia Iceland Jamaica 
 
Hansen Test 
Linearity versus two-states Markov switching model 
Standardized LR Test 
LR 4.324 4.792 4.001 3.998 
M = 0 (0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
M = 1 (0.0030) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
M = 2 (0.0070) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
M = 3 (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
M = 4 (0.0120) (0.0110) (0.0021) (0.0030) 
 
Two-states versus three-states Markov switching model 
LR 0.451 0.812 0.743 1.475 
M = 0 (0.6216) (0.3886) (0.5524) (0.4432) 
M = 1 (0.6219) (0.4191) (0.5532) (0.4521) 
M = 2 (0.7005) (0.4301) (0.5541) (0.4555) 
M = 3 (0.7026) (0.4500) (0.5567) (0.4601) 
M = 4 (0.7102) (0.4631) (0.5581) (0.4723) 
 
Model Selection Criteria Number of States 
TPM 2 2 2 2 
AIC 2 2 2 2 
Notes: The range [0.50, 0.99] in steps of 0.05 (10 grid points) is used as a grid for the transition 
probabilities; for the autoregressive coefficient and innovation variances, we use the range [0.1, 0.9] and 
[0.01, 0.17] respectively, in steps of 0.1 and 0.01 (9 grid points).  The P-value is calculated according to 
the method described in Hansen (1996), using 1,000 random draws for the relevant limiting Gaussian 
processes and bandwidth parameter M = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 (See Hansen, 1992 for further details).   
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The results from the TVTP models for Croatia (Table 2.3 columns 3 to 8) 
indicate that intervention did not have an impact on exchange rate dynamics either in 
the volatile or tranquil regimes. That is, intervention did not cause the transition 
probabilities in either regime. The results of the TVTP models with respect to direct 
intervention in Croatia are not surprising given the dynamics of intervention in Croatia 
occurring on only 5% of the sample days.  The practice of using purchasing 
interventions to build up foreign currency reserves in periods when it would not affect 
exchange rate behavior also predisposed total intervention to have no impact.  The fact 
that the CNB uses only partially sterilized interventions also meant that much of the 
impact of direct intervention may be channeled through the money base and interest rate 
changes to exchange rate returns. This seems to be the case as the policy interest rate 
significantly increased the probability of staying in both the volatile and tranquil 
regimes (parameters 1  and 2 in Table 2.3).  It appears, therefore, that the direct 
intervention practices in Croatia were ineffective with interest rate policy being the 
dominant channel through which policy makers can impact exchange rate dynamics. 
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Table 2.3: Estimated Models for Croatia 
Parameters Models 
RW LWI FTP TVTP(T) TVTP(B) TVTP(S) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  -0.003 
(-0.57) 
-0.0027 
(-0.50) 
       
1  
  -0.008 
(-2.02) 
-0.008 
(-1.92) 
-0.008 
(-1.94) 
-0.007 
(-1.76) 
-0.008 
(-1.89) 
-0.008 
(2.02) 
-0.008 
(-1.96) 
2  
  0.002 
(0.25) 
0.002 
(0.28) 
0.003 
(0.26) 
0.003 
(0.28) 
0.004 
(0.31) 
0.002 
(0.25) 
0.003 
(0.27) 
  0.218 
(43.61) 
0.217 
(43.42) 
       
1  
  0.099 
(28.51) 
0.099 
(28.43) 
0.102 
(28.92) 
0.101 
(28.64) 
0.106 
(29.78) 
0.99 
(28.33) 
0.101 
(28.68) 
2  
  0.311 
(49.22) 
0.311 
(49.51) 
0.320 
(45.93) 
0.314 
(47.88) 
0.329 
(42.95) 
0.310 
(49.62) 
0.318 
(46.57) 
1  
  2.088 
(12.04) 
2.078 
(11.97) 
1.562 
(5.91) 
2.056 
(11.76) 
1.632 
(6.02) 
2.076 
(11.92) 
1.589 
(6.01) 
2  
  1.772 
(10.19) 
1.777 
(10.13) 
0.860 
(2.96) 
1.656 
(9.21) 
0.825 
(2.88) 
1.758 
(9.93) 
0.907 
(3.21) 
   -0.003 
(-0.94) 
       
1  
   1.369 
(0.61) 
1.568 
(0.73) 
0.025 
(0.22) 
0.057 
(0.27) 
-1.064 
(-0.49) 
-1.199 
(-0.55) 
2  
   0.086 
(0.04) 
-0.029 
(-0.01) 
4.373 
(0.06) 
4.374 
(0.01) 
1.855 
(0.25) 
2.741 
(0.23) 
1  
    0.126 
(1.79) 
 0.118 
(1.52) 
 0.119 
(1.65) 
2  
    0.207 
(2.53) 
 0.185 
(2.21) 
 0.196 
(2.43) 
11p    0.89 
(3.52) 
      
22p  
 
  0.85 
(5.61) 
      
L 12.7 11.0 11.3 12.2 8.4 7.3 9.5 6.0 7.6 
LB
2 
 
78.4 77.0 11.6 11.3 13.4 12.8 12.0 12.4 12.4 
LogLik -173.8 -174.3 -412.9 -413.1 -415.4 -409.9 -411.2 -413.2 -415.3 
Notes: RW refers to the linear random walk model, tuty  with mean  and variance 2 . LWI refers to the 
linear model with intervention, tt
Iuty  

1
with mean  and variance 2 . FTP refers to the fixed 
transition probability model tt
s
t
suty  )()(   with mean and variance 1 and 
2
1 in regime 1 and 2  and 
2
2 in regime 2, respectively.  The fixed transition probabilities are 
}exp{1
}exp{
1
111



p and 
}exp{1
}exp{
2
222



p .  
TVTP(T), TVTP(B) and TVTP(S) refer to the time varying transition probability (total interventions), time varying 
transition probability (purchasing interventions) and time varying transition probability (selling interventions) 
models respectively. The time varying transition probability functions with lagged intervention only are 
}exp{1
}exp{
)(
11
11
1
11




tt Ip
and 
}22exp{1
}22exp{
)1(
22




tIpt
.  The time varying transition probability functions 
with lagged intervention and lagged policy interest rate are 
}111exp{1
}111exp{
)1,1(
11




 tRtIpt  and 
}222exp{1
}222exp{
)1,1(
22




 tRtIpt
. The t-statistics for the maximum likelihood estimates are in parentheses. 
LB and LB² are respectively the Ljung-Box test (1978) of significance of autocorrelations of twenty lags in the 
standardized and standardized squared residual. These tests should be interpreted with caution since they may not 
have a Chi-Squared distribution for Markov-Switching models. 
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Table 2.4: Estimated Models for Iceland 
Parameters Models 
RW LWI FTP TVTP(T) TVTP(B) TVTP(S) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  0.003 
(0.146) 
        
1  
  -0.024 
(-1.45) 
-0.022 
(-1.32) 
-0.022 
(-1.31) 
-0.023 
(-1.47) 
-0.021 
(-1.33) 
-0.021 
(-1.37) 
-0.021 
(-1.36) 
2  
  0.166 
(1.55) 
0.149 
(1.46) 
0.223 
(1.53) 
0.163 
(1.58) 
0.235 
(1.51) 
0.144 
(1.49) 
0.207 
(1.49) 
  0.737 
(38.81) 
        
1  
  0.553 
(10.21) 
0.549 
(40.62) 
0.573 
(39.89) 
0.553 
(40.15) 
0.574 
(40.32) 
0.548 
(40.23) 
0.566 
(40.01) 
2  
  1.423 
(26.36) 
1.412 
(26.75) 
1.582 
(19.60) 
1.422 
(26.13) 
1.604 
(19.15) 
1.403 
(27.22) 
1.565 
(20.21) 
1  
  3.507 
(12.96) 
3.440 
(12.42) 
1.801 
(1.67) 
3.476 
(10.21) 
2.305 
(1.77) 
3.537 
(12.36) 
1.902 
(1.98) 
2  
  1.505 
(5.47) 
1.479 
(5.53) 
-
11.314 
(-1.93) 
1.409 
(3.56) 
-
13.811 
(-2.01) 
1.461 
(5.41) 
-
10.600 
(-2.02) 
           
1  
   0.192 
(2.92) 
0.133 
(2.41) 
0.034 
(0.13) 
0.008 
(0.03) 
-0.244 
(-2.94) 
-0.156 
(-2.56) 
2  
   0.011 
(0.22) 
0.052 
(1.15) 
0.131 
(0.28) 
0.594 
(0.77) 
-0.007 
(-0.12) 
-0.039 
(-0.93) 
1  
    0.162 
(1.32) 
 0.111 
(0.82) 
 0.154 
(1.34) 
2  
    1.022 
(2.21) 
 1.433 
(2.23) 
 1.150 
(2.23) 
11p    0.97 
(3.23) 
      
22p  
 
  0.82 
(4.14) 
      
LB 24.0 31.5 9.7 9.2 6.6 9.7 5.5 9.3 5.8 
LB
2 
 
21.6 28.3 5.1 6.7 6.5 5.6 3.8 7.6 7.9 
LogLik -
1750.1 
-
1748.6 
-
1596.7 
-
1594.1 
-
1576.1 
-
1596.7 
-
1592.7 
-
1593.5 
-
1591.6 
Note: See notes Table 3.  
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Table 2.5: Estimated Models for Jamaica 
Parameters Models 
RW LWI FTP TVTP 
1 2 3 4 5 
  0.028 
(2.21) 
0.045 
(3.26) 
   
1  
  0.015 
(5.54) 
0.015 
(4.85) 
0.015 
(4.82) 
2  
  0.163 
(1.33) 
0.163 
(1.18) 
0.164 
(1.15) 
  0.432 
(33.23) 
0.432 
(30.87) 
   
1  
  0.101 
(51.96) 
0.101 
(51.82) 
0.101 
(49.21) 
2  
  1.403 
(35.42) 
1.400 
(33.24) 
1.410 
(32.81) 
1  
  4.722 
(14.66) 
4.700 
(12.29) 
6.048 
(6.27) 
2  
  2.324 
(10.62) 
2.442 
(7.71) 
0.203 
(0.29) 
   0.007 
(2.98) 
   
1  
   0.021 
(0.25) 
0.005 
(0.05) 
2  
   -0.022 
(-0.35) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
1  
    -0.085 
(-2.05) 
2  
    0.079 
(1.94) 
11p    0.99 
(5.27) 
  
22p  
 
  0.90 
(4.74) 
  
LB 32.3 30.6 14.9 14.7 14.6 
LB
2 
 
39.4 39.7 12.2 15.8 13.9 
LogLik -673.1 -668.6 -664.5 -664.6 -667.9 
Note: See notes Table 3.  There was almost no purchasing intervention observations in the sample period 
and the TVTP models are estimated using intervention sales only. 
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Table 2.6: Estimated Models for Australia 
Parameters Models 
RW LWI FTP TVTP(T) TVTP(B) TVTP(S) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  0.010 
(0.54) 
0.008 
(0.41) 
       
1  
  0.084 
(3.81) 
0.096 
(4.42) 
0.099 
(3.95) 
0.094 
(4.32) 
0.098 
(3.86) 
0.084 
(2.92) 
0.105 
(3.71) 
2  
  -0.051 
(-1.75) 
-0.048 
(-1.62) 
-0.096 
(-2.35) 
-0.047 
(-1.66) 
-0.102 
(-2.42) 
-0.051 
(-1.45) 
-0.072 
(-2.01) 
  0.697 
(38.72) 
0.696 
(38.62) 
       
1  
  0.518 
(29.15) 
0.505 
(37.43) 
0.509 
(24.13) 
0.508 
(38.21) 
0.508 
(22.95) 
0.446 
(17.94) 
0.463 
(19.93) 
2  
  0.811 
(40.25) 
0.795 
(46.01) 
0.863 
(28.73) 
0.796 
(45.86) 
0.868 
(27.75) 
0.844 
(34.51) 
0.840 
(34.55) 
1  
  4.216 
(12.63) 
6.837 
(4.57) 
22.010 
(4.32) 
7.584 
(3.71) 
21.722 
(4.55) 
0.986 
(2.27) 
23.174 
(2.79) 
2  
  4.363 
(13.63) 
5.047 
(8.81) 
18.718 
(3.84) 
5.380 
(8.92) 
18.949 
(3.91) 
0.704 
(2.06) 
2.975 
(1.14) 
   0.0004 
(1.43) 
       
1  
   -0.068 
(-2.86) 
-0.013 
(-1.64) 
-0.079 
(-2.52) 
-0.011 
(-1.34) 
-2.317 
(-0.63) 
-0.284 
(-2.32) 
2  
   -0.044 
(-3.81) 
-0.029 
(-2.54) 
-0.050 
(-3.94) 
-0.032 
(-2.59) 
-1.078 
(-1.94) 
-0.086 
(-1.93) 
1  
    -3.787 
(-3.92) 
 -3.765 
(-4.09) 
 -4.398 
(-2.54) 
2  
    -3.111 
(-3.34) 
 -3.156 
(-3.53) 
 -0.369 
(-0.71) 
11p    0.98 
(3.66) 
      
22p  
 
  0.99 
(3.19) 
      
LB 26.3 26.7 15.6 17.6 13.8 11.8 16.6 15.1 15.1 
LB
2 
 
48.1 46.2 12.1 13.8 14.5 12.1 12.4 10.6 16.3 
LogLik -
1516.2 
-
1515.1 
-
1469.1 
-
1469.3 
-
1453.3 
-
1469.2 
-
1461.1 
-
1477.7 
-
1469.8 
Note: See notes Table 3.  
 
 
In the case of Iceland, the TVTP models indicate that total direct interventions 
increase the probability of staying in the tranquil regime (stabilization) but have no 
significant impact in the volatile regime, even when we account for monetary policy 
effects in the market (See Table 2.4 columns 3 and 4).  When direct interventions were 
disaggregated into purchasing and selling operations the results show that intervention 
sales lowered the probability of staying in the tranquil regime (de-stabilizing)
22
 but had 
no significant impact in the volatile regime.  Intervention purchases had no significant 
impact on the transition probabilities in either regime.  The policy interest rate was also 
                                                 
22
  Similar results were found by Beine et al. (2003).   
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significantly positively related to the probability of staying in the volatile regime. In the 
case of Jamaica, intervention had no significant impact on the probability of changing 
regimes.  However, the coefficients of the policy interest rate indicate that interest rate 
policy may be the dominant policy instrument with respect to exchange rate dynamics.  
It also indicates a high interest rate policy may be destabilizing (See Columns 3 and 4 
Table 2.5).  
 
Finally, the case of Australia intervention reduces the probability of being in the 
tranquil as well as in the volatile regime, but does so more significantly in the case of 
the tranquil regime. This suggests an asymmetry in the impact with interventions in the 
tranquil regime being more destabilizing than the stabilizing interventions in the volatile 
regime (see Model 3 Table 2.6).  Intervention, therefore, seems to be effective when the 
market is in the high volatility regime but counter-productive when it is in the calm 
regime, apparently validating the microstructure framework of intervention in the 
foreign exchange market.  The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) also immediately fully 
sterilizes its interventions so there should be no additional money base/interest rate 
induced exchange rate changes arising from the original direct intervention in the 
market
23
.  If this is so the monetary policy/interest rate measures will have an 
independent impact on the first and second moment of exchange rate returns and when 
included in the TVTP model it should not minimize or detract from the impact of direct 
interventions. 
 
In the TVTP specification with the interest rate control included (model 4 Table 
2.6) 2  remains significantly negative but the size of the coefficient is smaller while 1  
is still negative but now insignificant.  Direct intervention is therefore still an effective 
stabilization tool in the volatile regime.  These results also suggest that even with full 
sterilization, these two policy instruments are not mutually exclusive with respect to 
exchange rate dynamics.  This highlights the importance of explicitly accounting for 
monetary policy measures when investigating the effectiveness of direct interventions in 
this foreign exchange market
24
.  It should be noted though that 1  and 2  are both 
significant and negative, implying that a high interest rate defense is stabilizing in the 
                                                 
23
 This is done because the RBA has different objectives for its normal monetary policy measures relative 
to direct interventions in the foreign exchange market which could be frustrated by un-sterilized 
interventions. 
24
  These results corroborate the findings of Kim (2003) and Kearns and Rigobon (2005). 
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volatile regime but destabilizing in the tranquil regime, with a higher negative impact in 
the tranquil regime.   
 
When direct intervention is separated out into purchasing and selling operations, 
purchasing operations (see columns 5 and 6 in Table 2.6), purchasing operations were 
the dominant mode of direct intervention in the period under review both in terms of the 
magnitude and frequency of interventions (see Table 2.1).  Selling operations on the 
other hand only had a significant stabilizing impact in the volatile regime, reducing the 
persistency of this regime.  However, when the monetary policy variable was included 
in the TVTP specification the results indicated that direct selling interventions reduced 
the probability of staying in both regimes (See Columns 7 and 8 Table 2.6).  Moreover, 
in the intervention sales specification, the policy interest rate only had a significant 
impact in the tranquil regime. This may indicate that direct intervention, particularly 
selling intervention, is the dominant policy instrument
25
 when the market is in the 
volatile regime.  On the other hand, monetary policy seems to be the dominant 
instrument impacting on the foreign exchange market when it is in the low volatility 
regime.  
 
Comparisons across countries reveal some interesting findings. Total 
intervention only had a significant impact in Australia (both regimes) and Iceland 
(tranquil regime only).  This is reflected in Figures 2.5 to 2.8 where total intervention is 
plotted against the probability of transitioning from one regime to another. Figures 2.5 
and 2.6 look at the probability of transitioning from the tranquil to the volatile regime 
for Australia and Iceland respectively.  Figures 2.7 and 2.8 look at the probability of 
transitioning from the volatile to the tranquil regime for Australia and Iceland 
respectively.  Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show that intervention increase the probability of 
switching from the volatile to the tranquil regime (stabilizing) in Australia but not in 
Iceland.  On the other hand, Panels 5 and 6 show that intervention can also be de-
stabilizing, generating high probabilities of transitioning from the tranquil to the volatile 
regime in Australia and Iceland, with only selling interventions driving the de-
stabilizing effect in Iceland.  
 
                                                 
25
  The magnitude of the coefficient of selling interventions in the volatile regime is larger than in all 
other TVTP specifications. 
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When total interventions were disaggregated into purchasing and selling 
interventions, the results do not change much relative to the results for total intervention 
for Australia and Croatia.  In the case of Iceland, however, contrary to the total 
intervention specification results which indicate that intervention increases the 
probability of staying in the tranquil regime (stabilizing), selling intervention decreases 
the probability of remaining in the tranquil regime (de-stabilizing). This result holds 
even when we account for monetary policy/interest rate effects. One explanation is that 
intervention purchases were used primarily to shore up foreign exchange reserves 
without affecting exchange rate dynamics while selling intervention reflects the “real” 
instrument in the sense that it was actually deployed to change exchange rate dynamics.  
The selling intervention did not succeed but instead increased volatility since it was 
implemented in the tranquil regime.   
 
These results also suggest that in cases where direct intervention does not have a 
significant impact on the transition probability, as we find in both regimes in Croatia 
and Jamaica, as well as the volatile regime in Iceland, monetary policy/interest rates 
seems to play a significant role with respect to exchange rate dynamics. Another 
noteworthy point is that, contrary to conventional thinking, intervention appears to be 
more effective in the developed market (Australia) relative to the developing and 
transition markets (Croatia, Iceland and Jamaica).  This does not appear to be due to the 
magnitude of intervention relative to market size. Rather, it seems to be caused by 
intervention practices such as the frequency of intervention and by the fact that direct 
intervention is implemented as a separate policy instrument to monetary policy by fully 
and immediately sterilizing intervention operations.  By not fully sterilizing direct 
interventions the developing markets may find themselves in a situation where direct 
intervention became simply a complement to monetary policy measures and a relatively 
ineffective tool on its own.  
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Figure 2.5: Intervention and Transition Probabilities (Regime 1 to 2) for Australia 
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Note: P21 denotes the probability of moving from regime 2 (volatile) to regime 1 (tranquil) and P12 
denotes the probability of moving from regime 1 (tranquil) to regime 2 (volatile).  Intervention represents 
total intervention (sales and purchases). 
 
Figure 2.6: Intervention and Transition Probabilities (Regime 1 to 2) for Iceland 
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Note: Same as Figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.7: Intervention and Transition Probabilities (Regime 2 to 1) for Australia 
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Note: Same as Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.8: Intervention and Transition Probabilities (Regime 2 to 1) for Iceland 
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Note: Same as Figure 2.5. 
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2.5 Summary  
 
The results of recent studies on the effectiveness of direct intervention as a 
policy instrument have led to increasing skepticism about its usefulness in the foreign 
exchange market but the results of this study indicate that this skepticism may be 
misplaced. In this paper, we have provided some empirical evidence on the casual 
relationship between interventions and exchange rate volatility using a Markov 
switching model. We have contributed to this literature by augmenting the time varying 
transition probability models with a control for monetary policy and by investigating 
separately the impact of intervention sales and purchases. These extensions and the 
focus on the second moments differentiate this study from other contributions to this 
literature. Contrary to the predominant view, the empirical results show that direct 
intervention is effective in the case of Australia whereas it had little or no effect in the 
developing markets reviewed. Therefore, actual intervention practices, such as having 
more frequent interventions and full and immediate sterilization of direct interventions 
to preserve its status as an independent policy instrument, are important factors 
determining the effectiveness of this policy instrument. This implies that intervention 
practices rather than the level of market development may be the major determinant of 
effectiveness.  
 
To summarize, there are important policy implications that our findings suggest: 
(i) the use of more frequent interventions rather than large one-off interventions tend to 
be more effective; (ii) if direct intervention aims to have an effect independent of 
monetary policy measures, these operations must be immediately and fully sterilized; 
(iii) even with full sterilization, there still seems to be feedback effects between these 
monetary/interest rate policy and direct intervention; (iv) selling and purchasing 
interventions lead to different effects.  More care should therefore be taken in timing 
their deployment since intervening with both instruments at close intervals could lower 
the intervention effectiveness; (v) intervention should be used mostly in volatile market 
conditions when there are clear threats and policy objectives tends to be more clearly 
defined.   
 
These issues are by no means exhaustive and many questions remain 
unanswered. The results of this study contribute to the empirical literature shedding 
some new light on the debate about the dynamic and effectiveness of direct intervention 
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in the foreign exchange market. The issue of whether direct intervention might be able 
to stabilise the foreign exchange market more effectively is an issue which can only be 
addressed in the context of a structural model. This is beyond the scope of the present 
chapter and constitutes an interesting topic for future research.      
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERVENTION IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
MARKET AND INTEREST RATE POLICY IN 
AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN: SIGNALING AND 
LEANING AGAINST THE WIND? 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
 Most central banks operating flexible exchange rate regimes have intervened 
with direct interventions in their foreign exchange market.  These interventions are 
usually executed together with offsetting operations in the domestic money market so 
that the money supply is not affected.  In this sense they are sterilized interventions and 
therefore cannot be thought of as monetary policy initiatives.  If central bank direct 
intervention in the market is not fully sterilised it can lead to changes in the interest 
rates as the central bank attempts to keep its liquidity targets. Also, monetary policy 
operating procedures may delay sterilization or render it incomplete which means there 
would be spillovers from direct intervention to monetary policy.  Interest rate 
developments can also cause exchange rate changes which the central bank may see as 
counter to some of its other policy objectives which may lead to a response in the form 
of direct intervention. Of course, the signaling literature (Mussa, 1981) posits that direct 
intervention signals future changes in the policy interest rate.   
 
 In spite of these a priori strong links between direct intervention and policy 
interest rates, not much has been done on the links between direct intervention, 
monetary policy, particularly interest rate policy, and exchange rates. This is a major 
gap in the literature on central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market.  This 
issue has assumed even greater importance since the recent global financial crisis as 
policy makers have grappled with a situation where "conventional" monetary policy 
measures such as interest rate policy have not been as effective given depressed demand 
conditions and weak consumer and business confidence.   This has driven increased 
interest in unconventional policy measures such as direct intervention in the foreign 
exchange market and the possible trade-offs between this policy instrument and policy 
interest rates, even in developed market economies.   
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 Direct intervention, interest rate policy
26
 and exchange rate dynamics should 
therefore ideally be examined in a joint framework but relatively few studies have 
adopted this approach (Lewis, 1995; Kaminsky and Lewis, 1996; Kim, 2003; Kearns 
and Rigobon, 2005).  These studies unfortunately tended to focus on the impact of 
policy on the level of exchange rate returns and not on its volatility which is 
increasingly of importance to policy makers.  Kim and Sheen (2006) have come closest 
to treating with these issues in a joint framework by using a bivariate EGARCH model 
of exchange rate returns and market volumes. The main weakness of their approach, 
however, was it treated direct intervention and interest rate policy as exogenous 
variables and most studies on policy reaction functions have shown that these policy 
instruments are endogenous as they respond to developments in the market
27
.  This 
approach therefore leads to less efficient estimates.  
 
 The multivariate GARCH framework we adopt corrects this specification 
problem by treating interest rate policy and direct intervention as endogenous variables.  
In this study we examine the links between direct intervention, interest rate policy and 
exchange rate dynamics in Australia and Japan in a joint trivariate VAR-GARCH(1,1)
28
 
framework. We study the Australian and Japanese foreign exchange markets to evaluate 
these issues since they are the largest developed markets
29
 in which central banks have 
intervened directly in the last decade.  Their experiences with direct intervention and 
interest rate policy initiatives in the foreign exchange market are therefore among the 
few on which we can gauge how effective these policy instruments are likely to be in 
other developed markets.  This is increasingly going to occupy the attention of these 
markets as major currencies come under pressure from the ongoing fallout from the 
international financial crisis. In this environment, central banks in these jurisdictions 
will have to manage their exchange rates more actively but would be constrained by the 
                                                 
26
  Interest rate policy and monetary policy will be used interchangeably in the rest of the paper. 
27
  See Lubika and Schorfheideb (2007) and Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) on interest rate policy reaction 
functions and Kim (2003) and Sarno and Taylor (2001) for policy reaction functions for direct 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
28
 Our work also has some similarities to Beine (2004) who used a bivariate GARCH to look at the impact 
of central bank interventions in two major foreign exchange markets and the spillovers in terms of 
correlations between the exchange rates in these markets.   
29
  In 2007 the Yen/US dollar and Australian dollar/US dollar currency pairs were the second and fourth 
most traded currency pairs globally at US$397 billion and US$175 billion respectively, together 
accounting for 19% of total global foreign exchange turnover which stood at US$3.2 trillion. The leading 
currency pair was the US dollar/Euro currency pair at 27% of total global foreign exchange turnover (See 
Bank for International Settlements, 2007). 
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degree to which they can raise interest rates. The dynamic of the links and feedback 
effects between direct intervention and interest rate changes in these markets is 
therefore a critical policy issue which requires renewed attention using more appropriate 
research methodologies.   
 
 The framework we adopt can also provide information on traditional issues such 
as whether direct intervention is used to “lean against the wind” of exchange rate trends 
and whether direct intervention “signals” future interest rates implying coordination 
between these policy instruments.  Studies of these issues on Australia and Japan have 
found evidence supporting “leaning against the wind” and "signaling" behaviour (Kim, 
2003; Kearns and Rigobon, 2005; Kim and Sheen, 2006).  Very importantly also, the 
approach we adopt allows us to evaluate the relative impact of direct intervention and 
interest rate policy on the volatility of exchange rate returns.  Additionally, this 
framework allows one to look at how policy intervention affects the conditional 
covariance and correlation of important variable like interest and exchange rates over 
time.   
 
 This information can provide insights into the way the correlation of important 
variables reacts to policy interventions and therefore shed some light on the costs and 
policy conflicts associated with unsynchronized implementation of related policy 
instruments over time. This chapter therefore makes a contribution in terms of the 
appropriate empirical methodology for measuring the links between the implementation 
of direct intervention and interest rate policy in the foreign exchange market and the 
costs of the unsynchronized implementation of these policy instruments in Australia and 
Japan.   
 
 The chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2 details very briefly the literature 
on the links between direct intervention and monetary/interest rate policy.  Section 3 
outlines the empirical methodology. Section 4 reviews the data used in this study and 
the intervention practices of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Bank of 
Japan (BoJ) especially as it relates to the coordination with monetary policy initiatives.  
Section 5 discusses the empirical results and section 6 concludes.   
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3.1 Theory 
 
 Many studies have examined the link between monetary/interest rate policy on 
exchange rates
30
 while others looked at the impact of direct central bank intervention in 
the foreign exchange market on exchange rates
31
.  These studies generally analysed the 
impact of these two policy instruments on exchange rates separately
32
, ignoring the 
inherent endogenous nature of the relationship between direct central bank intervention, 
monetary/interest rate policy.  In particular, research suggests that these policy 
instruments have policy reaction functions where the instruments not only impact on the 
exchange rate but the trends in the exchange rate can actually elicit changes in these 
policy instruments.  Additionally, if central bank direct intervention in the market is not 
fully and immediately sterilised it can lead to changes in the interest rates as the central 
bank attempts to keep its liquidity targets.  Interest rate changes can also cause 
exchange rate changes which the central bank may see as counter to some of its policy 
objectives which necessitate some response in the form of direct intervention.  Of 
course the signaling literature posits that these two policy instruments are linked 
because direct intervention is followed by policy interest rate changes which is 
consistent or bolsters the effect of the direct intervention.   
 
 Theoretically, sterilized interventions in the foreign exchange market can affect 
the exchange rate through a variety of channels that are not mutually exclusive.  These 
include the portfolio balance, market microstructure and signaling channels, all of 
which are based on their respective models of exchange rate determination
33
.  Of these 
channels, the exchange rate, direct intervention and interest rate policy stance nexus is 
only a central theme in the signaling framework.  
 
 The signaling channel works by signaling to market participants the future 
stance of monetary policy which shifts their expectations about future monetary policy 
leading to a change in present exchange rate dynamics.  This holds even if interventions 
are sterilized (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993a; Kaminsky and Lewis, 1996). In this 
framework the exchange rate is treated as an asset price which is determined by the 
                                                 
30
  See Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Clarida et. al. (1998) and Kim and Roubini (2000). 
31
  See Cavusoglu (2010) for an updated review of studies in this area. 
32
  Those studies (Lewis, 1995; Kim, 2003; Egert and Komarek, 2006; Kim and Sheen 2006) that did 
attempt to estimate the impact of these instruments on exchange rates in a joint empirical framework had 
a number of methodological problems. 
33
  See Mussa (1981), Taylor (1995) and Lyons (2001) for outlines of the signaling, portfolio balance and 
microstructure approaches to exchange rates respectively.  
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money supply.  This channel can only work effectively if the central bank has policy 
credibility since the lack of credibility may increase the likelihood of speculative 
attacks
34
 against the currency (Sarno and Taylor 2001).  The fact that this channel works 
by changing perceptions means that it can only be effective if it is well publicized to 
strengthen the central bank’s policy signal.   
 
 The signaling hypothesis requires that intervention leads to future changes in 
monetary policy in line with the initial intervention.  If the signaling channel is working 
sales (purchases) of foreign exchange must be backed up by future contractionary 
(expansionary) monetary policy.  Lewis (1995) demonstrated these features using a 
standard asset pricing model. He showed that in this framework the exchange rate 
depends on lagged money supply, the discounted present value of changes in the money 
supply adjusted by lagged intervention and the expected discounted present value of all 
future interventions.   
 
 This is best explained by a simple model as outlined in Lewis (1995).  Consider 
a standard asset pricing model: 
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where ts is the log exchange rate, f is the log of fundamentals and   is a discount 
factor. Furthermore 
 
 
   tttt vmmf  *         (2) 
 
  
where m  and *m  are the domestic and foreign monetary policy variables and tv  are 
fundaments which are not controlled by central banks.  Following Lewis (1995) we 
assume that *m  and v are exogenous and uncorrelated which means that the exchange 
                                                 
34
  This occurs when market participants speculate against the defensive (usually) interventions of the 
central bank. 
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rate solution is dependent on current expectations of future domestic monetary policy, 
as well as current expectations of foreign monetary policy and other fundamentals out 
of central banks’ control.  We set the values of *m  and v  to zero to focus on the role of 
domestic shocks so that tt mf  .  This does not affect the inferences that can be drawn 
from this simple model regarding the impact of intervention and domestic monetary 
policy on exchange rates because by assumption future values of *m  and v  are 
independent of m  and direct intervention )(I .  Assuming that the process of 
fundamentals is autoregressive in 1
st
 difference we have: 
 
 
 tkttmt Imm   1        (3) 
 
 
where   is the backward difference operator, m is the autoregressive coefficient of the 
first difference of fundamentals on their own lag, tI  is direct intervention at time  
t and   is a parameter relating intervention k  periods in the past to a current change in 
the domestic monetary supply.  If I is measured as sales of foreign currency and the 
central bank is effectively signaling with these interventions then   should be negative 
if m is a monetary aggregate.   
 
 The logic behind this is that an intervention sale is contractionary since it takes 
domestic liquidity out of the system. Therefore, for an intervention sale to be consistent 
with the signaling hypothesis future changes in monetary policy must be contractionary, 
that is, it must be correlated with a fall in m in the future. If a policy interest rate was 
used as a proxy for monetary policy then an intervention sale would have to be 
correlated with a rise in the interest rates, that is   must be positive.  The process for 
intervention is assumed to be autoregressive and is defined as:  
 
 ttIt eII  1  where 0)( tteE        (4) 
 
 
For a given lag  k  then the exchange rate solution is: 
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where   11  mm  .  Equation 5 therefore shows that in this framework the exchange 
rate depends on lagged money supply, the discounted present value of changes in the 
money supply adjusted by lagged intervention and the expected discounted present 
value of all future interventions.  In sum, current interventions affect the exchange rate 
by shifting the agents’ expectations of future money supplies – that is signaling. When 
0   interventions have no impact on the exchange rate but when 0  sales of foreign 
currency will signal future declines in money supplies and current and expected future 
interventions will lead to appreciation today.   
 
 If 1k , that is, the lag between intervention and changes in the money supply is 
one period, the exchange rate solution is: 
 
 
 tImtmtt Imms   1        (6) 
 
 
where   11  II  .  From equation 6, once 0 , current intervention will increase the 
expected money supply in the next period, changing the discount rate on money and 
therefore the exchange rate. The present value of the intervention effect on all future 
expected interventions and therefore money supplies is captured by Im , the product of 
the discount factor of money and the discount factor of intervention.  
 
 This implies that intervention in the foreign exchange market and monetary 
policy targeting the exchange rate are inextricably linked, with important feedback 
effects pointing to the inherent endogeneity of the relationship between direct 
intervention, interest rate (monetary policy) and exchange rates.  Studies studying the 
effectiveness of these policy instruments on exchange rate dynamics separately, 
therefore, invariable leads to the misspecification of the relationship between exchange 
rates and these policy instruments, as well as biased empirical estimates of the 
parameters of these relationships.  To adequately capture the complex dynamics of the 
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links between exchange rates, monetary policy and intervention, a joint empirical 
framework is required.  We turn to this in the next section.  
 
3.2 The Empirical Methodology: Multivariate GARCH 
 
 The empirical methodologies which have been used in previous studies to 
capture the relationship between monetary policy, direct intervention in the foreign 
exchange market and exchange rates in a joint empirical framework include bivariate 
VAR (Lewis, 1995), structural VAR (Kim, 2003), simulated GMM (Kearns and 
Rigobon, 2005) and bivariate EGARCH (Kim and Sheen, 2006).  These studies 
however all suffer from a variety of weaknesses inherent in the empirical methodology 
used.    
 
 Lewis (1995) used two bivariate VARs, one exploring the link between various 
monetary policy proxies and intervention and another looking at the relationship 
between various monetary policy proxies and the exchange rate. The first bivariate 
VAR was used to investigate whether the "signaling" channel was operating and the 
second VAR was used to see if monetary policy had any impact on exchange rates. This 
was an imperfect framework since it could not capture the full range of links and 
feedback effects between the three variables in a bivariate VAR.  Kim (2003) solved the 
specification problem inherent in Lewis' method by using a structural VAR approach 
which included the exchange rate along with the two policy variables, as well as a host 
of other economic variables.  However, the use of monthly data and the validity of the 
identifying restrictions weakened the validity of his results.   
 
 Kearns and Rigobon (2005) utilized daily data and simulated GMM in a multi-
equation framework to study the impact of intervention on exchange rates, whether the 
central bank reacts to exchange rate developments in the formulation of policy (and 
therefore the problem of endogeneity) and how monetary policy initiatives affected 
these relationships.  Their innovation was to use a change in intervention policy by the 
RBA and the BOJ to solve the problem of identification in a situation where the issue of 
endogeneity of the contemporaneous relationship between intervention and exchange 
rates was a serious problem.  
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 The weakness of this approach is that the identification scheme is very specific 
to the two markets studied and therefore its applicability to other markets is 
questionable.  The study also depended on the assumption that the change in 
intervention policy was truly exogenous and not dependent on exchange rate dynamics 
which is questionable given that intervention and therefore intervention policy has been 
shown to react to exchange rate dynamics.  This approach also assumed that parameters 
of the model are stable across the change in intervention policy which is also 
questionable given that the change was made to improve intervention’s effectiveness, 
that is, to make the coefficient measuring the impact of intervention on exchange rates 
larger and/or statistically significant relative to what it was before the change in 
intervention policy. 
 
 Moreover, all these study focused on the first moment ignoring the variance and 
therefore the impact of policy on the volatility of the exchange rate.  This is a major 
weakness of these approaches given that central bank policy is increasingly targeting 
volatility rather than a particular exchange rate.  The empirical methodology must 
therefore be able to measure the impact of policies on the volatility of the exchange rate 
to be useful in a policy context.  In this regard, Kim and Sheen (2006) used a bivariate 
EGARCH model to measure the impact of direct intervention on the exchange rate and 
also to explore the links of these two variables to transactions volumes in the Japanese 
foreign exchange market, not only at levels but also the level of variances.  
 
 Their focus was to examine how transaction volumes impacted on the 
relationship between intervention and exchange rates and therefore only included 
interest rates as an exogenous variable in the specification of the mean equations.  This 
however represents a misspecification since it is generally accepted that direct 
intervention and interest rate policy are endogenous, depending on trends in exchange 
rates and other important variables. It also did not allow the full dynamic of the 
volatility spillovers between direct intervention, interest rates and exchange rates to be 
measured which would provide useful information for policymakers in terms of the 
volatility trade-offs from policy implementation.   
 
 To address these issues we use a tri-variate VAR-GARCH(1,1) framework using 
the BEKK parameterization (See Appendix). The mean equation formulation used in 
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this study can be represented by the following where variables of interest include 
exchange rate returns (ER), intervention (I) and the policy interest rate changes (RR):  
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In this framework 12  and 13  measure the impact of intervention and monetary policy 
(interest rates) on exchange rates. Additionally, 21  measure the tendency of central 
bank interventions to lean against the wind while 32  indicates whether intervention 
“signals” monetary policy or not. 
 
 The conditional variance equation for each variable
35
 which shows how shocks 
and volatility are transmitted over time in each sector can be expanded as follows: 
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35
  The constant terms are excluded. 
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In this framework th ,11 is the conditional variance for the first variable (exchange rates) 
at time t , th ,12  is the conditional covariance between the first variable (exchange rates) 
and the second variable (intervention) and t,13h is the conditional covariance between the 
first (exchange rates) and third variables (interest rate).  The error term 2,ti  measures 
deviations from the mean due to some unanticipated event in variable i  and cross error 
terms such as tt ,2,1  measure the impact of unanticipated events in one sector on another. 
The iia  therefore measure the impact of shocks in variables under consideration on 
conditional variances (volatility) while the iib measure volatility spillovers between 
sectors. 
 
 The BFGS algorithm is used to obtain final estimates of the parameters with the 
variance-covariance matrix and corresponding Bollerslev-Woodridge (1992) 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent standard errors.  The Simplex 
method was used to obtain initial parameter for the BFGS algorithm.  
 
3.3 Data and Intervention Practices in Australia and Japan 
 
3.3.1 Data 
 
 We utilize daily data on intervention, policy interest rates and exchange rates 
rather than the monthly and weekly data used in some studies (Lewis, 1995; Kim, 
2003).  Daily data is more appropriate in today’s policy environment given the ample 
evidence that exchange rates reacts to new information and policy interventions very 
quickly, even on an intra-daily basis. Additionally, the paper utilizes the most recently 
released data on intervention in the foreign exchange market by the Reserve Bank of 
Australia covering the period up to the end of 2006.   
 
 Intervention is defined as daily sales and purchases of foreign currency by the 
RBA and the BoJ.  The exchange rates used for Australia and Japan are measured as 
units of the intervention currency, the US dollar, per Australian dollar and Japanese Yen 
respectively.  Exchange rate returns are used in the estimated models as is standard 
practice in the literature and is defined as )/log(*100 1 ttt ererER  where ter denotes 
the number of units of the US dollars per unit of domestic currency.  The data set on 
Australia covers 1780 observations (after omitting holidays and other non-trading days) 
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over the period January 3, 2000 to December 29, 2006 while the data set for Japan 
covers 1646 observations over the period January 5, 1998 to April 30, 2004.    
 
 Policy interest rate changes are as used as proxies for monetary policy initiatives 
instead of monetary aggregates in this study
36
. Policy interest rate changes are defined 
as )/log(*100 1 ttt rrrrRR where trr denotes the annualized policy interest rate. The 
annualized rates used are the Overnight Call Rate in the case of Japan and the 180-day 
Treasury Bill Rate for Australia.  In Australia’s case the policy interest rate is the Cash 
Rate but the 180-day Treasury Bill Rate is used since it better captured daily changes 
and is highly correlated with the Cash Rate. 
 
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present some summary statistics on exchange rate changes, 
intervention and interest rate changes for Australia and Japan.  These series exhibit 
many of the usual properties of financial time series.  They are generally non-normal, 
leptokurtic and serially correlated.  In the case of Australia, there is bi-directional 
Granger causality between intervention and exchange rate changes, as well as between 
interest rate changes and exchange rate changes.  There is, however, no Granger 
causality between interest rate changes and intervention in either direction.  In the case 
of Japan, Granger causality runs only from exchange rate changes to intervention, while 
there is bi-directional causality between interest rate and exchange rate changes.  Like 
Australia, there is no causality between interest rate changes and intervention. 
                                                 
36
  This is increasingly the practice in empirical studies since monetary aggregates contain elements which 
are positively correlated with interest rates (leeper et. al 1996).  This would be an inappropriate proxy for 
monetary policy analysis based on a monetary model since monetary models are driven by liquidity 
effects which predicts that monetary aggregates would be negatively related to interest rates (Christiano 
and Eichenbaum, 1992).   
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics and Statistical Tests for Australia 
Summary Statistics Australia 
 Exchange rate Intervention Interest rate 
Mean 0.013 0.046 0.003 
Variance 0.48 0.31 0.45 
Skewness -0.26 0.87 -0.99 
Excess kurtosis 4.57 26.15 17.64 
JB normality 203.66 39981 16181 
Unit root -43.39 -11.12 -42.52 
Q(20) 21.36 (0.37) 1222 (0.00) 50 (0.00) 
 
Granger causality 
   
H0: Intervention does not 
cause Exchange rate 
2.89 (0.08)  
H0: Exchange rate does not 
cause intervention 
48.48 (0.00)  
H0: Interest rate does not 
cause Exchange rate 
2.72 (0.09)  
H0: Exchange rate does not 
cause Interest rate 
8.46 (0.00)  
Ho: Intervention does not 
cause Interest rate 
0.92 (0.33)  
H0: Interest rate does not 
cause Intervention 
0.04 (0.83)  
Notes: Unit roots test was the augmented Dickey-Fuller test with constant and lags chosen by the 
Schwarz Information Criterion.  Q(20) is the Ljung-Box Q Statistic for serial correlation and JB 
normality is the Jaque-Bera test statistic for normality.  
 
  
 
 64 
 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics and Statistical Tests for Japan 
Summary Statistics Japan 
 Exchange rate Intervention Interest rate 
Mean 0.011 0.029 -0.237 
Variance 0.50 0.02 423.54 
Skewness 0.52 1.68 0.33 
Excess kurtosis 6.71 83.64 64.79 
JB normality 1016 446773 262792 
Unit root -38.77 -12.28 -27.11 
Q(20) 19.37 (0.49) 525 (0.00) 183.44 (0.00) 
 
Granger causality 
   
H0: Intervention does not 
cause Exchange rate 
0.41 (0.52)  
H0: Exchange rate does 
not cause intervention 
2.74 (0.09)  
H0: Interest rate does not 
cause Exchange rate 
3.55 (0.05)  
H0: Exchange rate does 
not cause Interest rate 
3.97 (0.04)  
Ho: Intervention does not 
cause Interest rate 
0.71 (0.39)  
H0: Interest rate does not 
cause Intervention 
0.15 (0.69)  
Notes: Unit roots test was the augmented Dickey-Fuller test with constant and lags chosen by the 
Schwarz Information Criterion.  Q(20) is the Ljung-Box Q Statistic for serial correlation and JB 
normality is the Jaque-Bera test statistic for normality.  
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3.3.2 Intervention Practices 
 
 In the case of Australia, the RBA’s approach to intervention has changed over 
time.  In particular, the RBA has moved from using frequent small interventions with 
many switches from intervention sales to purchases prior to June 1995 to infrequent and 
large intervention after that date (Kearns and Rigobon, 2005 and Kim and Sheen, 2006).  
This was driven by the RBA’s initial concern with volatility and unsettled market 
conditions in the early years of the float
37
 which then changed from June 1995 to 
focusing on episodes when the exchange rate moved to a level that did not seem 
consistent with macroeconomic fundamentals.  The period covered by this study 
therefore coincides with the latter regime.  Identifying when the exchange rate is not 
aligned with fundamentals is not a simple issue but in practice this means that the RBA 
generally intervenes when the exchange rate moves to long or medium term highs and 
lows (Becker and Sinclair, 2004).    
 
 The RBA’s intervention purchases and sales of Australian dollars has been 
relatively frequent (See Table 2.3) and are predominantly against the US dollar in the 
spot market. The RBA not only has to decide when to intervene but also must determine 
the amount of the intervention.  The RBA’s intervention activities are sterilized by 
countervailing transactions in the Australian money market to keep the domestic policy 
interest rate close to target.  The RBA has recently begun to make greater use of foreign 
exchange swaps to sterilize intervention activities.   In Australia’s case intervention 
policy generally seemed to be in sync with monetary policy objectives, with 
intervention generally attempting to move the exchange rate in a direction consistent 
with the current monetary policy stance (Mc Farlane, 1993). 
 
 In the case of Japan, the BoJ did not intervene nearly as frequently as the RBA 
(See Table 3.3) but when it did so it generally intervened on a much larger scale than 
the RBA.  This is not surprising given the relative size of the two markets, although the 
turnover in the Australian market has been increasing relative to the Japanese market in 
recent years
38.  The stated objective of the BoJ’s interventions in the foreign exchange 
market is to mitigate the negative impact of large fluctuations in the Yen, which is on a 
                                                 
37
  The Australian dollar was floated on December 12, 1983. 
38
  The average daily turnover in the Australian foreign exchange market over the period 1998-2007 was 
US$92.8 billion compared to US$180 billion In the Japanese market in the same period (BIS, 2007). 
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long term appreciating trend
39
.  This implies that the BoJ not only responds to volatility 
but “leans against the wind” of Yen appreciation. 
 
Table 3.3: The Dynamics of Intervention 
Variable Australia Japan 
Sales Days 
Purchases Days 
Total Interventions Days 
Total Sample Days 
443 3 
646 158 
1089 161 
1782 1646 
%  Intervention Days 
% Intervention Sale Days  
% Intervention Purchase Days 
61.1 9.8 
24.9 0.2 
36.3 9.6 
Average Inter. Sales (US$M) 
Average Inter. Purchases (US$M) 
Max. Inter. Sales (US$M) 
Max. Inter. Purchases (US$M) 
27.3 7805.1 
31.3 2920.7 
293.0 20306.1 
458.5 15568.0 
  
Note: % intervention days are calculated as intervention days divided by 
total sample days. 
   
 The BoJ’s intervention transactions were predominantly against the US dollar in 
the spot market but there were a few transactions against the Euro in the review period.  
The BoJ intervention transactions appear to be sterilized given that funds for US$ 
purchase/Yen sales were raised by issuing financing bills and US$ sales/Yen purchases 
are derived from the Foreign Exchange Fund Special Account of the Japanese 
government.  The sterilization of intervention transactions and the link to monetary 
policy is complicated in the period covered by this study because interest rates were 
close to zero and the normal monetary policy transmission channels may not have been 
in play in many instances during this period.  Moreover, from 2003 onwards the money 
supply has increased steadily along with intensive intervention purchases of foreign 
currency/sales of Yen.  This implies that the BoJ did not sterilize all or part of the Yen 
sales from its intervention activity, that is, a significant amount of interventions may 
have been unsterilized (Spiegel, 2003).  Even if the intervention transaction of the BoJ 
near the end of the period under review was unsterilized, the low interest rate/liquidity 
trap environment for this period may manifest itself in insignificant links between 
                                                 
39
  The objectives, modality and financing of intervention in the Japanese foreign exchange market are 
explained in a BoJ document at (www.boj.or.jp/en/about/basic/etc/faqkainy.htm). 
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intervention and interest rates but significant links between intervention and exchange 
rate implying that intervention is operating mostly through the portfolio channel.    
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
 
 The mean and variance equations with BEKK parameterization are estimated 
simultaneously and the results for Australian and Japan are reported in Tables 3.4 and 
3.5 respectively.  The constant terms in the mean and variance equations are not 
reported for brevity
40
.  The variables in the tri-variate VAR-GARCH(1,1), exchange 
rate returns, intervention and interest rate changes are indexed as 1, 2 and 3 respectively 
in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.  
 
 The estimation results from the mean equation are important because they speak 
to important issues concerning the practice of central bank intervention in the foreign 
exchange market.  In particular, 12  and 13  measure the impact of intervention and 
monetary policy (interest rates) respectively on exchange rates. Additionally, 21  
measures the tendency of central bank interventions to lean against the wind while 32  
indicates whether intervention signals monetary policy or not.   
 
 In the case of Australia, the coefficient 12  is -0.100 and significant, indicating 
that sales of foreign currency against the local currency lead to an appreciation of the 
Australia Dollar.  This coefficient is relatively close but smaller than the coefficient 
obtained in Kearns and Rigobon (2005) but this is likely related to the fact that they 
used the period 1986 to 2002.  The coefficient 21  was 0.155 and significant indicating 
that the RBA intervened predominantly to “lean against the wind”, that is, if the 
exchange rate was depreciating (appreciating) it intervened by selling (purchasing) 
foreign exchange to counter this trend.  This is again in keeping with the findings of 
previous studies exploring this issue in Australia (Kearns and Rigobon, 2005).   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
  The constant terms were all highly significant indicating the models were well specified but were 
excluded because they had no bearing on the central themes being investigated.  Also, including these 
terms would have made the tables difficult to format.  
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Table 3.4: Estimated Coefficients for the Trivariate GARCH for Australia 
 Exchange 
Rate (i=1) 
 Intervention 
(i=2) 
 Interest 
Rate (i=3) 
 
i1  
0.005 (0.23) -0.100 (-4.01) 0.040 (1.67) 
i2  
0.155 (6.13) 0.162 (5.68) 0.003 (0.19) 
i3  
0.037 (2.19) -0.027 (-1.56) 0.030 (1.12) 
i1a  
0.991 (343.43) -0.032 (-4.68) -0.004 (-1.60) 
i2a  
0.067 (3.08) 0.808 (12.77) -0.011 (-1.13) 
i3a  
0.001 (0.32) -0.001 (-0.12) 0.988 (212.27) 
i1b  
0.084 (2.65) 0.217 (3.14) 0.038 (1.89) 
i2b  
-0.063 (-2.94) 0.401 (6.03) 0.009 (0.65) 
ib3  
0.006 (0.21) -0.031 (-0.79) 0.146 (4.98) 
)10(LB  9.9 [0.45] 10.2 [0.39] 8.9 [0.56] 
)10(LBs  8.2 [0.61] 1.4 [0.99] 2.1 [0.99] 
LLR  -3636      
Notes: )10(LB  and )10(LBs are the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for standardized and squared standardized 
residuals at lag 10 respectively and LLR  is the log likelihood. Standard errors are Bollerslev-Woodridge 
(1992) heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent. Values in round brackets are t-values and 
square brackets are the probabilities for the Ljung-Box Q-statistics.  In terms of the estimated coefficients 
starting from left to right in the Table,  the coefficient 11 in the first row first column measures the 
impact of lagged exchange rate returns on current levels of exchange rate returns, the coefficient 12 in 
the first row third column measures the impact of lagged intervention on current exchange rate returns 
and the coefficient 13 in the first row sixth column measures the impact of lagged interest rate changes 
on current exchange rate returns. Similarly, in the ninth row first column, the coefficient 31b measures the 
volatility spillovers from lagged exchange rate returns to current volatility of interest rate changes, in the 
ninth row third column, the coefficient 32b measures volatility spillovers from lagged intervention to 
current interest rate changes and the coefficient 33b in the ninth row sixth column measures the volatility 
spillovers from lagged  to current interest rate change changes. 
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 The coefficient value for 32 was -0.027, its sign suggested that a sale of foreign 
currency, which is contractionary, would lead to an increase in the interest rate (also 
contractionary) and therefore direct intervention appeared to “signal’ future interest rate 
policy. This coefficient was however marginally insignificant. The impact of interest 
rate policy on exchange rates as measured by the coefficient 13 is 0.040 indicating that 
increases (decreases) in interest rates leads to exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) 
as would be expected.   
 
 Other noteworthy results include the fact that interest rate and exchange rate 
changes appears to have a bi-directional relationship and seem to be driven by common 
factors since both coefficients 13  and 31  are positive and significant.  These common 
factors are most likely due to the fact that the period under review is dominated by a 
trend of exchange rate appreciation and increased interest rates in the context of robust 
economic growth.   
 
 In the case of Japan, the mean equation results are broadly similar to Australia in 
the sense that intervention moves the exchange rate in the expected direction, the BoJ 
displays “leaning against the wind” behavior and direct intervention appears to “signal” 
future interest rate policy (Watanabe, 1994).  That is, 12 , 21  and 32 are -0.16, 0.01 
and -2.18 respectively (See Table 3.5).  These results are broadly in line with the results 
of previous studies in this area on Japan (Kearns and Rigobon, 2005; Kim and Sheen, 
2006).  The fact that 12  is negative and significant means that when the BoJ intervenes 
selling US dollars (negative) the Yen appreciates (positive exchange rate returns).  The 
estimated coefficient 21  indicates that if the exchange rate is depreciating (negative 
exchange rate returns) the central banks tends to intervene selling foreign exchange to 
support the Yen and "lean against the wind" of the exchange rate trend.  The BoJ also 
tends to intervene buying foreign exchange to slow down or stop an appreciating trend.  
In fact, for a significant part of this period the BoJ was engaged in intervention 
purchases of foreign currency to weaken the Yen against the US dollar in an attempt to 
promote export led growth.   
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Table 3.5: Estimated Coefficients for the Trivariate GARCH for Japan 
 Exchange 
Rate (i=1) 
 Intervention 
(i=2) 
 Interest 
Rate (i=3) 
 
i1  
0.076 (2.57) -0.156 (-1.83) -0.001 (-2.07) 
i2  
0.009 (12.01) 0.090 (5.00) -0.001 (-5.89) 
i3  
-0.122 (-0.17) -2.180 (-2.38) -0.525 (-4.79) 
ia1  
0.995 (548.01) -0.001 (-1.01) -0.255 (-3.97) 
i2a  
-0.032 (-0.21) 0.036 (1.83) 0.102 (0.09) 
i3a  
0.001 (2.21) 0.001 (2.51) 0.967 (108.33) 
i1b  
0.063 (2.51) -0.075 (-7.78) 4.049 (3.52) 
i2b  
0.087 (0.09) 6.179 (9.19) -1.127 (-0.15) 
i3b  
-0.001 (-1.62) 0.001 (0.37) 0.255 (7.07) 
)10(LB  6.6 [0.75] 9.7 [0.61] 10.1 [0.53] 
)10(LBs  1.2 [0.99] 1.9 [0.98] 1.1 [0.99] 
LLR  -6662      
Notes: See notes to Table 4. 
 
 The negative and significant value of the coefficient 32 indicates that 
intervention "signals" interest rate policy changes since direct intervention is normally 
followed by an interest rate policy change that bolsters the impact of the direct 
intervention.  That is, intervention sales of foreign exchange (negative) which aims to 
curb monetary expansion would be followed by an increase in the policy interest rate 
(positive) which is also restrictive and intervention purchases of foreign exchange 
(positive) would tend to be followed by a decrease in the policy interest rate which are 
both expansionary.  The negatively signed coefficient 13  indicates that increases in the 
domestic policy interest rate leads to exchange rate depreciation.  This is not what one 
would expect and may be due to extremely low interest rates during this period coupled 
with the mild average trend for the Yen to depreciate over this period.  In any case the 
coefficient is extremely small (-0.0014).  The coefficient 23 is also negative and 
significant, albeit very small, indicating some level of bi-directional relation between 
interest rates and intervention, that is, if interest rates rise (contractionary) this is 
generally accompanied by the central bank intervention sales of foreign currency 
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(contractionary).  This implies that intervention activity and interest rate policy 
measures are geared to common goals and appear to be used interchangeably in Japan.  
These results, especially those from the mean equations, can be exploited for forecasting 
purposes.  The strong relationship between direct intervention and exchange rate returns 
means that market participants can reliably estimate future exchange rate returns based 
on current central bank intervention activity.  The ability to forecast exchange rate 
returns have huge implications for investment managers with Yen denominated 
financial assets and currency traders.   
 
 As noted above, the trivariate VAR-GARCH (1,1) framework through the 
variance/covariance equations also allows us to look at the volatility dynamics of 
exchange rates, intervention and interest rate policy in a joint framework.  This is 
important since central banks are increasingly concerned about the volatility 
consequences of policy measures.  The transmission of shocks across variables in the 
trivariate VAR-GARCH (1,1) is reflected in the iia coefficients with the diagonal 
elements measuring the impact of own past shocks while the off-diagonal elements 
measure the impact of shocks from other variables on volatility.  In the case of 
Australia, Table 3.4 shows that shocks to intervention, that is the coefficient 12a , is -
0.032 and significant, which suggests that intervention activity reduces exchange rate 
volatility.  The coefficient  13a  is -0.004 but insignificant which suggests that interest 
rate changes do not have a significant effect on volatility.  This implies that in Australia 
direct intervention could be deployed to control exchange rate volatility and undesirable 
trends but interest rate policy is only effective in moving the level of the exchange rate 
in the desired direction.   More importantly, the implementation of these policy 
instruments were not associated with increased volatility and therefore reduced 
effectiveness as advanced by some studies.  Additionally, shocks to the exchange rate 
increases the volatility of intervention since 21a  is 0.068 and significant. This backs up 
the "leaning against the wind" results from the mean equation where intervention 
activity increases in response to exchange rate developments which the central bank 
views as undesirable. 
 
 The volatility spillovers between variables in the trivariate VAR-GARCH (1,1) 
are reflected in the iib  coefficients.  For Australia, volatility spillovers from intervention 
( 12b ) and interest rates ( 13b ) to exchange rates are significant at 0.217 and 0.038 
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respectively, implying that inconsistent or erratic implementation of these policy 
instruments may contribute to greater exchange rate volatility.  This may have informed 
the observed interest rate smoothing behavior on the part of central banks and the move 
to have fewer but larger direct interventions to project an unambiguous signal to the 
market.   
 
 In the case of Japan (Table 3.5), the coefficient 13a  at -0.255 indicates that 
shocks to interest rates has a significant dampening effect on exchange rate volatility 
whereas the coefficient 12a at -0.001 but insignificant suggests that intervention activity 
have no significant impact on exchange rate volatility.  This implies that direct 
intervention is not effective in controlling exchange rate volatility but interest rate 
policy charges are.  Also, shocks to exchange rates have a small positive and significant 
impact on the volatility of interest rates as reflected in the coefficient 31a , implying a 
sort of trade off between exchange and interest rate volatility.  Past shocks to 
intervention also generates a small but significant increase in the volatility of interest 
rates ( 32a ) implying that this policy instrument achieves its goals in terms of moving the 
exchange rate level in the desired direction, without increasing exchange rate volatility 
but at the expense of moderate increases in interest rate volatility.   
 
 The transmission of volatility spillovers between variables in the trivariate VAR-
GARCH (1,1) for Japan indicates that volatility in intervention activity and interest rates 
have significant effects on the volatility in exchange rates.  The coefficient 12b  of -0.075 
indicates that higher variances of intervention associated with the implementation of 
direct intervention leads to lower volatility in exchange rates and therefore the central 
bank do not have to worry about increased exchange rate volatility when using direct 
intervention.  On the other hand, the significant coefficient 13b  of 4.049 indicates that 
interest rate volatility increases the volatility of exchange rates and greater caution is 
needed when implementing policy interest rate changes.  This suggests that policy 
interest rate changes should be done in consistent manner to avoid reversals and 
minimize volatility.  It also suggests that interest rate smoothing would be a useful 
strategy in this market. 
 
 The multivariate GARCH framework also allows us to look at the conditional 
correlation of important variables over time.  This allows us to see how these 
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correlations evolve over time and could offer some insights into the substitutability of 
direct intervention and policy interest rates over time, as well important trade-offs 
between the costs of policy implementation such as increased volatility and the 
achievement of policy targets.  In this regard, Charts 3.1 and 3.2 show the conditional 
correlation of the variables in the trivariate VAR-GARCH(1,1) model for Australia and 
Japan respectively.   
 
 In both Charts 3.1 and 3.2 the correlations over time between intervention and 
exchange rate, interest rate and exchange rate and intervention and interest rate are 
displayed in rows 1, 2 and 3 of these Charts respectively together with intervention, 
interest rate changes and exchange rate changes respectively. The most obvious fact 
flowing from Charts 3.1 and 3.2 is that while the correlations may be low for much of 
the periods under review in Australia and Japan, they are very high during periods when 
exchange rate volatility is high, as well as, during periods when there are very large 
changes in the two policy instruments.   
 
 For Australia, Chart 3.1 shows that generally the correlation of intervention and 
exchange rate is highest when intervention (panel A), interest rate changes (panel B) 
and exchange rate changes (panel C) respectively are high. Similarly, panels D, E and F 
of Chart 3.1 show that the correlation between interest rates and exchange rates are high 
when intervention, interest rate changes and exchange rate movement respectively are 
high. This is also the case of the correlation of intervention and interest rates when 
intervention (panel G), interest rate changes (panel H) and exchange rate movement 
(panel I) respectively are high. 
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Figure 3.1: Conditional Correlations for Australia 
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Figure 3.2: Conditional Correlations for Japan 
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 In the case of Japan a similar pattern is observed when we look at Chart 3.2 
panels A to I. The average correlation between these variables are low because of the 
low correlation between these policy instruments and exchange rates during the 
predominantly long periods of calm in the foreign exchange markets, suggesting the 
ineffectiveness of these policy instruments during these calm periods.  During periods 
of high volatility, however, the correlations between exchange rates and policy 
instruments are high implying effectiveness.  
 
 The policy instruments therefore appear to be effective when they are most 
needed, that is, during periods of volatility and when the exchange rate may have moved 
too far from the level implied by fundamentals.  The low and or insignificant impact of 
direct intervention found in many previous studies could be attributed to the fact that 
only in high volatility periods is changes to the policy instrument large enough and 
therefore the policy signal from the central bank clear enough to market participants to 
elicit a significant change in the exchange rate (Seerattan and Spagnolo, 2009).        
 
 It also appears that periods when the correlation of intervention and exchange 
rates was high coincided with periods when there were large changes in policy interest 
rates.  For Australia, Chart 3.1 panel B bears this out while a similar pattern emerges for 
Japan from Chart 3.2 panel B.  The correlation of interest rate changes and exchange 
rate returns seems also to be high when intervention activity is high in Australia (Chart 
3.1 panel D) and Japan (Chart 3.2 panel D). This implies that there is some level of 
coordination between direct intervention and policy interest rate changes.  This 
implication is borne out in the correlation of direct intervention and interest rate changes 
in panels G and H of Charts 3.1 and 3.2 for Australia and Japan respectively.   
 
 These charts show that the correlation between these two policy instruments 
tends to be high when the magnitude of policy interventions is high.  Moreover, the 
correlation between these two policy instruments also tend to be high during periods 
when exchange rate movements are pronounced (panel I in Charts 3.1 and 3.2 for 
Australia and Japan), implying that unusually large exchange rate changes tend to elicit 
large policy changes in these two instruments which are coordinated.    
 
 The results imply that there are common factors driving direct intervention and 
policy interest rates initiatives.  The results of the multivariate GARCH estimation in 
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terms of the mean and variance equations, as well as the conditional correlations 
indicate that chief amongst these common factors is exchange rate developments.  The 
sequence of events therefore appears to be that the central bank responds to unfavorable 
exchange rate developments, which normally relates to unusually large movement in the 
level and/or volatility of the rate.  This elicits direct intervention by the central bank 
generally designed to “lean against the wind” which then “signals” the future interest 
rate policy stance. 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
 The main conclusions of this chapter are broadly supportive of the results of 
previous studies looking at the issue of the effectiveness of and motivation for direct 
intervention in the foreign exchange markets in Australia and Japan.  The results of the 
study also add new information on the links between exchange rate dynamics, direct 
intervention and interest rate policy in a joint framework that allow us to look at the 
results of policy both at the levels and volatility of exchange rates.  The trivariate VAR-
GARCH (1,1) framework also allowed us to look at the conditional correlation of 
important variables over time which highlighted the effectiveness of policy at key 
junctures in the periods under review and the fact that the policy instruments were 
linked because they were responding to common factors.   
 
 The results confirmed the results of many past studies that intervention is 
effective in Australia and Japan in the sense that it tends to move the level of exchange 
rate changes in the desired direction.  The study also confirmed that central banks 
generally intervened to “lean against the wind” and the relationship of intervention to 
policy interest rates could generally be characterized by the “signaling” framework.   
 
 The results from the variance equations also added to our knowledge in the 
sense that it showed that the implementation of these policy measures was not 
associated with the cost of increased exchange rate volatility in the short term.  Indeed, 
quite to the contrary it showed that these policy instruments were generally successful 
in reducing exchange rate volatility in both countries, although Australia appeared to 
have greater success with direct intervention while Japan had more success with interest 
rate policy changes.  Additionally, in terms of the indirect cost of increased exchange 
rate volatility when intervention was used Japan paid no costs since the volatility 
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spillovers were negative but Australia paid significant indirect costs in terms of greater 
exchange rate volatility.  In the case of interest rate policy, indirect volatility spillovers 
from the policy instrument to exchange rate volatility was positive in both countries but 
Japan paid a much higher price relative to Australia. These differential impacts of policy 
instruments on the mean and variance of the exchange rate highlights the utility and 
logic of using a trivariate VAR-GARCH (1,1) framework for the simultaneous 
assessment of these issues.  
 
 Another noteworthy new insight from the results is that the lack of significant 
spillovers from exchange rate volatility to the volatility of direct intervention and 
interest rate changes also suggest that in both Australia and Japan the authorities was 
more concerned with countering undesirable trends in the exchange rate rather that 
dealing with excessive volatility.    
 
 Finally, the evidence from the conditional correlations suggests that the links 
between the policy instruments were in large part due to the fact that both were driven 
by common factors.  In particular, both generally responded to exchange rate changes in 
the context of leaning against undesirable exchange rate trends. Additionally, this 
relationship was most clearly defined during periods of high exchange rate volatility 
when the policy interventions were large and the objective of policy interventions was 
very clear to agents in the market.  The correlations also suggest a reason for previous 
studies results indicating intervention activities were ineffective, that is, the correlation 
of this policy variable with exchange rate changes were generally only high during 
volatile episode when there were large changes in the exchange rate.  The coefficient 
generated by these studies were averages of the periods studied which were generally 
dominated by normal periods when there were small exchange rate changes and 
therefore would misleadingly generate coefficient that were either insignificant or 
wrongly signed.  The time varying correlations allowed us to see clearly that the 
relationship between direct intervention and exchange rate was much stronger during 
unusual times and contrary to these previous studies this instrument was effective when 
it had to be.      
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CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPACT OF CENTRAL BANK POLICY 
INTERVENTIONS ON THE VOLUME-ASSET PRICE 
DYNAMIC IN THE ICELANDIC FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE MARKET 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
 Trading volume in the foreign exchange market eclipses that in other financial 
markets by a considerable margin (Lyons, 1996; Jorion, 1996).  The sheer size of 
trading volumes in these markets and the fact that trading also seems to be correlated 
with increases in price variability also suggests that trading volume may possess 
information that is central to the pricing dynamics in the foreign exchange markets 
(Tauchen and Pitts, 1983; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Galati, 2000; Rime, Sarno and 
Sojli, 2010).  The links between trading volumes and asset returns are usually analysed 
in the information flow and market microstructure frameworks (Copeland, 1976; 
Clarke, 1973; Tauchen and Pitt, 1983; Pfleiderer, 1984; Easley and O’Hara, 1987; 
Blume, Easley and O’Hara, 1994; Wang, 1994).  This literature has focused on stock 
markets (Karpoff, 1987) but increasingly researchers have looked at this issue in foreign 
exchange markets (Jorion, 1996; Hartmann, 1999).  
 
 Studies on volume dynamics in foreign exchange markets have, however, 
suffered from the absence of comprehensive data on volume in these markets.  These 
studies have used proxies such as foreign exchange futures (Jorion, 1996), the frequency 
of indicative quotes (Bollerslev and Domowitz, 1993) and brokered volume on the 
Tokyo market (Kim and Sheen, 2006).  All of these volume measures suffer from 
weaknesses related to their suitability for capturing all the trades in the market.  Galati 
(2000) is one of the few studies to examine comprehensive volume data in a number of 
countries and finds that unexpected volume is positively correlated to price volatility.  
 
 In this context, trading volume is likely to have a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of government policy instruments directed at changing the price dynamics 
in this market but only a few studies have focused on this issue (Chang, 2005; Kim and 
Sheen, 2006). Policy makers are also increasingly interested in the volatility dynamics 
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in the market, as well as price at levels, so an empirical framework such as multivariate 
GARCH is needed which allows for the measurement of the impact of policy variables 
on both levels and variance for target variables.  The suitability of this empirical 
methodology to analyse the links between volumes and prices in the foreign exchange 
market is reinforced when one considers that Hsier (1989), Baillie and Bollerslev 
(1989), Bollerslev (1990) and Anderson (1996) have all shown that exchange rate 
returns can best be modeled by a GARCH processes while Hartmann (1999) and Jorion 
(1996) have shown that foreign exchange volume can also be modeled as a GARCH 
process. 
 
 The few studies looking at the impact of policy on volume and prices in the 
foreign exchange market have correctly used the GARCH methodology but they have 
invariably focused on developed markets, have used trading volume information that 
did not capture the total volume generated in these markets and did not extend the 
empirical methodology to capture the full endogeneity between policy measures and 
volume and prices in the foreign exchange market (Chang, 2005; Kim and Sheen, 
2006).  
 
 This study seeks to help fill the gap in the literature on the dynamic between 
volume and returns in the foreign exchange market in the context of central bank policy 
initiatives by building on and extending the work of Kim and Sheen (2006).  It extends 
the work by looking at these issues in a developing market with a volume measure that 
captures virtually all the transactions in the spot foreign exchange market.  It also 
extends the work by including both direct intervention and policy interest rates in a 
multivariate GARCH framework thereby capturing the major variable driving returns 
and volumes in the foreign exchange market and therefore the true endogeneity of the 
relationship between these variables.  This therefore represents an improvement on the 
empirical specification used in Kim and Sheen (2006) to investigate these issues.  It 
examines the links at levels and variance between volumes and returns in a developing 
market, the Icelandic foreign exchange market, and the effect that central bank policy 
such as direct intervention and interest rate policy has on this relationship in a four 
variable VAR GARCH (1,1) framework.     
 
 Very importantly, it also investigates the impact of policy on the level and 
volatility of trading volume.  This is important since even in the absence of significant 
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changes in exchange rate returns, unsettled market conditions in the form of huge 
swings in volume can be as damaging as price volatility. These episodes of volatility in 
trading volumes are often accompanied by volatile exchange rate returns and large 
changes in domestic interest rates, making economic management extremely difficult 
for policy makers.  
 
 The Icelandic foreign exchange market is chosen to investigate these issues 
because it suffered two episodes of crisis in its foreign exchange market recently in 
2006 and 2008.  Moreover, although the Icelandic foreign exchange market is small by 
international standards, experience has shown that volatility in this market has been 
transmitted to a number of emerging markets in 2006 because of the carry trade 
phenomenon.  Additionally, the 2008 episode exposed the inherent vulnerability of 
small foreign exchange markets such as the Icelandic market driven by the risky 
portfolio strategy of their commercial banks which took on huge open positions in 
foreign currency liabilities to finance asset acquisition in domestic and foreign currency, 
way in excess of the Country’s capacity to carry such liabilities or to bail out failed 
banks.  In this context, as well as the context of the international financial and economic 
crisis in 2008, the problems in this market were transmitted to many developed markets.  
Indeed, a range of institutional investors were affected in developed market economies 
when Icelandic banks could not honor their foreign currency liabilities.   
 
 In both these episode of currency crisis in Iceland there were huge swings in 
trading volume.  The links between volume and returns and the impact central bank 
policy interventions have had on this relationship and the market generally is therefore 
of increased importance given that the international financial crisis that began in 2007 
has meant that this dynamic is likely to be played out in many countries.  The recent 
global financial crisis in many cases was propagated through foreign exchange markets 
and direct intervention in the foreign markets was a tool used by many central banks in 
their efforts to control contagion from the financial crisis affecting their foreign 
exchange markets.  Additionally, trading volume and market liquidity often dried up or 
became extremely volatile during the crisis exacerbating the economic problems being 
experienced.  In this context, the importance of the relationship between trading volume 
and returns in the foreign exchange market, as well as how this relationship was 
affected by central bank intervention in this market has assumed great importance to 
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policymakers.  The release of data on the foreign exchange market by the central bank 
of Iceland has also made this analysis possible.   
 
 This study therefore investigates the link between trading volume and returns in 
the foreign exchange market at level and variance, as well as the effect that central bank 
policies (both in terms of interest rate policy and direct interventions) have on this 
relationship.  This would allow policy makers to draw inferences about traditional 
challenges such as the effectiveness of central bank intervention in moving exchange 
rates in the desired direction and the ability to control exchange rate volatility.  Very 
importantly, it will also investigate the impact of policy on the level and volatility of 
trading volume.  This is important since even in the absence of significant changes in 
exchange rate returns, unsettled market conditions in the form of huge swings in volume 
can be as damaging as price volatility, especially in smaller markets where low market 
liquidity poses serious challenges to agents in the market.  Also, large fluctuations in 
volume often signals that there is currently major differences of opinions amongst 
agents in the market about trends in prices which is also cause for concern because it 
could generate considerable price volatility in the future.  Volatile volume can therefore 
serve as an important early warning of price volatility.  It is therefore reasonable to 
expect central banks to be concerned about the behavior of trading volume in the 
foreign exchange market and to try and meliorate undesirable volume dynamics from 
developing in the foreign exchange market. In this context, trading volume is not only a 
target for policy but an explanatory variable in the policy reaction function of central 
banks, since developments with respect to volume can drive the policy response of 
central banks.    
 
 This study contributes to the literature on the link between volume and price 
dynamics in the foreign exchange market by examining these issues in a joint empirical 
framework, a four-variable VAR-GARCH (1,1), which allows us to capture the inherent 
endogenous relationships in the foreign exchange market between policy measures, 
price and volume.  We can look at the impact of policy on the level and variance of 
target variables, we can look at the way in which market conditions drives the policy 
responses of the central bank and we can look at the interaction of different policy 
instrument to discern the interconnectedness of policy instruments.  
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 This study is closest in orientation to the study by Kim and Sheen (2006).  The 
structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the links 
between trading volumes and returns in the foreign exchange market and the impact 
central bank interventions have had on this relationship. Section 3 presents stylized facts 
on the Icelandic foreign exchange market and details of policy interventions by the 
Central Bank of Iceland.  Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology and discusses 
the empirical results and, Section 5 concludes. 
 
4.1 Literature Review:  The Links Between Volume, Price Dynamics 
and Central Bank Policy Interventions in the Foreign Exchange 
Market       
 
 The relationship between volume and asset returns in financial markets has 
generally been couched in the information dynamics framework amongst agents in the 
market, as well as in the market microstructure framework.  It should be noted that these 
are not mutually exclusive frameworks since information asymmetry plays an important 
role in both systems.  The information flow framework is essentially driven by the 
sequential information arrival models and the mixture of distributions (MDH) models.  
The sequential information arrival models (Copeland 1976) starts off with agents in 
equilibrium, that is they are satisfied with their portfolio holdings, new information is 
then received by individual agents one at a time who then revise their beliefs and trades 
to arrive at a new temporary equilibrium.  These actions lead to increased volumes and 
transaction price changes.  This process continues until all agents have received the 
information and a new final equilibrium is reached.  The fundamental insight of these 
models is that volume can forecast prices.  
 
 In contrast the MDH (Clarke, 1973; Tauchen and Pitt 1983) posits an underlying 
information flow that leads to the joint dependence of volumes and prices.  They 
assume a random arrival of new information where information arrivals cause increased 
trading volume and price changes.  Anderson (1996) modifies this basic model by 
including liquidity traders who do not trade in response to information arrivals and by 
assuming that information arrivals are serially correlated.  The latter property leads to 
volatility persistence and therefore GARCH type models may be best at capturing the 
time series properties of the relationship between volume and prices in the MDH 
framework.     
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 In terms of the market microstructure framework, private information is central 
to the analysis of the price-volume relationship.  This relationship is, however, clouded 
by the fact that it is unclear what exact information volume provides to the market.  The 
informational role of volume in the price process has been investigated by Pfleiderer 
(1984), Easley and O’Hara (1987), Blume, Easley and O’Hara (1994) and Wang (1994).  
These studies can be separated into two categories, one which used the rational 
expectations framework to look at how volume is generated in an environment where 
agents with different information trade and another which looks at the information 
inherent in volume and the learning that occurs from observing volume. The first set of 
studies (Wang, 1994) provides links between volume and agents characteristics which 
allows one to make a connection between price changes and volume.  In particular, 
volume is positively correlated with the absolute value of excess returns and the greater 
the asymmetry between agents information sets the greater the trading volume.    
 
 The second approach (Blume, Easley and O’Hara, 1994) looks at the learning 
that occurs when agents can condition their behavior on information contained in 
volume as well as price information in forming demand. The role of volume in the price 
adjustment process is to help agents to clear up the uncertainty of the quality of 
information from the direction of information which is derived from observing prices.  
The signal from volume is different from prices because volume, unlike prices, is not 
normally distributed. Agents therefore get better information by observing both volumes 
and prices.  In this learning by trading approach volume and price changes are 
positively correlated.     
 
 A review of the relationship between trading volumes and asset price dynamics 
by Karpoff (1987) also indicated that the vast majority of studies up to that period were 
devoted to examining this issue in the context of stock exchanges.  This has since 
changed with a number of studies looking at these issues in the context of the foreign 
exchange markets (Bollerslev and and Domowitz, 1993; Jorion, 1996; Kim and Sheen, 
2006; Galati, 2000; Melvin and Yin, 2000; Park, 2010).  This trend has been caused by 
a number of factors.  Some of the main reasons include the fact that foreign exchange 
markets are the largest in terms of daily turnover, the fact that exchange rate dynamics 
have such profound effects on economic conditions generally and on financial asset 
prices in particular and because more comprehensive information on the operations of 
foreign exchange markets are increasingly readily available.  
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 Many studies have looked at the impact of direct central bank intervention in the 
foreign exchange market in terms of its impact on price dynamics (Beine, 2004; Kim 
and Rigobon, 2005; Kim and sheen, 2006).  The direct intervention policy reaction 
function of the central bank have also been looked at by a number of authors 
(Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1996; Ito, 2002; Ito and Yabu; 2007) and some studies 
have looked at the substitutability and relationship between direct intervention and 
monetary policy, particularly interest rate policy (kaminsky and Lewis, 1996; Bosner-
Neal, Roley and Sellon, 1998, Sellon, 2003; Vitale, 2003; Egert and Komarek, 2006).  
Moreover, many studies have looked at the impact of interest rate policy on exchange 
rate dynamics (Eichenbaum and Evens, 1995; Faust and Rogers, 2003; Chen 2006) and 
some have looked at the effect of central bank interventions on volume (Jorion, 1996; 
Chaboud and Lebron, 2001).   
 
 We do not know of any study, however, that have looked at the impact of central 
bank policy (both direct intervention and interest rate policy) on trading volume and 
exchange rate returns at both the level and variance in the foreign exchange market.  
The only study to our knowledge that have come closest to pulling these related strands 
of literature together in an integrated framework for the spot foreign exchange market is 
the Kim and Sheen (2006) study
41
. Kim and Sheen looked at the impact of central bank 
policy in the spot foreign exchange market in a multivariate GARCH framework that 
captured the many inherent links between volume, prices and policy variables in the 
foreign exchange market.  However, Kim and Sheen (2006) by using a bivariate 
GARCH formulation with volume and returns together with a separate probit model for 
the policy reaction function of the central bank for direct intervention, was unable to 
capture the full dynamics of the linkages and endogeneity between volume, returns and 
direct intervention at levels and variances.  
 This is a significant weakness not only because one cannot trace the complete 
set of linkages and feedback effects but also because the estimated parameters would 
tend to be less efficient than if a more complete four-variable GARCH model was used 
to capture the relationship between volumes, returns, direct intervention and interest 
rates.  Another weakness of the study by Kim and Sheen (2006) was that they only 
included policy interest rates as an exogenous variable in the separate policy reaction 
                                                 
41
  Chang (2005) have looked at the impact of central bank interventions on the relationship between 
volume and price volatility but only in the yen/US dollar futures market. 
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function of the central bank.  Modeling the effect of policy interest rates this way did 
not capture the inherent linkages and endogeneity between direct intervention and 
policy interest rates and indeed between policy interest rates, exchange rate returns and 
foreign exchange volumes (Chen, 2005). 
 
 The failure to look at the role volume plays in central bank policy effectiveness 
in the foreign exchange market in a fully integrated empirical framework is a huge 
lucuna in the literature since volume dynamics is central to the functioning of the 
market in terms of price dynamics and confidence.  We address this issue in the 
Icelandic foreign exchange market in the following sections. 
 
4.2 The Structure of the Icelandic Foreign Exchange Market and 
Central Bank Policy Interventions
42
 
 
 The current Icelandic foreign exchange market structure can trace its beginnings 
to May 28, 1993 when interbank trading in foreign currency began.  Prior to this the 
exchange rate was set by the Central Bank.  The main problem in the initial interbank 
market was that the market was only open for a short period during fixing meetings 
when market participants traded with each other and the exchange rate for that day was 
set.  As the market developed and as volume increased, the short period for trading 
became a major constraint and on July 1, 1997 the fixing meetings were discontinued 
and an active interbank market in foreign currency came into being which operated 
during the banks’ opening hours. This study covers the period after the beginning of this 
full time interbank foreign exchange market and covers the period January 7, 1999 to 
August 30, 2010. 
 
4.2.1 Volume and Exchange Rate Dynamics in the Icelandic Foreign Exchange 
 Market 
 
 The development and evolution of the Icelandic foreign exchange market is 
reflected in the changing volume dynamics in the market (See Figure 4.1).  As the 
market developed, market liquidity deepened and total traded volume increased 
consistently until the crash of the market in October 2008 when trading volume/liquidity 
declined drastically as agents’ risk aversion increased sharply.  Trading volume has 
                                                 
42
  This section is based largely on Isberg and Petursson 2003, Central Bank of Iceland, 2001 and various 
issues of the Central Bank of Iceland Monetary Bulletin. 
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remained relatively muted since then. The evolution of the market can also be evaluated 
in the context of the Central Banks’ share of trading volume. 
 
      Figure 4.1: Trading Volume in the Spot Foreign Exchange Market 
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This declined from a high of 89.2% in 1995 at the early stages of market development 
to 2.2% in 2001 as the market deepened considerably.  However, after the market 
turmoil in 2008, central bank volume rose to 66.4% of total volume as the bank again 
became the dominant player in the market as it sort to restore confidence and liquidity.   
 
 The evolution of the market was also reflected in exchange rate dynamics over 
the period under review. In the period January 7, 1999 to March 26, 2001, a full time 
interbank foreign exchange market operated under a crawling peg exchange rate regime 
and the market was characterised by the depreciation of the Krona.  This trend 
continued after the adoption of an inflation targeting regime (see shaded area in Figure 
4.2) and the floating of the Krona until the end of November 2001.  From December 
2001 the Krona entered a long period of gradual and consistent appreciation which 
came to an end in March 2006 when the credit rating of Iceland was downgraded.  The 
exchange rate recovered somewhat towards the end of 2006 but by the summer of 2007 
and the onset of the international financial crisis the depreciating trend accelerated 
again.  There was some improvement in the rate beginning in January 2009 but by the 
end of March 2009 the rate started depreciating again until January 2010 when the rate 
started appreciating gradually (See Figure 4.2).    
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    Figure 4.2: Exchange Rate Trends 
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4.2.2 Central Bank Policy Interventions and Trends in the Foreign Exchange 
Market  
 
 In the period 1993 to 2000, Central Bank policy was designed to allow the 
exchange rate to float with a band which was originally 2.25% which was later widened 
to 6% on September 6, 1995 and further to 9% on February 14, 2000. Subsequently on 
March 27, 2001, inflation targeting was adopted and the exchange rate was allowed to 
float without any specific constraints in terms of deviation bands.  This led to a sharp 
increase in trading volume and greater volatility in the exchange rate.  With the onset of 
the financial crisis, price volatility increased significantly and trading volume declined 
sharply in the last quarter of 2008.  In this environment, the Central Bank had to 
intervene and provide liquidity to the market resulting in its share of market volume 
increased to levels not seen since the early 1990s.  This episode of volatility was 
different to the crisis which occurred in 2006 since trading volume
43
 and liquidity was 
not adversely affected then and price volatility was relatively short-lived.  In the most 
recent episode, trading volume declined precipitously in late 2008 which amplified price 
volatility.  Volume dynamics therefore made a difference to the severity and length of 
the most recent crisis. 
 
                                                 
43
  Trading had been executed in US dollars but this changed to Euros on December 1, 2006. 
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 The factors affecting trading include expectations about exchange rate 
developments, market makers foreign currency balances (i.e whether they have short or 
long positions on their trading books), foreign exchange margin requirements, new 
economic information such as news of changes in economic policy and, central bank 
intervention.  Interbank trading in foreign currency affects all traders’ foreign currency 
holdings but changes in the exchange rate generated by this trading activity also affects 
the value of these holding and can result in further trading to get to their desired 
position.  Trading volume and exchange rates therefore tend to exhibit bi-directional 
causality, reinforcing the importance of trading and trading volume to the functioning of 
the market.  Based on transactions in the market, the exchange rate is fixed by the 
central bank between 10.45 and 11.00 am on each trading day.  This feature of the 
market means that the daily trading volumes and price changes over the entire trading 
day is not synchronized which could cause problems if one was interested in analyzing 
the relationship between volumes and prices over the trading day.    
 
 The Icelandic foreign exchange market is still relatively illiquid and there are a 
few agents in the market.  In these conditions a major player or trade can exert a 
disproportionate response in the market both in terms of price and volume.  In 
particular, it is easy in such markets for a negative spiral to form where the market is 
short (that is, where most agents in the market foreign currency liabilities exceed their 
foreign currency assets), inflows of foreign currencies are weak and agents expect the 
domestic currency to weaken.  In this environment, the purchase of foreign currency 
makes the market shorter and sets of a spate of buying as all agents try to close their 
positions and market makers raise their quotes sharply to reflect scarcity.  This surge in 
turnover and increased price volatility is a more frequent event in these markets relative 
to more liquid markets where the large numbers of agents and huge volumes minimizes 
these episodic disturbances in the market.  The ways in which these negative spirals can 
be stopped is by increased inflows into the market, usually easier if domestic interest 
rates are increasing relative to foreign rates.  Central bank intervention can also reverse 
this trend and, of course, if market fundamentals change, then market makers would be 
willing to take a countervailing position by selling foreign exchange expecting the rate 
to recover and make profits.    
 
 In terms of the interaction of policy instruments such as direct intervention and 
interest rates in the foreign exchange market, the transition to an inflation targeting 
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regime in March 2001 meant that the objectives for direct intervention had changed.  
With the new monetary framework the exchange rate was no longer an intermediate 
target for monetary policy since a formal inflation target was adopted as a nominal 
anchor for monetary policy. Intervention would not be used to target a particular rate 
but it was kept in reserve if exchange rate trends posed a threat to the inflation target or 
if exchange rate volatility threatened financial stability.  In effect, however, the need to 
lean against exchange rate trends meant that intervention was used to target exchange 
rate trends and as such the central bank had to coordinate the timing of policy 
implementation to avoid policy conflicts that frustrated the achievement of the inflation 
target.  In this context, intervention and policy interest rates were still inextricably 
linked. Once intervention operations were in tune with inflation expectations, 
intervention and monetary policy would have target consistency which would help 
bolster the credibility of the inflation target and increase the effectiveness of both policy 
instruments.  
 
 Over the period 2001 to 2010, there have been periods where direct intervention 
and policy interest rate appeared to be coordinated in the foreign exchange market, 
depending on conditions in the market such as exchange rate and trading volume 
dynamics, as well as general economic conditions such as economic growth and 
inflation.  This period has also been witness to episodes when these policy instruments 
did not appear to be coordinated which usually coincided with periods when there was 
no target consistency and direct intervention was deployed to objectives that moved the 
country away from inflation targets. These policy instruments deployed in the foreign 
exchange market are coordinated if a tightening of monetary policy in the form of rising 
interest rates are accompanied by intervention sales of foreign currency (purchase of 
domestic currency instruments), which has a similar effect since it takes domestic 
liquidity out of the system.  Conversely, purchases of foreign currency should be 
accompanied by falling interest rates.   
 
 The year 2001 was characterized by intervention sales of foreign currency to 
counter increased exchange rate volatility and a depreciating trend in the context of 
huge swings in trading volume in the wake of the move to an inflation targeting regime.  
Interest rates were also maintained at high levels and increased towards the end of the 
year in an attempt to bolster the exchange rate.  This was followed by a period from 
January to August, 2002 when the exchange rate had stabilized and was on an 
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appreciating trend and volume was stable.  In this environment there was no direct 
Central Bank intervention in the market and the policy rate was lowered in line with 
inflation expectations.  The period covering September 2002 to April 2004 was 
characterized by exchange rate stability and increasing volume as the market developed. 
The Central Bank generally purchased foreign exchange during this period to bolster 
reserves and policy rates were lowered as inflationary pressures were subdued.   
 
 From May 2004 to March 2006, the exchange rate was either stable or on an 
appreciating trend with increasing trading volumes and liquidity.  In these market 
conditions the Central Bank continued its purchases of foreign exchange, however, due 
to rising inflationary pressures from an overheating economy policy interest rates were 
raised.  The period April 2006 to March 2008 was characterized by increased exchange 
rate volatility and a depreciating trend
44
 but the Central Bank continued its purchases of 
foreign exchange which seem to be predicated on the fact that market volumes were still 
very strong
45
.  Interest rates were raised in this period not only to counter inflationary 
pressures but also to bolster the exchange rate.   
 
 For the period April 2008 to September 2008, the market was characterized by 
high exchange rate volatility and exchange rate depreciation driven by the unfolding 
international financial crisis and the unwinding of domestic imbalances.   In spite of 
these problems, trading volume in the market remained relatively high on average but 
there was a noticeable increase in the volatility of volumes.  In this environment, the 
Central Bank did not intervene directly in the market but kept policy interest rates high 
to bolster the exchange rate and counter inflationary pressures.  
 
 With the collapse of Lehman Brothers the international financial crisis worsened 
considerably. The following period from October 2008 to March 2009 was therefore 
characterized by the intensification of exchange rate volatility, the depreciation of the 
currency and the drying up of liquidity in the foreign exchange market.  The collapse of 
                                                 
44
  In March 2006 a number of reports critical of the Icelandic banking system was published and the 
credit rating of Iceland was downgraded which resulted in a rapid depreciation of the Krona until July 
2006.  The exchange rate had recovered somewhat by mid 2007 but with the onset of the international 
financial crisis in the summer of 2007, the depreciation trend started again and the currency only started 
to recoup some of its value in December 2009.   
45
  This seems to be borne out by the fact that it only started intervention sales of foreign currency to 
bolster the exchange rate when foreign exchange volume dropped precipitously in October 2008. This 
gives credence to the view that trading volume trends were important as a target for policy and must be 
included in the Central Bank policy reaction function.  
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the banking system at the beginning of October 2008 resulted in the closure of the inter-
bank foreign exchange market for the period October 4-14, 2008.  When the market 
reopened on October 15, 2008 the Central Bank issued guideline that effectively 
restricted the trading of foreign exchange.  The Central Bank subsequently issued 
capital controls to manage the crisis in the foreign exchange market.  The Central Bank 
also responded with intervention sales of foreign currency to control volatility, counter 
depreciation and to increase trading volume and liquidity.  This was accompanied by 
increases in Central Bank policy interest rates to back up its intervention operations.   
 
 During the period April to November 2009 these market conditions persisted but 
the Central Bank started to cut its policy interest rates in April 2009 as inflationary 
pressures eased.  The period running from December 2009 to December 2010 was 
characterized by low trading volume with the exchange rate regaining some of its lost 
value and exchange rate volatility down.  Policy interest rates also declined over this 
period as inflationary pressures eased.  There was no Central Bank direct intervention 
operations in the market between December 2009 and July 2010 but intervention 
purchases began again in August 2010, ostensibly to start building up reserves again.  
The period from October 15, 2008 is therefore an entirely different regime characterized 
by restrictions on trading in the foreign exchange market.   
 
 The Central Bank interest rate policy and direct intervention strategy in the 
foreign exchange market was therefore mostly consistent.  Nevertheless, between May 
2004 and March 2008 the stance of these two policy instruments was somewhat 
contradictory with intervention purchases of foreign exchange (expansionary) used 
together with increased policy interest rate (contractionary) since direct intervention 
objectives in the foreign exchange markets was not consistent with policy interest rates’ 
target for inflation.  A similar situation occurred in the period April to November 2009 
for the same reasons but on that occasion intervention sales were deployed together with 
cuts in the policy interest rate.  Outside of these periods, however, there was target 
consistency between the two policy instruments (See Figure 4.3). 
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  Figure 4.3: Central Bank Intervention and Policy Interest Rates 
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 The experience also suggests that the Central Bank made policy decisions based 
on the volume dynamics in the market.  In particular, if trading volume was buoyant and 
relatively stable they would tend to be unwilling to intervene even if there was an 
increase in price volatility.  If volume volatility did not accompany price volatility the 
Central Bank would be more inclined to believe that it was a non-fundamental 
temporary factors driving development and therefore there was no need to intervene. 
 
 Very importantly, there appears to be three clear regimes that are included in the 
period under study.  The first period running from 1999 to 2001 is essentially a crawling 
peg type arrangement where the Central Bank attempted to keep the exchange rate 
within some predetermined band.  The period from 2001 to 2008 represented a period of 
floating exchange rates where the Central Bank used inflation targeting as its policy 
regime. A noteworthy fact though is that over this period there are two distinct 
exchange rate regimes, the first part of this period (March 29, 2001 to January 6, 2006) 
saw a regime where the exchange rate was appreciating while the latter part of the 
period (January 9, 2006 to October 3, 2008) the exchange rate was generally 
depreciating.  The last period running from 2008 to 2010 represents a period where the 
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Central Bank had to take extraordinary policy measure - the imposition of capital 
controls to deal with the crisis in the foreign exchange market. In this context, the 
relationship between policy initiatives and price and volume dynamics in the foreign 
exchange market is therefore likely to change across policy regimes and this is one 
aspect that is investigated in the empirical analysis.  
 
4.3 Data, Empirical Methodology and Estimation Results 
 
4.3.1 Data 
 
 We utilize daily data on trading volume in the Icelandic foreign exchange 
market, exchange rate returns, central bank intervention in the market and policy 
interest rates.  Daily data is more appropriate in today’s policy environment given the 
ample evidence that exchange rates reacts to new information and policy interventions 
very quickly, even on an intra-daily basis. Additionally, the paper utilizes the most 
recently released data on intervention in the foreign exchange market by the Central 
Bank of Iceland covering the period from January 7, 1999 to August 30, 2010.  During 
this period the exchange rate system evolved from a crewing peg system to a floating 
exchange rate regime and finally to the period after the financial crisis in 2008 which 
was characterized by the imposition of capital controls and heavy central bank selling of 
foreign exchange to provide liquidity to the market. The data set covered by this study 
includes 2892 data points after holidays and other non-trading periods were eliminated. 
Moreover, since as outlined above the full sample includes three distinct exchange rate 
regimes, the sample is split into three sub-samples with the first spanning the period 
January 7, 1999 to March 26, 2001, the second from March 27, 2001 to October 3, 2008 
and the final period running from October 15, 2008 to August 30, 2010.  This is done to 
determine whether the relationships between the variables included in the model 
changes over time as market and policy regimes change. 
 
 Trading volume is taken as the total daily value of all spot trade on the Icelandic 
interbank foreign exchange market measured in millions of Kronas sourced from the 
Central Bank of Iceland. This is an improvement on previous studies (Kim and Sheen, 
2006; Hartmann, 1999) which all used measure of trading volume which did not capture 
the full extent of trading volume in the market.  The vast majority of foreign exchange 
spot trades took place in US dollars before December 1, 2006 but changed to Euros after 
that date.  In the context of the mixture of distribution hypothesis, unexpected trading 
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volume is the component of volume expected to impact significantly on future price 
dynamics since market agents have already factored in expected volume and this 
information is already embedded in current prices.  Similarly, only unexpected volume 
is expected to impact on central banks' intervention decisions because again unexpected 
volumes represents in the MDH context, the arrival of new information and the presence 
of informed traders in the market which the central bank will have to respond to if it is 
to affect market dynamics. The general practice in the literature is to generate 
unexpected volumes using ARIMA modeling (Hartmann, 1999; Jorion, 1996; Bjonnes 
et. al., 2005) and we follow this approach in this study.  The stationarity properties of 
the volume series was examined and then using standard Box Jenkins tests it was found 
that an ARIMA (3,1,1) specification performed best.  The residual from this model was 
then used as the unexpected volume measure in the estimation of the empirical model 
(See Figure 4.4 below).     
 
 Intervention is defined as daily sales (negative) and purchases (positive) of 
foreign currency by the Central Bank of Iceland in millions of Kronas.  Exchange rate 
returns are used in the estimated models as is standard practice in the literature and is 
defined as )/log(*100 1 ttt ererER  where ter denotes the number of units of the local 
currency per unit of foreign currency. The exchange rate data available from the Central 
Bank of Iceland is flawed since the average rate is measured at 11am based on bid/ask 
prices up to that time.  This is problematic since trading activity takes place the whole 
day while the market is open and not only up to 11am, leading to a situation where the 
average exchange rate does not adequately reflect trading volume dynamics for the 
entire day.  To circumvent this problem we used the opening Reuters exchange rate 
instead. 
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    Figure 4.4: Unexpected Trading Volume 
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 To reflect that fact that most trades changed from US dollar to Euros on 
December 1, 2006, the exchange rate series used is the Reuters opening US/Krona 
dollar exchange rate up to this date and the opening Reuters Euro/Krona exchange rate 
thereafter.  To avoid a similar large jump in exchange rate returns on this date we follow 
Bjonnes et. al. (2005) and adjust the exchange rate on December 1, 2006 by the 
USD/Euro rate on that day.  The exchange rate return series used in the multivariate 
GARCH estimation is detailed below in Figure 4.5.  
 
 Policy interest rate changes are as used as proxies for monetary policy initiatives 
instead of monetary aggregates in this study
46
. Policy interest rate changes are defined 
as )rr/rrlog(RR 1ttt  where trr denotes the annualized policy interest rate. The 
annualized rate used is the Overnight Interbank Rate.  The primary policy interest rate 
in Iceland is the Collateral loan Rate but the Overnight Interbank Rate is used since it is 
available for the entire period and it is highly correlated with the Collateral loan Rate.  
The policy interest rate changes series is shown below in Figure 4.6. 
                                                 
46
  This is increasingly the practice in empirical studies since monetary aggregates contain elements which 
are positively correlated with interest rates.  This would be an inappropriate proxy for monetary policy 
analysis based on a monetary model since monetary models are driven by liquidity effects which predicts 
that monetary aggregates would be negatively related to interest rates (Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992).   
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          Figure 4.5: Exchange Rate Returns 
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          Figure 4.6: Policy interest Rate Changes 
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 Table 4.1 presents some summary statistics on exchange rate changes, 
intervention and interest rate changes for Iceland.  These series exhibit many of the 
usual properties of financial time series.  They are generally non-normal, leptokurtic and 
serially correlated.   
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Statistic Exchange 
Rate Returns 
Intervention Interest Rate 
Changes 
Unexpected 
Volume 
     
 Mean 0.0273 12.8133 -0.0001 -0.0011 
 Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0983 
 Maximum 27.7178 5756.1000 1.5195 6.2031 
 Minimum -11.9732 -4017.0900 -1.5412 -10.3515 
 Std. Dev. 0.9880 337.3516 0.1023 1.2932 
 Skewness 7.1495 -2.4685 0.2015 -1.5478 
 Kurtosis 227.6414 88.5092 59.9600 12.7823 
     
 Jarque-Bera 6099189.0000 883094.9000 390568.7000 12672.4900 
 Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 2889.0000 2889.0000 2889.0000 2889.0000 
 
 Some of the other data elements used in the study include central banks profits, 
foreign interest rates and the variance of exchange rate returns.  The variance of 
exchange rate returns is the series generated from the GARCH estimation below while 
the daily Federal Funds Rate was used as the representative foreign interest rate.  In 
terms of central bank profits, it is virtually impossible to get information on central bank 
profitability, particularly at a high frequency.  To compute a daily series on central bank 
profitability we exploit the information on actual daily central bank intervention as done 
in previous studies (Leahy, 1995; Neely, 1998; Kim and Sheen, 2002; Kim and Sheen, 
2006). Profits from central bank intervention is made up of essentially two components, 
profit and losses from trading and net interest income from reserves obtained through 
trading (Edison, 1993).  Profits from trading is determined by the difference between 
the value of intervention measured as the exchange rate at the end of the period and the 
exchange rate on the date the intervention was effected while net interest income is 
determined by additional interest earned from holding the intervention currency rather 
than domestic currency, that is the interest differential between the two currencies.  
Thus cumulative central bank intervention profits for Iceland can be measured by the 
following equation: 
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where CP is cumulative profits measured from m periods in the past, I is daily 
intervention, ER is the spot exchange rate, USi  is the foreign interest rate and ICEi  is the 
domestic interest rate
47
.  The evolution of cumulative profits from central bank 
interventions is detailed in Figure 4.7 below. 
 
   Figure 4.7: Central Bank Cumulative Profits from Intervention 
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4.3.2 Empirical Methodology Multivariate VAR-GARCH   
 
 The empirical methodologies which have been used in previous studies to 
capture the relationship between central bank policy initiatives and dynamics in the 
foreign exchange market include bivariate VAR (Lewis, 1995), structural VAR (Kim, 
2003), simulated GMM (Kearns and Rigobon, 2005) and bivariate GARCH (Kim and 
Sheen, 2006).  These studies however all suffer from a variety of weaknesses inherent in 
the empirical methodology used.   
 
 The VAR methodology used in Lewis (1995) and Kim (2003) is suitable for 
studying the interaction of variables that are endogenous. Lewis (1995) used two 
bivariate VARs, one with monetary policy and exchange rate and, another with 
intervention in the foreign exchange market and exchange rates using daily data to study 
these links.  This is an imperfect arrangement because the full range of interactions 
cannot be studied without a higher order VAR.  Kim (2003) solved this problem by 
                                                 
47
  See Kim and Sheen (2002) for a detailed discussion on the pros and cons of this profitability measure. 
 100 
using the structural VAR approach but the use of monthly data and the validity of the 
identifying restrictions weaken the validity of his results.   
 
 Kearns and Rigobon (2005) utilizes daily data and simulated GMM in a multi-
equation framework to study the impact of intervention on exchange rates, whether the 
central bank reacts to exchange rate developments in the formulation of policy (and 
therefore the problem of endogeneity) and the how monetary policy initiatives affects 
these relationships.  Their innovation was to use a change in intervention policy to solve 
the problem of identification in a situation where the issue of endogeneity of the 
contemporaneous relationship between intervention and exchange rates was a serious 
problem. The weakness of this approach is that the identification scheme is very specific 
to the two markets studied and therefore its applicability to other markets is 
questionable.  The study is also dependent on the assumption that the change in 
intervention policy is truly exogenous and not dependent on the exchange rate dynamics 
which is questionable given that intervention and therefore intervention policy has been 
shown to react to exchange rate dynamics.  This approach also assumes that most 
parameters of the model is stable across the change in intervention policy which is also 
questionable given that the change was made to improve intervention’s effectiveness, 
that is, to make the coefficient measuring the impact of intervention on exchange rates 
larger and/or statistically significant relative to what it was before the change in 
intervention policy.  
 
 Moreover, all these study focused on the first moment ignoring the variance and 
therefore the impact of policy on the volatility of the exchange rate.  This is a major 
weakness of these approaches given that central bank policy is increasingly targeting 
volatility rather than a particular exchange rate.  The empirical methodology must 
therefore be able to measure the impact of policy on the volatility of the exchange rate 
to be useful in a policy context. 
 
 Kim and Sheen (2006) employed a bivariate GARCH framework to study the 
links between exchange rate changes, volumes and the Bank of Japan’s intervention in 
the foreign exchange market using daily data.  This allowed them to look at these issues 
in a joint framework both at the level and variance of exchange rate returns and dealt 
with a number of weaknesses of previous studies.  They used separate mean equations 
for exchange rate changes and volume with intervention treated as an exogenous 
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variable.  This approach represented a step forward because it was a joint framework 
which addressed the links and feedback effects between volumes and direct intervention 
on exchange rate dynamics both at the level of returns and variance.  However, by not 
including separate mean equations for the central bank’s policy reaction functions for 
direct intervention and interest rate policy in the multivariate GARCH framework and 
instead modeling these policy instruments as exogenous, represented a significant flaw 
in the approach.  This specification was not appropriate since the literature on policy 
reaction functions have found that policy makers respond to developments in the market 
and these policy instruments must therefore be specified as endogenous. Kim and Sheen 
(2006) tried to address this weakness by modeling central bank interventions as driven 
by a number of variables including exchange rate and volume dynamics but in a 
separate friction model.  Very importantly also, they did not include a policy reaction 
function for interest rate policy.  By not treating with this issue explicitly in the 
multivariate GARCH framework, their estimates were not as efficient as they could be 
and, it did not allow them to explore the full set of links and feedback effects between 
exchange rate changes, volume, direct intervention and interest rate policy changes in 
the foreign exchange market.      
 
 To address these weaknesses we extend this approach by using a four variable 
multivariate GARCH framework to study the links and feedback effects between 
monetary policy, intervention in the foreign exchange market, volume in the market and 
exchange rate dynamics. This framework allows us to look at the impact of intervention 
on exchange rate, the impact of monetary policy on exchange rates the links between 
the two policy instruments in particular whether central banks signal monetary policy 
with its intervention operations in the foreign exchange market and whether the central 
banks leans against the wind with respect to exchange rate dynamics.  It also allows us 
to look at how volume dynamics impacts on the effectiveness of policy from a market 
microstructure perspective. Additionally, it can allow one to look at how policy 
instruments interact and therefore shed some light on the costs and policy conflicts 
associated with unsynchronized implementation of related policy instruments over time. 
  
 The mean equation formulation for the multivariate GARCH used in this chapter 
can be more explicitly represented by the following four equations which outline the 
relationship among the variables of interest, that is, exchange rate returns (ER), 
intervention (I), policy interest rate changes (RR) and unexpected volume (UV):  
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 In this framework FFR  is the change in the Federal Funds Rate which is used 
as a proxy for foreign interest rate, CP  is the change in cumulative central bank 
profits and 11H  is the variance of exchange rate returns.  A number of dummy 
variables are also used to capture the possible impact of differential market conditions 
on variables of interest.  In particular, dumev  is a dummy variable which takes on the 
value of positive (negative) 1 when exchange rate returns experience positive (negative) 
change by more than two standard deviation outside the mean and 0 otherwise. Also, 
dumert  is a dummy that takes on the value 1 when exchange return trends are positive 
(depreciation), -1 when exchange rate returns are negative (appreciation) and 0 
otherwise.  Finally, dums is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 for 
intervention purchases and -1 for intervention sales of foreign currency that are large 
(that is, more than 200 million Kronas) respectively and, 0 otherwise while dumc  is a 
dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if there are interventions in the same direction 
on two consecutive days and 0 otherwise.   
 
 Coefficients with important policy implications include 12  and 13  which 
measure the impact of intervention and monetary policy (interest rates) respectively on 
exchange rates.  These two coefficients a priori are expected to be positive and negative 
 103 
respectively if they are effective as intervention sales (negative) of foreign exchange by 
the Central Bank of Iceland and increased domestic interest rates (positive) are expected 
to lead to an appreciation (negative) of the Krona. Additionally, 21  measures the 
tendency of central bank interventions to lean against the wind and if this tendency is at 
play then the coefficient should be negative while a positive 32  would indicate that 
intervention signals monetary policy.   
 
 Very importantly, 42 if positive indicates that central bank intervention 
precipitates increased unexpected volume and therefore increases disorderly market 
conditions while a negative sign indicates that intervention calms the market by 
lowering unexpected volumes, possibly by driving more speculative traders out of the 
market.  On the other hand, 24 measures the way central bank intervention activity 
responds to unexpected volumes.  If negative it indicates that the central bank reduces it 
intervention activities to stabilize trading volume but if it is positive it may indicate that 
the central bank has increased its intervention activity, possibly to counter informed 
traders in the market, whose presence is normally associated with an increase in 
unexpected volumes in the MDH framework and who may be driving an undesirable 
trend. These coefficients can lead to some important new policy insights since it will let 
us know if central banks are responding to volume, as well as price signals and, whether 
central bank policy initiatives can work to control volume dynamics in the market.    
 
 The coefficient on central bank profitability should be negative when 
profitability is rising since the central bank would feel it has the resources to practice 
"leaning against the wind".  If it is positive when profitability is rising it indicates that 
the central bank is acting like a profit seeking dealer by riding the price trend. If 
profitability is falling the expected coefficient would still be negative since it may sell 
foreign exchange when the exchange rate is appreciating or buy foreign exchange when 
the exchange rate is depreciating to build profits and reserves.   
 
 As an example, the conditional variance equation for the first variable
48
 which 
shows how shocks and volatility are transmitted over time in each sector can be 
expanded as follows: 
 
                                                 
48
  The constant terms are excluded. 
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 In this framework t,11h is the conditional variance for the first variable (exchange 
rates) at time t , th ,12  is the conditional covariance between the first variable (exchange 
rates) and the second variable (intervention), t,13h is the conditional covariance between 
the first and third (interest rate) variables and th ,14 is the conditional covariance between 
the first and the forth (unexpected volume) variables.  The error term 2,1 t  measures 
deviations from the mean due to some unanticipated event in variable 1 (exchange rate 
returns) and cross error terms such as t,2t,1  measure the impact of shocks to variable 2 
(intervention) on variable 1 (exchange rate returns). The iia  coefficients measure the 
impact of shocks in variables under consideration on conditional variances (volatility) 
while the iib coefficients measure the impact of past variances on current variances, that 
is, volatility spillovers across time in the same variable, as well as volatility spillovers 
between variables. 
 
 The BFGS algorithm is used to obtain final estimates of the parameter with the 
variance-covariance matrix and corresponding Bollerslev-Woodridge (1992) standard 
errors which are heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent.   
 
 
4.3.3 Empirical Results  
 
 As discussed in section 4.2.1 there are in principle three distinct policy regimes 
over the period reviewed by this study.  Moreover, the second policy regime, that is, the 
inflation targeting regime can be divided further into a first sub-period when the 
exchange rate generally appreciated and a second sub-period when the exchange rate 
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generally depreciated.  Since the central banks and other agents in the market tend to 
respond differently depending on market conditions, the relationship between the policy 
variables and price and volume dynamics may be fundamentally different in these two 
periods and therefore these two sub-periods could be considered as two separate 
regimes. In this context, there could be three to four separate regimes over the full 
period covered by the study and this was examined empirically by estimating the model 
for the periods covered by the three major policy regimes and also for the two distinct 
market environment periods under the inflation targeting policy regime.  
 
 The fact that the results from the multivariate GARCH model for the full sample 
and the inflation targeting policy regime represent averages of the sub-periods contained 
in these samples means that coefficients estimated from these periods may not provide 
consistent or sensible results.  In fact, coefficients in different sub-samples may have 
opposite signs which make the relationship between the variables ambiguous when 
estimated over the longer periods.  Indeed, this was the case for the full sample, as well 
as the inflation targeting period as the coefficients estimated over the sub-samples often 
had different signs. In this context, I only discuss in detail the results for the four sub-
samples although the results for the full sample and the full inflation targeting regime 
are also presented.   
 
The First Period  
 
 The first period running from January 7, 1999 to March 27, 2001 was a period 
characterized by trading volume increasing from relatively low levels as private agents 
came to dominate the market and the central bank percentage of trading volume fell off.  
It was also a period where the exchange rate regime was based on a crawling peg 
system and the exchange rate was on a depreciating trend generally in the context of 
relatively low volumes where the central bank often intervened selling foreign exchange 
to boost liquidity and counter the depreciating trend in the rate.   
 
 The VAR-GARCH estimation results are detailed in Table 4.2 below.   For 
direct intervention in the market to be effective the coefficient 12  must be positive 
indicating that intervention sales of foreign exchange leads to appreciation in the 
exchange rate.  The estimated coefficient was -0.033 and insignificant but as argued in 
many studies this may be due to simultaneity bias and the fact that small or isolated 
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interventions may not be effective.  When we consider dummy variables for large and 
consistent interventions the picture changes as the coefficients for large interventions 
(interventions over 200 million Kronas) S12 , as well as that for consistent 
interventions (those that are in the same direction for two or more days) C12 are both 
positive and significant and therefore effective on those occasions when interventions 
were large and/or consistent.  Unexpected volume as captured by coefficient 14  also 
had a significant negative impact on exchange rate returns indicating that increased 
unexpected volume led to an appreciation in the rate.  This is to be expected in this 
period when much of the increases in unexpected volume were related to central bank 
intervention activity which from the results above appeared to have been successful.  
This appears to be corroborated by the fact that coefficient 41 was significantly 
positive indicating that a depreciating exchange rate (increasing rate) usually led to 
increased unexpected volume which again is most likely driven by central bank 
intervention sales to bolster the exchange rate.  Very interesting, neither the domestic 
policy interest rate nor the foreign interest rate had an effect on the exchange rate.  In all 
likelihood this result was due to the fact that during this period the interbank system in 
the foreign exchange and money markets were relatively under-developed and had little 
exposure to the international financial markets. 
 
 In terms of the policy reaction function for direct intervention in the foreign 
exchange market, it appears that the central bank was "leaning against the wind" of 
exchange rate trends during this period as evidenced by the fact that the coefficient 
21 was significantly negative (-0.008).  Paradoxically, the coefficient on the dummy 
for large changes in the exchange rate ( S21 ) was positive and significant suggesting 
that when exchange rate changes were very large the central bank "leaned with the 
wind" possibly because it felt that these changes were in the right direction and wanted 
to reinforce the trend. 
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Table 4.2: First Period Estimated Coefficients for the VAR-GARCH Model for Iceland  
 ER(i=1)  I(i=2)  RR(i=3)  UV(i=4)  ∆FFR ∆CP H11 
Mean Equations 
 
i1  
0.064 -0.033 0.009 -0.036
c
 0.002   
s12  
 0.323
a
      
c12  
 0.424
b
      
i2  
-0.008
a
 -0.349
a
 0.002 -0.009
a
 -0.003 -0.00002
a
  
s21  
0.135
a
       
s24  
   -0.008
a
    
s25  
     -0.000005
a
  
i3  
0.011 -0.009 -0.342  0.048   
i4  
0.277
a
 -0.180  0.018   -0.009 
Variance Equations 
 
i1a  
-0.633
b
 0.005 -0.079 -1.568
a
    
i2a  
-0.146 0.233
a
 -0.046 -0.746
a
    
i
a3  
-0.345 -0.002 0.218 1.736    
i
a4  
0.261 0.003
c
 -0.067 -0.085    
i1b  
-0.054 0.048
a
 0.011 -0.407
a
    
i2b  
-2.051
b
 6.136
a
 0.075 -2.130
c
    
ib3  
-0.305 0.139
a
 0.200 -2.498    
ib4  
-0.049 0.054
a
 -0.005 -0.006    
)10(LB  7.991 
(0.62) 
8.051 
(0.62) 
8.921 
(0.60) 
8.604 
(0.57) 
   
)10(LBs  6.008 
(0.81) 
1.682 
(0.99) 
11.880 
(0.29) 
13.185 
(0.21) 
   
LLR  -304.96       
Notes: )10(LB  and )10(LBs are the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for standardized and squared standardized 
residuals at lag 10 respectively and LLR  is the log likelihood. Values in square brackets are the 
probabilities for the Ljung-Box Q-statistics while a, b and c denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels respectively. The standard errors estimated are heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
consistent (Bollerslev-Woodridge, 1992). 
  
Also, significant and negative was the coefficient 24  which measures the 
impact of unexpected volumes on direct intervention activity, indicating that an increase 
in unexpected volumes generally led to a decline in intervention activity.  This result is 
reinforced by the fact that the coefficient of the dummy for exchange rate trends ( S24 ) 
was also significantly negative, indicating this result held irrespective of whether the 
exchange rate was depreciating or appreciating. Unexpectedly high volumes in this 
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context may signal episodic volatility and problems in the market and the central bank 
therefore scales back its trades which will tend to lower the unexpected component of 
volume.  This result may also indicate that the central bank may believe that 
interventions on days of especially high traded volume is less likely to be effective 
compared to days when traded volume is low because central bank volume is a more 
significant component of total volume on those days and its signal is therefore much 
stronger.  This means that the central bank is responding to volume in addition to price 
signals and vindicates the inclusion of the volume measure in the direct intervention 
policy reaction function of the central bank.  This is a fairly new result as only Kim and 
Sheen (2006) have looked at this issue for Japan and found similar results so this adds 
support to this relatively new finding of the importance of volume in the foreign 
exchange market generally and to central banks' decision to intervene in the market in 
particular.   
 
 The impact of the profitability of central bank interventions on the willingness to 
support the currency is a key challenge in developing markets where foreign exchange 
liquidity is generally on the low side and the central bank does not have large reserves.  
As indicated below, if 25  is negative it suggests that the central bank will be 
comfortable with practicing "leaning against the wind" behaviour but if positive it 
would suggest that the central bank is behaving like any other profit seeking dealer by 
riding on the exchange rate trend by buying the domestic currency (selling foreign 
currency) when its value is rising (appreciating) and selling the domestic currency 
(buying foreign exchange) when its value is falling (depreciating).  The coefficient 25  
is negative and significant indicating that the central bank was comfortable with selling 
foreign exchange to support the exchange rate in a period when the rate was generally 
on a depreciating trend since intervention profits were generally increasing in this 
period. Taken together these results from the mean equations present a cogent picture of 
the logical framework in which the central bank operated, the signals it responded to 
and the constraints it faced in its intervention activity in the Icelandic foreign exchange 
market.  
 
 This empirical framework also allows one to discern the impact of the market 
conditions and policy changes on volatility which is increasingly important to policy 
makers today since the results from the variance equations shed light on these issues.  
As described above the a  parameters measure the impact of shocks in variables on the 
 109 
conditional variance of all variables while the b  parameters measure the impact of past 
variances on current variances of all variables.  Shocks to unexpected volumes 
significantly reduced the variances of both exchange rate changes ( 14a ) and 
intervention ( 24a ) while shocks to intervention increased the variance of unexpected 
volumes ( 42a ).  It seems therefore that intervention was the genesis for volatility 
transmission in the system.  There was also significant positive volatility spillovers from 
intervention to exchange rates ( 12b ), interest rates ( 32b ) and unexpected volumes ( 42b ). 
Higher variance in unexpected volumes also lowered volatility in exchange rates ( 14b ) 
and intervention ( 24b ) reinforcing the results from the a  parameters above. These 
results highlight the central role of intervention as a catalyst for change in this system 
and also show the important role unexpected volume plays in the transmission of policy 
signals to the market and volatility transmission in the foreign exchange market.   
 
The Inflation Targeting Exchange Rate Appreciation Period 
 
 The inflation targeting regime with a generally appreciating exchange rate 
began effectively on March 27, 2001 and ended on January 6, 2006 when the credit 
rating of Iceland was downgraded and the Krona began a long depreciating trend.  This 
period was characterised by robust economic growth, generally rising domestic interest 
rates (a trend which escalated in 2004), a few large and many small purchasing 
interventions and rising liquidity in the foreign exchange market.   The estimated results 
for this period are detailed in Table 4.3 below.   
 
 The coefficient 14  was again significant and positive as in the first period but 
24  was now marginally significant and positive but the coefficient on the dummy 
variable S24 was still negative, indicating that increased unexpected volumes still led 
to a scaling back of central bank intervention activity.  Very importantly, the 
coefficients 12 , S12  and C12  were still positive but insignificant indicating that even 
large and consistent interventions did not have an impact on exchange rates.  This is not 
surprising since there were very few large interventions in this period and the central 
bank concentrated on making numerous small purchases of foreign exchange to boost 
foreign exchange reserves in a period when the central bank was relatively unconcerned 
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by developments in the foreign exchange market since the rate was appreciating and 
trading volume was on the rise.   
 
 
Table 4.3: Inflation Targeting Exchange Rate Appreciation Period Estimated 
Coefficients for the VAR-GARCH Model for Iceland  
 ER(i=1)  I(i=2)  RR(i=3)  UV(i=4)  ∆FFR ∆CP H11 
Mean Equations 
 
i1  
0.069 0.131 0.081 -0.073
a
 -0.142   
s12  
 0.023      
c12  
 0.079      
i2  
-0.002 1.114
a
 -0.003 0.001
c
 0.011
b
 -0.000001
b
  
s21  
0.003       
s24  
   -0.003
b
    
s25  
     -0.000002  
i3  
-0.009
b
 -0.059
a
 -0.184
a
  0.015   
i4  
0.017 -0.001  0.093
b
   -0.016 
Variance Equations 
 
i1a  
-0.247 -0.002
a
 0.015 -0.102    
i2a  
0.112 0.603
a
 0.008 0.088
a
    
i
a3  
0.193 -0.007
b
 0.840
a
 3.767
a
    
i
a4  
-0.041 -0.001 -0.077
a
 0.816
a
    
i1b  
-0.195
b
 -0.007
a
 -0.001 0.018    
i2b  
0.082 2.856
a
 -0.069
a
 0.031    
ib3  
0.012 0.025 0.110
a
 -0.269    
ib4  
-0.072
b
 0.008
c
 0.006 0.118
a
    
)10(LB  10.133 
(0.43) 
8.316 
(0.60) 
6.352 
(0.82) 
7.338 
(0.69) 
   
)10(LBs  15.159 
(0.13) 
13.090 
(0.21) 
15.914 
(0.13) 
12.987 
(0.22) 
   
LLR  -1008       
Notes: Same as Table 2. 
 
 The central bank also seemed to have abandoned its "leaning against the wind" 
behaviour in this environment since the coefficient 21  is now insignificant. Also of 
note is the fact that the central bank appears to have "leaned with the wind" for large 
exchange rate changes since the coefficient of the dummy for large exchange rate 
changes S21  is now positive and significant. In this period, there was some large 
purchasing of foreign exchange interventions made around a few instances when the 
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exchange rate depreciated indicating that the central bank may have wanted to promote 
this depreciating trend in an environment where the rate was generally appreciating in a 
situation where the economy may have been overheating.  The coefficient capturing the 
impact of exchange rate trends on interest rates 31  is also negative and significant 
indicating that as the exchange rate appreciated (falling rate) the interest rate generally 
rose which corroborates the "leaning with the wind" behaviour by the central bank 
captured by the coefficient S21 .  This may reflect the fact that in a period of a 
generally appreciating exchange rate driven by robust growth the central bank may have 
been purchasing foreign exchange to boost reserves but at the same time was trying to 
restrain inflationary pressures by raising policy interest rates for a significant part of the 
period.   
 
 The fact that the coefficient 32  is -0.059 and significant indicates that the 
central bank is signaling monetary policy with central bank intervention which 
characterizes the earlier part of the period when direct interventions by the central bank 
was consistent with its interest rate policy, that is, the policy interest rate was falling 
(loosing policy) and foreign exchange purchasing interventions (loosing policy by 
selling domestic currency) were made.  The fact that this coefficient is negative in a 
period where for most of the period (after 2003) interest rates were rising (tightening 
policy) and the central bank was intervening purchasing foreign exchange (loosing 
policy) and therefore central bank policy in the foreign exchange market appears to be 
inconsistent is most likely due to the fact that the central bank was purchasing foreign 
exchange more frequently, consistently and with larger interventions in the first part of 
the period (before 2003) when interest rates were falling.  
 
 In terms of the volatility transmission in the foreign exchange market, the 
coefficients 12a   and 32a  both significant at -0.002 and -0.007 respectively indicate that 
shocks to intervention reduces volatility in the exchange rate and interest rates.  
Intervention therefore seems to be able to temper volatility in the exchange rate 
although it was not effective in this period in affecting the trend of the rate.  The fact 
that intervention lowered the variance of interest rates also suggests that there is greater 
substitutability between these two policy instruments in this period relative to the first 
period.  The fact that the coefficient 43a  is negative and significant indicate that shocks 
to interest rates lowers volatility in unexpected volumes adding further evidence of the 
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apparent greater traction of interest rate policy in this period relative to the first.  
Additionally, shocks to unexpected volumes significantly increases the volatility of 
direct intervention ( 24a ) as well as interest rates ( 34a ) which suggest that these two 
policy instruments are indeed responding to signals from unexpected volumes.   
 
 The impact of past variances of variables in the VAR GARCH on each other 
also seems to corroborate these above results.  The coefficient 12b  is negative and 
significant indicating that volatility in intervention reduces volatility in exchange rates.  
The volatility in interest rates also appears to significantly reduce volatility in 
intervention, reinforcing the evidence of an apparent tradeoff between volatility of 
interest rates and intervention. An important result is that volatility in intervention 
activity increases volatility in unexpected volumes ( 42b ) which is consistent with the 
literature on the central bank as an informed trader in the foreign exchange market. In 
this framework, central bank trades (intervention) emit new information to the market 
which generates a cascade of trade (unexpected volume) from other agents in the 
market. Very interestingly, this does not seem to be accompanied by greater volatility in 
prices implying that the market is comfortable with the exchange rate trends being 
signaled by the central bank in its interventions in this period
49
.   Also of note is the fact 
that coefficient 41b  was significant and negative indicating that exchange rate volatility 
reduced volatility in unexpected volumes implying that agents in the market may 
withdraw whenever exchange rate volatility increased.  This is a very important result 
for the central bank because it highlights the need to monitor exchange rate volatility 
and unexpected volume especially in a developing market where liquidity may not be as 
deep and small volume changes may elicit huge swings in the exchange rate.  
 
The Inflation Targeting Exchange Rate Depreciation Period 
     
 This period was characterised by a depreciating exchange rate, high and/or 
rising interest rates, relatively high traded volume but with the central bank continuing a 
policy of only making small purchasing interventions to boost foreign exchange 
reserves.  The estimated results for this period are detailed in Table 4.4 below.   
 
                                                 
49
  The market would have been comfortable with an appreciating exchange rate in a period when the 
economy was growing strongly. 
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Table 4.4: Inflation Targeting Exchange Rate Depreciating Period Estimated 
Coefficients for the VAR-GARCH Model for Iceland  
 ER(i=1)  I(i=2)  RR(i=3)  UV(i=4)  ∆FFR ∆CP H11 
Mean Equations 
 
i1  
-0.040 1.143
b
 3.189 0.346
a
 0.179   
s12  
 3.698
a
      
c12  
 3.733
a
      
i2  
0.003 0.173 0.175 -0.005 -0.062
a
 0.00001
a
  
s21  
0.001       
s24  
   0.011
b
    
s25  
     -0.00002  
i3  
0.001
b
 -0.020 -0.083
c
  -0.009
b
   
i4  
0.009 0.430
b
  0.270
a
   0.003 
Variance Equations 
 
i1a  
0.039 0.001 -0.001 -0.013    
i2a  
1.831
c
 -0.171 -0.141
a
 -4.825
a
    
i
a3  
5.931
b
 -1.097
a
 0.782
a
 -3.116
a
    
i
a4  
-0.002 0.019 0.002 -0.274    
i1b  
0.358
b
 -0.010
a
 -0.002
a
 -0.099
a
    
i2b  
-2.031 -0.054 -0.076
a
 0.944    
ib3  
-4.371
a
 -0.330
b
 0.379
a
 -0.303    
ib4  
0.836
a
 0.001 0.001 0.455
a
    
)10(LB  12.801 
(0.23) 
18.642 
(0.10) 
11.489 
(0.25) 
14.898 
(0.13) 
   
)10(LBs  11.514 
(0.31) 
10.351 
(0.43) 
2.415 
(0.99) 
5.890 
(0.82) 
   
LLR  -989       
Notes: Same as Table 2. 
 
 In this environment it was not surprising that 12 , as well as S12  and C12 , 
the coefficients on the dummy for intervention size and consistency respectively were 
all positive and significant indicating that intervention purchases of foreign exchange 
led to a depreciation in the Krona.  This result is mostly coincidental since the central 
bank in this period was essentially making small purchasing intervention not geared to 
changing the trend but this inadvertently may have helped to reinforce the depreciating 
trend.  The coefficient 21  which measures the tendency of the central bank to lean 
against the wind was actually positive suggesting that the central was "leaning with the 
wind" but it was marginally insignificant.   
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 In this period the central bank seemed to focus more on using increases in the 
policy interest rate to deal with the economic challenges it faced.  This is borne out by 
the fact that the coefficient 31  was positive and significant indicating that exchange 
rate depreciation (positive exchange rate changes) generated increases in interest rates.  
The coefficient 34  is negative and significant reflecting the fact that the central bank 
was raising domestic policy rates as international rates were falling in an attempt to 
stem inflationary trends.  
 
 In terms of volume, increases in unexpected volume was positively associated 
with exchange rate depreciation ( 14 ) and intervention purchases ( S24 ).  This is as a 
result of the dominance of these trends in the foreign exchange market during this 
period.  Very interestingly the coefficient 25  is now positive and significant indicating 
that the central bank was operating more like a profit driven dealer riding the exchange 
rate trend.  This seems to be borne out by the fact that the central bank continued to 
make small purchases of foreign exchange as the exchange rate depreciated and this 
activity was associated with increases in unexpected volumes since 42  is positive and 
significant. 
 
 In terms of the volatility consequences of these relationships and policy 
implementation, there were some significant changes from the previous inflation 
targeting sub-period.  In particular, shocks to unexpected volume lowers the volatility of 
intervention and interest rates which implies that the central bank may be scaling back 
its policy interventions when there are unexpectedly large spikes in volume.  This is 
most likely due to the fact that spikes in unexpected volumes were now viewed as 
destabilizing and the central bank was aware that its policy interventions might 
accentuate these developments.  This is a plausible explanation since in this period there 
were many speculative inflows related to the carry trade phenomenon which was driven 
by the huge differentials between international interest rates and Icelandic interest rates 
so interest rate policy in particular may have been changed based on these shocks to 
unexpected volume.   
 
 Also of note is the fact that both 23a  and 32a  were negative and significant 
indicating that a shock to either one of the policy instruments lowered volatility in the 
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other suggesting some level of substitution between these two policy instruments.  Also, 
as already outlined, shocks to exchange rates in this period (large depreciations) was 
associated with increased volatility of interventions ( 21a ) and interest rates ( 31a ) 
mirroring the results from the mean equations where the central bank policy 
instruments, particularly interest rates, are responding to exchange rate developments. 
 
 In terms of the impact of past variance on current variances of variables in the 
VAR GARCH, 12b  and 13b  were both negative and significant indicating that the 
volatility of direct intervention and interest rates lowered the volatility of exchange 
rates. The fact that 31b  is also significantly negative suggests that there is some tradeoff 
between exchange rate and interest rate volatility.  It appears therefore that these policy 
instruments may not have been effective in changing the exchange rate trend but were 
able (especially interest rates) to reduce the volatility of the exchange rate during this 
period.  The fact that the coefficients 23b  and 32b  are both negative and significant 
suggests some substitutability between these two policy instruments.  Interestingly, the 
coefficient 41b  was positive and significant indicating that exchange rate volatility 
increased the volatility of unexpected volume but the coefficient 14b  was significantly 
negative implying volatility in unexpected volume lowered volatility in exchange rates. 
This could be reflecting the sequence of volatility spillovers in the foreign exchange 
market with exchange rate dynamics the trigger for volatility transmission in the foreign 
exchange market but with unexpected volume reflecting the second round actions of 
informed traders one of which was the central bank.  If the central bank dominated 
volume and was able to calm the market by its presence then volatility in unexpected 
volume would lower volatility in the exchange rate.   
 
The Last Period: The Post-Crisis Period 
 
 This period runs from October 15, 2008 to August 30, 2010, the end of the 
period under review.  This was the period after the failure of the major banks and the 
closure of the foreign exchange market.  The foreign exchange market re-opened but 
with restrictions on capital flow which in effect represented a different policy regime to 
the one that preceded the crisis.  This period was characterised by a sharp contraction in 
trading volume as agents retreated from the foreign exchange market and the associated 
low liquidity, an initial period of depreciation followed by the strengthening of the 
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currency and falling interest rates.  The estimated results for this period are detailed in 
Table 4.5 below. 
 
Table 4.5: last Period Estimated Coefficients for the VAR-GARCH Model for Iceland  
 ER(i=1)  I(i=2)  RR(i=3)  UV(i=4)  ∆FFR ∆CP H11 
Mean Equations 
 
i1  
0.119 1.330
a
 -2.061 -0.007 0.670   
s12  
 0.375
c
      
c12  
 -0.383      
i2  
-0.001 0.539
a
 0.231 0.0001 0.017 -0.00001  
s21  
0.011       
s24  
   0.0001    
s25  
     -0.00001  
i3  
-0.001
c
 0.0001  0.004 -0.155   
i4  
-0.069 -0.269  -0.055   -0.021 
Variance Equations 
 
i1a  
0.783
a
 0.001
b
 -0.0003 -0.021    
i2a  
-0.421
a
 0.897
a
 0.017
a
 -1.045
b
    
i
a3  
-1.886
b
 0.0007 0.626
a
 -16.335
a
    
i
a4  
0.014
c
 0.00004 0.007
a
 0.442
a
    
i1b  
0.590
a
 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.029    
i2b  
1.999
a
 0.638
a
 -0.0006 -1.663
b
    
ib3  
3.254 -0.644 0.529
b
 13.320    
ib4  
-0.055
a
 0.0004 -0.002
a
 0.171
b
    
)10(LB  16.787 
(0.07) 
12.991 
(0.27) 
9.911 
(0.44) 
15.878 
(0.10) 
   
)10(LBs  7.747 
(0.65) 
1.179 
(0.99) 
0.918 
(0.99) 
1.377 
(0.99) 
   
LLR  -243       
Notes: Same as Table 2. 
 
 In this environment central bank interventions appeared to have been effective 
as the coefficient 12  was positive and significant.  This is understandable given the 
conditions that prevailed in the market such as the fact that central bank sales of foreign 
exchange accounted for the lion's share of total volume in the market.  Moreover, the 
policy changes such as exchange controls reinforced the central bank dominance and 
influence in the market.  The fact that interventions were also mostly large sales of 
foreign exchange, consistent with the market expectations given market conditions and 
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unambiguous in terms of its objective all contributed to a strong policy signal from the 
central bank and bolstered the effectiveness of direct interventions.  
 
 In this period increases in policy interest rates was also used to support the 
exchange rate at least up until the end of April 2009.  Thereafter, interest rates were 
lowered as the exchange rate strengthened and inflationary pressures eased. It is 
therefore not surprising that the coefficient 13 was negative and significant indicating 
that increases in the interest rate led to a decrease in the exchange rate or an 
appreciation.  The fact that the coefficient 31 is very small but significantly negative 
reflects the fact that for some parts of this period the exchange rate depreciated (positive 
changes in the exchange rate) as interest rates were reduced since inflationary pressures 
were easing. This is situation that have developed at times when objectives in the 
foreign exchange market (to strengthen the exchange rate) conflicted with domestic 
policy objectives such as improving economic growth by making monetary policy more 
accommodating as inflation pressures eased.  Additionally, in this period unexpected 
volume had little or no impact since liquidity in the foreign exchange market had dried 
up and the supply of foreign exchange to the market by the central bank was 
predictable.   
 
 In terms of the volatility consequences of these developments, shocks to 
exchange rates reduced volatility in intervention ( 21a ) and interest rates ( 31a ) but 
increased volatility in unexpected trading volumes ( 41a ) reflecting the fact that 
adjustments were occurring through the exchange rate and trading volumes.  Shocks to 
intervention also increased volatility in the exchange rate ( 21a ) so the bolstering of the 
exchange rate may have been bought at the cost of increased exchange rate volatility.  
Shocks to interest rates also increased the volatility of unexpected volume so use of the 
two policy instrument seems to have achieved their objective with respect to stabilising 
the exchange rate trend but also contributed to volatility in the exchange rate and 
unexpected volumes.  This implies that although the central bank policy signals were 
clear, it took time for agents in the market to assimilate the signals into prices which 
contributed to short-run volatility in prices and trading volume.  It also may indicate that 
there was still a lot of heterogeneity among agents in the market with respect their 
exchange rate expectations which would not be surprising given the scale of the crisis 
and the level of risk aversion in the market in this period. Also noteworthy, was the fact 
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that shocks to unexpected volumes decreased the volatility in both policy instruments 
( 24a  and 34a ) which indicates that in the face of instability manifested in huge swings 
in unexpected volumes the central bank's policy implementation became more 
consistent, that is, policy changes were generally made in the same direction and there 
were fewer policy reversals.   
 
 In terms of the significant volatility spillovers from past variances, past 
volatility in exchange rates leads to increased volatility in intervention ( 21b ) but lower 
volatility in unexpected volumes ( 41b ), the latter result possibly reflecting the fact that 
volatility manifests itself in either unexpected volumes or exchange rate but in this 
period of low volume that was tightly controlled by the central bank most of the 
volatility in the market manifested itself in prices.  Past volatility in interest rates also 
led to lower volatility in unexpected volumes ( 43b ) as this period was characterised by 
greater use of the policy interest rate combined with a period when volume was tightly 
controlled.  Volatility in unexpected volume led to a reduction in the volatility of 
intervention ( 24b ), mirroring the results which implied that increased disorderliness in 
the market in the form of volatility in volumes led to adjustments in policy 
implementation to promote consistency.            
 
A Comparison of the Full Period to Sub-Period Empirical Results  
 
 As argued at the beginning of this chapter the distinct differences in policy 
regimes and market condition regimes across the full sample meant that the full sample 
results would be an average of the various sub-samples and therefore was not likely to 
yield sensible results in terms of picking up the different dynamics between the policy 
instruments and market conditions variables over time.  The discussion of the results 
above bear this out as there are several important instances where the effectiveness of 
policy instruments changed over time, as well as key relationships between the variables 
of interest. 
 
 The results for the full sample (see Table 4.6) indicate that intervention is only 
effective when it is relatively large and consistent.  This result hold in the first period 
but in the inflation targeting period (see Table 4.7) only consistent interventions were 
effective, that is C12  was significantly positive.  The results obtained when the 
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inflation targeting period was split into one sub-period when the exchange rate was 
appreciating and a second when it was depreciating revealed that not even large and 
consistent interventions were effective in the first sub-period while interventions were 
effective in the second sub-period.  The full inflation targeting period being an average 
of these two sub-samples generated less accurate results.  In the last period only large 
interventions were effective.  These results vindicate the decision to split the full period 
into different samples based on different policy and market conditions regimes.  It also 
demonstrated that interventions that were large and/or consistent tended to be more 
effective irrespective of the state of the market. 
 
Table 4.6: Full Sample Estimated Coefficients for the VAR-GARCH Model for Iceland  
 ER(i=1)  I(i=2)  RR(i=3)  UV(i=4)  ∆FFR ∆CP H11 
Mean Equations 
 
i1  
0.056
c
 -0.199 -0.005 -0.037
a
 -0.421   
s12  
 0.344
a
      
c12  
 0.304
c
      
i2  
-0.0001 0.986
a
 0.091
b
 0.001 -0.086
c
 0.00003
a
  
s21  
0.024
c
       
s24  
   0.001    
s25  
     0.0000001  
i3  
0.00002 -0.001 -0.148
a
  -0.007   
i4  
0.067 0.148
b
  0.119
a
   0.001 
Variance Equations 
 
ia1  
0.966
a
 -0.009 -0.001 -0.050    
i2a  
-0.387
b
 0.745
a
 -0.001 -0.067
a
    
i
a3  
0.160 0.002 0.799
a
 0.064    
i
a4  
-0.001 0.001
c
 0.001 0.986
a
    
i
b1  
0.326
a
 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.048    
i2b  
-0.315
c
 1.758
a
 0.0003 0.295
c
    
ib3  
0.059 0.120
a
 0.590
a
 -0.106    
ib4  
0.009 -0.019
a
 -0.009 0.163
a
    
)10(LB  14.992 
(0.13) 
16.248 
(0.12) 
12.769 
(0.15) 
4.920 
(0.89) 
   
)10(LBs  0.811 
(0.99) 
0.386 
(0.99) 
0.516 
(0.99) 
12.461 
(0.25) 
   
LLR  -3896       
Notes: Same as Table 2. 
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Table 4.7: Inflation Targeting Period Estimated Coefficients for the VAR-GARCH 
Model for Iceland  
 ER(i=1)  I(i=2)  RR(i=3)  UV(i=4)  ∆FFR ∆CP H11 
Mean Equations 
 
i1  
-0.167 -0.013 -0.596
c
 0.001 0.008   
s12  
 -0.053      
c12  
 1.494
b
      
i2  
-0.001
c
 0.969
a
 0.033c -0.001 0.0001 0.000003
c
  
s21  
-0.001       
s24  
   0.003
a
    
s25  
     -0.0001  
i3  
0.0001 -0.003 -0.182
a
  -0.001   
i4  
0.006 0.174
c
 0.001  0.169
a
   
Variance Equations 
 
ia1  
0.471
a
 -0.001 0.001 0.034    
i2a  
0.018 -0.746
a
 -0.003 -0.262
c
    
i
a3  
-0.448 0.002 -0.989
a
 -0.193    
i
a4  
0.021 0.005 0.005 0.983
a
    
i
b1  
0.986
b
 0.003 0.001 -0.044    
i2b  
0.035 1.714
a
 -0.001 0.211    
ib3  
0.083 -0.035 -0.145
a
 -0.007    
ib4  
0.007 -0.006
a
 0.0003 0.176
b
    
)10(LB  4.981 
(0.94) 
8.197 
(0.63) 
7.298 
(0.68) 
13.139 
(0.21) 
   
)10(LBs  1.128 
(0.99) 
2.937 
(0.98) 
2.734 
(0.98) 
1.184 
(0.99) 
   
LLR  -1249       
Notes: Same as Table 2. 
 
 The coefficient 13  capturing the impact of policy interest rate changes on the 
exchange rate indicated that this instrument was not effective over the full period and 
the first period.  This coefficient for the full inflation targeting period on the other hand 
indicated it was effective. Separating the inflation targeting period into the two sub-
samples suggested that this instrument was only effective in the second sub-sample 
when policy rates rose significantly.  This instrument also appeared to be effective in 
the last period, especially initially when the central bank raised interest rates to 
unprecedented levels to stem the slide in the domestic currency. 
 
 
 121 
 
 In the very important area of the impact of unexpected trading volume on the 
exchange rate ( 14 ), it was found that unexpected volumes tended to lead to an 
appreciation of the exchange rate for the full sample ostensibly because much of the 
unexplained volumes was driven by central bank intervention activity.  This result held 
for the first period but the coefficient for the inflation targeting period was insignificant.  
The latter result was driven by the fact that this result only held for the first sub-sample 
of the inflation targeting period.  In fact, the second sub-sample result indicated that 
spikes in unexpected volume actually led to a depreciation of the exchange rate and this 
could be explained by the fact that in this period when the exchange rate was 
depreciating, the central bank continued to make small purchases of foreign exchange 
which reinforced the depreciating trend.  This coefficient was negative but insignificant 
in the last period due in large part to the fact trading volume dropped off sharply and 
because the central bank imposed tight controls on volume to deal with the crisis.      
 
 In terms of the impact of unexpected volume on central bank direct 
intervention in the foreign exchange market ( 24 ), although the coefficient for the full 
sample was insignificant the coefficient for the first period was negative and significant 
indicating that increases in unexpected volume led to the central bank scaling back its 
intervention activities in an attempt to bring volumes back to normal since it knows its 
interventions leads to a cascade of trading volume.  This may also reflect the fact that 
the central bank may feel that its interventions on days of very high volumes may not be 
as effective as day when volume is lower (Kim and Sheen, 2006).   
 
 The 24 coefficient for the full inflation targeting period was negative but 
insignificant, however, the coefficient of the dummy for exchange rate trends s24 was 
positive and significant which suggests that when the exchange rate was depreciating 
increases in unexpected volume led to the central bank to increasing its intervention 
activity and in this case acting like a profit seeking dealer which was riding the 
exchange rate trend by purchasing foreign exchange.  Further evidence is provided 
when one looks at the two sub-samples in the inflation targeting period.  For the period 
when the exchange rate generally appreciated, although the coefficient for unexpected 
volume was positive and significant when the dummy for exchange trend was factored 
in the impact was negative and significant.  On the other hand, in the depreciating 
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period the impact was positive and significant when the dummy for exchange rate trend 
is factored in.   
 
 The impact of the change in central bank profits on central bank intervention 
activity also seems to be different depending on the policy and market regime shifts 
over time.  As described above, if the coefficient is negative and significant it indicates 
that the central bank is comfortable with "leaning against the wind" since its 
profitability is on the increase but if positive it suggests that the central bank is acting 
like profit a profit seeking dealer.  The coefficient 25  is positive and significant for the 
full period and the inflation targeting period but is negative and significant for first 
period and insignificant for the last period suggesting that for most of the period under 
review the central bank was generally acting like a profit seeking dealer.  In the first 
period, profits from intervention were increasing so the central bank was comfortable 
with "leaning against the wind" of the depreciating exchange rate trend by selling 
foreign exchange.  
 
 In the inflation targeting period profits were decreasing but the central bank on 
most days was purchasing foreign exchange.  When this period is separated into 
appreciating and depreciating exchange rate sub-samples, 25  is negative and 
significant in the appreciating period but positive and significant in the depreciating 
period.   This means in the period when the rate was appreciating and profits falling 
(sometimes significantly in this period) the central bank was comfortable in purchasing 
foreign exchange because it leaned against the exchange rate trend and at the same time 
helped to bolster profits (selling domestic currency when its price was high).  Over the 
part of the period when the exchange rate was depreciating and profits was still falling 
the central bank may have felt that it was in no position to support the rate by selling 
foreign exchange since this would add to central bank losses in a situation where the 
profitability of central bank intervention was falling.  This may in part explain why the 
central bank did not act to support the exchange rate in the latter part of the inflation 
targeting period.  The coefficient 25  was negative but insignificant in the last period 
possibly because in this period the exchange rate first depreciated and then appreciated 
while profitability generally rose
50
.  
 
                                                 
50
  Separating the last period into appreciating and depreciating exchange rate sub-samples may have 
provided more clarity but these sub-samples may have been too small to yield consistent results.  
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 The impact of direct intervention on unexpected volume ( 42 ) is significantly 
positive for the full period, as well as for the inflation targeting period implying that 
central bank intervention generally increased unexpected volumes.  This is expected in 
the market microstructure literature in which the central bank is considered as an 
informed trader whose trades carry new information in the market.  When the central 
bank intervenes it generates a cascade of trades as other agents gradually incorporate 
this new information into prices leading to a spike in volume that is unexpected since 
the intervention was not pre-announced.  This coefficient was not significant in the first 
period, the last period and the sub-sample of the inflation targeting regime when the 
exchange rate was appreciating possibly because central bank intervention activity was 
more predictable in those periods. 
 
 In terms of the volatility transmission across different periods, shocks to 
different variables appeared to have relatively similar patterns of transmission across 
different variables.  In particular, the coefficients 21a and 24a  were both generally 
significantly negative while 42a  was generally positive but only significant in the first 
and the full samples.  Shocks to exchange rates and unexpected volumes therefore 
generally reduced volatility in intervention (more consistency) while shocks to 
intervention tended to increase volatility in unexpected volumes in keeping with the 
microstructure literature.   
 
 The slight difference in volatility transmission from shocks between sub-
periods relates to the importance of interest rates in the last period where shocks to 
exchange rates  and unexpected volumes significantly reduced volatility in interest rates 
(more consistency) while shocks to interest rates generally increased volatility in 
unexpected volumes.  This different result in the last period is driven by the increased 
use of the policy interest rate changes to manage the situation.  In this period also 
shocks to intervention increased exchange rate volatility while shocks to exchange rates 
tended to increase the volatility of unexpected volumes both of which is supported by 
the microstructure framework. 
 
 Volatility spillovers between variables were generally more mixed over sub-
periods with volatility in unexpected volumes reducing volatility in intervention ( 24b ) 
in the first and the last periods (more consistency). This coefficient is not significant 
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during the inflation targeting period possibly reflecting the lack of focus of direct 
interventions over this period.  Volatility in intervention also generally led to a decline 
of volatility in unexpected volumes ( 42b ), suggesting that central bank intervention 
activities may have been successful in smoothing volatility in trading volumes.   
 
 The coefficient 14b  was also generally negative and significant implying that 
volatility in unexpected volumes led to a decline in exchange rate volatility except in the 
last period when it led to an increase in exchange rate volatility.  This is contrary to the 
mixture of distribution hypothesis (MDH) were a common trigger is driving exchange 
rate and volume dynamics in which case this coefficient should be positive.  This again 
may reflect central bank intervention activity geared to promoting stability in exchange 
rate dynamics which drives much of the spikes in unexplained volume.  This seems to 
be corroborated by the coefficient 21b  which was significantly negative for the full 
sample and the first period but positive and significant for the last period.  These results 
imply that in response to volatility in the exchange rate the central bank intervention 
activity became more focused except in the last period when the volatility in 
intervention activity increased.  The latter result may simply be related to the magnitude 
of exchange rate changes in the start of the last period alongside massive selling 
interventions used to support the Krona.  
 
 lastly, the observation above that interest rate changes became more important 
in volatility transmission towards the end of the period consistent with more aggressive 
use of this instrument is borne out by the coefficients 13b  and 31b  which are both 
significantly negative suggesting that the central bank both respond to and try to control 
exchange rate volatility with policy interest rates.  The coefficient 23b  and 43b  are also 
negative and significant implying that volatility in interest rates lead to decreases in 
volatility in intervention and unexplained volumes, implying that interest rate policy is 
being used more intensively relative to direct intervention in the latter part of the 
inflation targeting period and during the last period. 
 
4.4 Summary        
 
 The results outlined above validate the importance of trading volume, especially 
unexpected volumes, in both triggering policy responses and in terms of its role in the 
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transmission of policy response to the market.  The separating out of the full period into 
sub-samples characterised by distinct policy and market conditions regimes was also 
validated as the effectiveness of policy instruments, the relationship between important 
market parameters and the transmission of volatility were in many cases different in the 
various sub-samples.  The utility of the VAR-GARCH methodology was also illustrated 
as we were able to track the impact of policy instruments, the policy reaction function of 
the central bank and the inherent endogeneity of the variables in the mean equation of 
the multivariate GARCH model, as well as the transmission of volatility from the 
variance equations. 
 
 The results indicate that unexpected volumes have a significant impact on the 
exchange rate, both at levels and variance.  Furthermore, the central bank takes 
unexpected volumes into account in its decisions not only to intervene but the nature of 
the intervention as well.  The central bank was also able to control the dynamics of 
unexpected volumes with its direct intervention activities, as well as with policy interest 
rate changes.  The state of the market and the policy regime was shown to be a 
significant determinant of the effectiveness of policy, validating the regime dependent 
approach taken in chapter 2.  The importance of volume dynamics is a relatively new 
result building on the work of Kim and Sheen (2006) for Japan.  These results 
demonstrate that the volume dynamics was important in Iceland over the period being 
studied and that volume dynamics were even more important in the lead up to the crisis 
in 2008 and in the post crisis period when liquidity in the market dried up.  This 
suggests also that volume dynamics are important irrespective of the size and 
sophistication of the market and that studies that attempt to measure the impact of 
central bank policy interventions in the foreign exchange market without incorporating 
volume dynamics are fundamentally misspecified. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
The results of most studies before 2000 on the effectiveness of direct 
intervention as a policy instrument have led to increasing skepticism about its 
usefulness in foreign exchange markets (Schultz, 2000). Recent studies that have 
utilised high frequency data on actual central bank intervention activity (purchases and 
sales of foreign exchange) in the foreign exchange market and the development of more 
appropriate empirical frameworks have, however, started to produce results which 
suggest that central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market might be effective 
after all depending on the state of the market, if its coordinated with monetary policy 
initiatives and if interventions were more consistent and/or significant.  In this context, 
this thesis has sought to investigate the effectiveness of central bank policy intervention 
in the foreign exchange market of a variety of developed and emerging economies using 
actual high frequency data on central bank intervention and more appropriate and 
comprehensive empirical methodologies.   
 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
 
Chapter 1 reviewed global trends in foreign exchange markets such as the rapid 
growth of turnover, the increasing complexity of market most notably in the 
heterogeneity of agents in the market and the growth of new instruments, as well as the 
vulnerability of these markets to external influences and shocks.  This chapter also 
looked at how the recent international financial crisis was transmitted through these 
markets, as well as the increased use and effectiveness of central bank direct 
intervention in the foreign exchange market to contain the crisis in so many countries.  
An implication of this development was that this instrument is likely to be used more 
intensely in the future and a better understanding of how this policy instrument operated 
in different countries and market conditions was critical to effectively dealing with 
some of the emerging financial challenges. This chapter also reviewed the literature on 
interventions to map how the empirical methodologies for measuring the effectiveness 
of direct intervention have improved over the years to determine the most appropriate 
 127 
framework to use to adequately capture the complex dynamics in the foreign exchange 
market in the context of direct central bank intervention in this market.   
 
Chapter 2 investigated the impact of direct central bank intervention (sales and 
purchases of foreign currency) on the mean and variance of exchange rate returns in the 
foreign exchange markets for three developing markets, namely Croatia, Iceland and 
Jamaica and one developed market, Australia, for comparative purposes. In particular, 
following Hamilton (1994) we assume exchange rate dynamics are captured by a first-
order Markov switching fixed transition probability (FTP) model where there are two 
regimes, one in which the market is characterized by stable conditions (liquidity trading 
state) with a relatively small mean and variance and another characterized by volatility 
(informed trading state) with relatively higher mean and variance.  We then extend this 
fixed transition model to a time varying transition (TVTP) model by making the 
probability of switching from one regime to the next depend on exogenous variables, in 
this case central bank interventions (Filardo, 1994; Diebold et al., 1994).  
 
We also innovate on previous studies using the Markov switching framework by 
including a policy interest rate as a control in the TVTP specification for monetary 
policy measures implemented around the same time as direct interventions and which 
can affect exchange rate dynamics. This control is also needed in cases where the direct 
intervention in the foreign exchange market may be partially sterilized as is often the 
case in developing and emerging markets. Additionally, we also look at the impact of 
intervention sales and purchases separately in our analysis, since in many regards they 
are different policy instruments.  We also compare the intervention dynamics in 
developing countries with that of a developed market. Australia is used as the developed 
market for comparative purposes because its market though developed is not a dominant 
international centre for foreign exchange trading.  Also, as with developing countries its 
market is dominated by the local dollar/US dollar trades.  Moreover, its intervention 
volumes though larger are still comparable in size to the developing market reviewed in 
this study. 
 
 The results of our attempt to measure the effectiveness of central bank 
intervention using various TVTP specifications have generated a number of conclusions 
that potentially have important implications for intervention policy in the foreign 
exchange markets.  The results show that there are two market conditions regimes, each 
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characterized mainly by their variances. We find that direct intervention does have an 
impact on the probability of switching between regimes in the developed market but 
having little or no effect in the developing markets reviewed. Direct intervention in the 
developed market is generally found to be stabilizing when implemented in the volatile 
regime but de-stabilizing when implemented in the tranquil regime.  We also find that 
intervention purchases and sales tend to have differential impacts since they are 
generally used to achieve different objectives.  
 
Monetary policy is also found to impact on the transition probabilities and the 
impact of monetary policy on exchange rate returns tend to overshadow direct 
intervention, especially in the developing countries under review.  In this group of 
countries, intervention practices such an infrequent interventions and partial sterilization 
of direct interventions may have led to monetary policy dominating direct intervention 
in the foreign exchange market.  Contrary to the predominant view therefore, Australia, 
a developed market, had more success using direct intervention relative to the 
developing countries surveyed.  The reason for this apparent anomaly seems to be that 
actual intervention practices such as having more frequent interventions and full and 
immediate sterilization of direct interventions to preserve its status as an independent 
policy instrument ensured its continued effectiveness in the foreign exchange market.   
 
In Chapter 3 we examine the links between direct intervention, interest rate 
policy and exchange rate dynamics in Australia and Japan in a joint trivariate VAR-
GARCH (1,1) framework using the BEKK parameterization. We study the Australian 
and Japanese foreign exchange markets to evaluate these issues since they are the 
largest developed markets in which central banks have intervened directly in the last 
decade.  Their experiences with direct intervention and interest rate policy initiatives in 
the foreign exchange market are therefore among the few on which we can gauge how 
effective these policy instruments are likely to be in other developed markets.  This is 
increasingly going to occupy the attention of these markets as major currencies come 
under pressure from the ongoing fallout from the international financial crisis. In this 
environment, central banks in these jurisdictions will have to manage their exchange 
rates more actively but would be constrained by the degree to which they can raise 
interest rates. The dynamic of the links and feedback effects between direct intervention 
and interest rate changes in these markets is therefore a critical policy issue which 
requires renewed attention using more appropriate research methodologies.   
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The study confirmed that the relationship of intervention to policy interest rates 
could generally be characterized by the “signaling” framework, in that direct 
interventions and interest rate policy were coordinated and consistent so that 
intervention sales of foreign exchange were usually backed up by subsequent increases 
in interest rates to reinforce the impact of the initial direct intervention.  The results also 
confirmed the results of many past studies that intervention is effective in Australia and 
Japan in the sense that it tends to move the level of exchange rate changes in the desired 
direction.  The study also confirmed that central banks generally intervened to “lean 
against the wind”. 
 
The results from the variance equations also added to our knowledge in the 
sense that it showed that shocks to these policy instruments were not associated with 
increased exchange rate volatility in the short term.  Indeed, quite to the contrary it 
showed that these policy instruments were generally successful in reducing exchange 
rate volatility in both countries, although Australia appeared to have greater success 
with direct intervention while Japan had more success with interest rate policy changes.  
Additionally, increased volatility in intervention (less consistency) had no negative 
consequences for Japan in terms of more volatile exchange rates since the volatility 
spillovers were negative but Australia paid significant indirect costs in terms of greater 
exchange rate volatility.  In the case of interest rate policy, indirect volatility spillovers 
from the policy instrument to exchange rate volatility was positive in both countries but 
Japan paid a much higher price relative to Australia.  Another noteworthy new insight 
from the results is that the lack of significant spillovers from exchange rate volatility to 
the volatility of direct intervention and interest rate changes also suggest that in both 
Australia and Japan the authorities was more concerned with countering undesirable 
trends in the exchange rate rather that dealing with excessive volatility.    
 
Finally, the evidence from the conditional correlations suggests that the links 
between the policy instruments were in large part due to the fact that both were driven 
by common factors.  In particular, both generally responded to exchange rate changes in 
the context of leaning against undesirable exchange rate trends. Additionally, this 
relationship was most clearly defined during periods of high exchange rate volatility 
when the policy interventions were large and the objective of policy interventions was 
very clear to agents in the market. 
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Given the observed correlation between trading volumes and prices, Chapter 4 
examined whether volume dynamics have a significant impact on the effectiveness of 
central bank policy instruments directed at changing the price dynamics in this market. 
It examined the links at levels and variance between volumes and returns in a 
developing market, the Icelandic foreign exchange market, and the effect that central 
bank policy such as direct intervention and interest rate policy have on this relationship 
in a four variable VAR GARCH framework.  Moreover, given that there appears to be 
distinct policy and market conditions regimes over the full period of the study which 
may mean that the significance as well as the nature of the relationship between policy 
and market conditions variables change over time, the VAR-GARCH model is 
estimated for four different periods. The first period was characterised by a crawling 
peg type exchange rate regime, the second an inflation targeting regime which was 
further divided into two sub-samples one characterised by exchange rate appreciation 
and the other in which exchange rate depreciation predominated and, a last period 
characterised by capital controls and the dominance of the central bank as market maker 
and the primary provider of liquidity to the foreign exchange market.   
 
The results validate the importance of trading volume, especially unexpected 
volumes, in both triggering policy responses and in terms of its role in the transmission 
of policy response to the market. The separating out of the full period into sub-samples 
characterised by distinct policy and market conditions regimes was also validated as the 
effectiveness of policy instruments, the relationship between important market 
parameters and the transmission of volatility were in many cases different in the various 
sub-samples, validating the regime dependent approach taken in chapter 2.  The results 
indicate that unexpected volumes have a significant impact on the exchange rate, both at 
levels and variance.  Furthermore, the central bank takes unexpected volumes into 
account in its decisions not only to intervene but in crafting the nature of the 
intervention as well.  The central bank was also able to control the dynamics of 
unexpected volumes with its direct intervention activities, as well as with policy interest 
rate changes.  
 
 These results demonstrate that the volume dynamics was important in Iceland 
over the period being studied and that volume dynamics were even more important in 
the lead up to the crisis in 2008 and in the post crisis period when liquidity in the market 
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dried up.  This adds to the evidence provided by Kim and Sheen (2006) of the 
importance of volume to the effectiveness of policy instruments in and the functioning 
of the foreign exchange markets.   This suggests that volume dynamics are important 
irrespective of the size and sophistication of the market and that studies that attempt to 
measure the impact of central bank policy interventions in the foreign exchange market 
without incorporating volume dynamics are fundamentally mis-specified. 
 
Contrary to the predominant view, the empirical results from this research shows 
that direct intervention is effective depending on the state of the market in which policy 
is being implemented, the size and consistency of policy instruments, the level of 
coordination between different policy instruments during central bank policy 
implementation in the foreign exchange market and the scale of the problem relative to 
the capacity of the central bank to intervene. It has also demonstrated that trading 
volume in this market is very important since it acts as a very important trigger for 
policy implementation and it is also central to the transmission mechanism for policy 
instruments, as well as to the transmission of volatility through the market.   
 
The results also indicate volatility dynamics is important in the market and 
therefore empirical methodologies that do not include analysis of variances are 
incomplete and flawed.  In particular, central banks not only respond to trends in 
exchange rates and volumes it considers to be undesirable but would often intervene if it 
feels that volatility in the market, whether in terms of prices or volumes or both, is too 
high.  The results also indicate that central bank policy instruments can be successfully 
deployed to dampen volatility in the market.    
 
The fact that previous studies would have found that these policy instruments 
were ineffective can be attributed in large part to the use of inappropriate proxies for 
central bank intervention and the fact that volume dynamics were not considered.  Most 
importantly, however, is the fact that these studies used empirical frameworks that did 
not incorporate volatility dynamics, non-linearity, endogeniety and regime dependency 
inherent in the area of central bank policy effectiveness in the foreign exchange market.  
This study, by correcting many of these deficiencies in terms of the use of high 
frequency data together with more appropriate and comprehensive empirical 
frameworks, has shown that central bank policy interventions, both direct interventions 
in terms of purchasing and selling of foreign exchange and policy interest rate changes, 
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can be effective, especially if implemented consistently and at the right time.  This is 
critically important in the present difficult international economic environment since 
central banks would in all likelihood have to intervene more frequently in the foreign 
exchange market to deal with lingering vulnerabilities which manifest themselves in 
episodic volatility in exchange rates and trading volume. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The VAR-GARCH models we consider have the following general form: 
 
 
t1tt XuX            (1) 
 
 
where tX  is a vector of variables of interest (exchange rates, direct intervention, policy 
interest rates and trading volumes in the foreign exchange market) at time t,   is a long 
term drift coefficient and t  is the error term at time t.  
 
The two most popular parameterization for multivariate GARCH models are the VECH 
(Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge, 1988) and BEKK (Engle and Kroner, 1995) and 
parameterization.  The VECH parameterization is characterized as: 
 
 
)()()(
1 1
0 jtjt
q
j
p
j
jjtjt vechAHvechBAHvech 
 

       (2)     
 
 
where ttt H 
2/1  iidt ~ N(0,1).    The notation vech (.) is a matrix operator 
which stacks the lower part of the symmetric matrix into a column vector and tH  is the 
conditional variance-covariance matrix.  0A  is a vector of constants capturing the 
unconditional variances and covariances while jB  and jA are matrices of parameters 
representing the GARCH process.  The major weaknesses of the VECH model include 
the number of parameters
51
 to be estimated and the fact that there is no guarantee that 
the covariance matrix will be positive semi-definite unless additional restrictions are 
imposed.  The latter property is necessary for the estimated variance to be greater than 
or equal to zero.  We therefore use the BEKK parameterization for the multivariate 
GARCH model estimated in this paper. 
                                                 
51
  For example in a trivariate model the number of parameters to be estimated for the variance equation 
would be 78. 
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The general form of the BEKK model is: 
 
 
BHBAACCH tttt  1       (3) 
 
 
The BEKK model is more tractable since it utilizes quadratic forms in such a way to 
ensure that matrix tH  will be positive semi-definite, without additional restrictions 
having to be imposed. This multivariate GARCH parameterization can significantly 
reduce the number of elements to be estimated in the variance equations.  The BEKK 
model still involves some heavy computations because of the number of matrix 
inversions which is required.  Also, because the BEKK parameterization uses a higher 
order polynomial representation which increases the non-linearity of the parameters, 
obtaining convergence may be difficult and time consuming.   
 
The individual elements of matrices A, B and C in the case of a three and four variables 
multivariate GARCH models are outlined below in equations 4 and 5 respectively: 
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where C is a 3x3 lower triangular matrix of unconditional variances and covariance, A is 
a 3x3 square matrix of parameters that show the correlation of conditional variances 
with past squared errors and B is a 3x3 matrix of parameters that measure the impact of 
past levels on current levels of conditional variances.   
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where C is a 4x4 lower triangular matrix of unconditional variances and covariance, A is 
a 4x4 square matrix of parameters that show the correlation of conditional variances 
with past squared errors and B is a 4x4 matrix of parameters that measure the impact of 
past levels on current levels of conditional variances.   
 
The parameters in A measure the impact of shocks in variables on the conditional 
variance of all variables while the parameters in B measure the volatility spillovers from 
variables under consideration. Assuming that the errors are normally distributed the 
following likelihood function is maximized: 
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where T  is the number of observations, N  is the number of variables in the model and 
  is the vector of parameters to be estimated.   
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